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Pref ace
In this dissertation I examine the relationship of
various concepts and theories of subjectivity to political
praxis.

Specifically this dissertation seeks to determine

which concept of subjectivity is most useful for grounding
an emancipatory feminist politics.

My central thesis is

that the postmodern feminist conception of subjectivity that
conceives the subject as performative is precisely the
conception of subjectivity most adequate to the project of
emancipatory politics.
Philosophy has long been concerned with the
relationship of theory and practice. By looking at the
relationship of theories of subjectivity to the practice of
emancipatory politics, this dissertation aims to advance our
understanding of this complex relationship.

Of particular

concern are the concepts of gender and patriarchy, concepts
basic to feminist theory.

Philosophers have traditionally

ignored gender in defining subjectivity, and have overlooked
patriarchy as a system of structural domination.

By

specifically examining the contribution that feminist theory
makes to our understanding of the relationship between
theories of subjectivity and political praxis, I hope to
contribute to an understanding of the role gender plays in

v

our conception of subjectivity and how this relates to an
emancipatory political praxis aimed at disengaging ourselves
from patriarchy.

(An assumption upon which this dissertation

is built is that patriarchy is indeed an oppressive system
from which liberation is necessary.

This assumption will

not be defended in the dissertation, although the legitimacy
of making such normative claims will be addressed.)
The structure of this dissertation is as follows.

In

Chapter One I offer a critical examination of certain key
elements in the thought of Karl Marx, the great theorist of
revolutionary social transformation.

Specifically, I

examine Marx's conception of human nature, the Marxian
account of the relationship between private property and
gender (drawing here primarily on Engels), and Marx's
conception of revolution.

In this chapter I am critical of

many aspects of Marxism, but I argue that Marxism and
postmodernism should not necessarily be seen--as they most
often are seen, especially by Marxists--as antithetical.
In Chapter Two I critically examine some basic tenets
of the thought of Sigmund Freud.

I examine Freud's

structural model of the mind, his discussion of female
sexuality and gender construction, and his metanarrative of
the development of civilization.

I argue that Freud offers

a useful critique of Enlightenment rationalism, and that his
complex and multidetermined model of the mind is important,
including his theory of the unconscious.
vi

Ultimately,

however, I am highly critical of Freud's ideas about female
sexuality and gender, and conclude that Freud remains
complicit with patriarchy throughout his work.
In Chapter Three I begin an explicit discussion of
postmodern theory with an analysis of Michel Foucault.
start with

Foucault's critique of Marx and Freud.

I

I then

examine Foucault's genealogical method, the "repressive
hypothesis," his analysis of truth, power, subjectivity, and
resistance.

I conclude that

Foucault's discussion of

constructed subjectivity, and his contention that
subjectivity itself is a site of politics opens a place for
postmodern feminist theory.

Ultimately, however, Foucault

does not adequately develop the gendered aspects of
subjectivity, nor does he discuss how a specifically
feminist emancipatory politics can emerge from his work.
Chapter Three ends with a defense of Foucault against Nancy
Fraser's criticism that his position lacks an adequate
normative grounding for an ethical

politics praxis.

In Chapter Four I discuss Jane Flax.

I begin with her

analysis and critique of Marx, Freud, and Foucault.

Next I

discuss her concept of the multiple self, her critique of
rationality, and her alternative conception of justice.
While in many ways Flax's project is similar to my own, I
argue that she ultimately reifies dichotomous thinking by
discussing psychoanalysis, postmodernism, and feminism as
separate discourses, often opposing them to each other.
vii

I

conclude that Flax's concept of subjectivity as fluid and
multiple is useful to postmodern feminist theory, and that
she enriches this postmodern

conception of subjectivity

with psychoanalytic insights.
In Chapter Five I examine Judith Butler, a postmodern
feminist philosopher.

I begin by discussing Butler's

critical examination of what is traditionally thought of as
political praxis and who is considered the subject of
politics.

I go on to analyze Butler's treatment of

universality, and then her key concept, the "performative
self."

I argue that the concept of first articulated by

Foucault as the constructed self and then developed by
Butler into the performative self is the most useful for
grounding an emancipatory feminist politics.

By

deconstructing the ontologically grounded subject,
performative theory allows for the practical and strategic
enactment of various subject positions and thus provides us
with the necessary tools for carrying out various
emancipatory political strategies.

(It insists, however,

that we always examine the political implications and the
exclusionary practices that this strategic employment
entails) .
In the final section of Chapter Five I address Seyla
Benhabib and Nancy Fraser's criticism of Butler.

Benhabib

criticizes Butler for having an inadequate concept of
agency.

She also claims that performativity is overly
viii

deterministic.

Fraser criticizes Butler for employing

anti-humanist language, for offering an inadequate theory of
liberation, and for lacking normative grounds on which to
secure her politics.

I defend Butler against these

criticisms.
In my concluding chapter I address an array of standard
criticisms which are leveled against postmodern philosophy
generally, and which, therefore, could be addressed to the
theory I have advocated.

I choose as representative of

politically-committed critics of postmodernism the Marxist
theorists Ellen Meiksins Wood and Terry Eagleton.

I offer a

close reading of recent works of each, and conclude that
their criticisms do not hold up under scrutiny.
My director, David Schweickart, through his exciting,
politically engaged scholarship and wonderful teaching, was
a mentor and a role model of what a philosopher is.

I wish

to thank him for his guidance and inspiration throughout my
graduate career, and particularly for his generosity with
time and energy in directing this dissertation.

I

gratefully acknowledge Pamela Caughie for introducing me to
what ultimately became my area of specialization: postmodern
feminist theory.

She has provided years of invaluable and

inspiring discussion and friendship.

I also wish to thank

David Ingram for his useful comments on my dissertation and
for his friendship as well.

I thank my parents, Paul and

Bella Dolinko for teaching me to value learning and for
ix

inspiring me to always strive to attain my goals.

I also

thank my husband's parents, Sonny and Bob Weiner, for always
supporting and believing in me throughout the time I have
been in graduate school.

Finally and most importantly I

wish to thank my husband, Joel Weiner, for his love,
patience, intelligence, kindness, and humor.

It was his

unwavering belief in me that always kept me going throughout
this project.

It is to him that I dedicate this

dissertation.
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Chapter one
Marx
This chapter on Marx is written with a specific aim in
mind.

It will not attempt to deal with the whole of Marxian

thought. Specifically I will look at Marx's concept of human
nature, and how this is connected to his theory of social
intervention: namely revolution. 1 I will not address the
entirety of these two topics, but rather will look at them
with the aim of comparing them to Freud and Foucault, and of
showing how Marxian concepts come to be criticized and
expanded on by contemporary postmodern feminist
philosophers.
Marx and Human Nature
In analyzing Marx's conception of human nature, I draw
primarily on Marx's early writings, since this notion is
addressed more systematically there than anywhere else.
There are, of course, many controversies in this area.

In

my view, three of the best commentaries here are Bertell
Ollman, Richard Schmitt and Carol Gould.

1

I will build on

While some interpreters of Marx argue that there are
significant differences between his view and those of
Engels, others say that they are primarily interchangeable.
(Bertell Ollman maintains the latter position.)
In this
work I will not attempt to distinguish between the two
views.

2

their analyses.
In this section I will argue that Marx's theory of
revolution is grounded in an Enlightenment concept of
subjectivity.

Although Marx conceives of the individual as

"an ensemble of social relations," a concept with postmodern
resonances, his agent of change, the proletariat, is
conceived of as a unified locus of revolt that can overthrow
a unified locus of oppression.

In this section I will show

that while Marx, and some scholars of Marx, give the
interpretation of subjectivity a nuanced and contextual
dimension, ultimately Marx's subject is confined within the
Enlightenment tradition and is a genderless, rational agent.
It will be seen that Marx does have a conception of a
socially constructed self, but unlike the postmodern
conception of constructed subjectivity there is an essential
core to Marx's socially constructed self, which is then
shaped by external conditions.

In other words, most

postmodern theorists argue that the self is decentered and
socially constructed:

There is no core element that is then

shaped and molded by social and power conditions; the whole
self is a constructed self.
sense, a double core.

For Marx the self has, in a

There is a core common to all human

beings at all times, and there is a core element, common to
all people in the same social circumstances.

For him social

circumstances are defined by economic conditions. He does
not look at how, for example, gender and race affect and are

3

affected by social circumstances.

Thus he can assume all

people of the same class will develop the same
consciousness.

According to the Marxian theory of

subjectivity, there is a core self which is acted upon.

In

contrast, postmodern theory argues that the action itself
produces the subject.
Marx examines human nature in order to look at the
possibility for social transformation.

He was, as Engels

said at his graveside, "a revolutionist." 2 The thesis of
this dissertation is that the way in which we conceive of
human nature sets limits on what type of social
transformation we think is possible.
Marx Schmitt supports this thesis:

In his discussion of
"Marx and Engels studied

the process of social transformation.

They were interested

in human nature because that 'nature' sets limits on the
sorts of changes that are possible." 3 Marx's conception of
human nature delimits his theory of emancipatory politics.
In understanding Marx, it is therefore essential to examine
together his theory of human nature and his theory of
politics. 4
2

Robert Schmitt, Introduction to Marx and Engels: A
Critical Reconstruction (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987),
xiii.
3

4

Ibid., 12.

About Marx's theory of human nature, Bertel! Ollman
writes:
"Human nature is most often treated as a cipher in
Marx's system or described with a few simple adjectives.
In
those instances where it is taken as a significant variable,
it has never been sufficiently integrated with Marx's other

4

Marx does not study subjectivity and human nature in
the abstract; rather his subject is always situated within a
specific historical, economic, and political environment.
There are some aspects of human nature, however, that Marx
says are common to all people at all times:

the possession

of "certain powers and needs, some of which he calls
'natural' and others 'species•.

115

According to Ollman, this

distinction between "natural" and "species" is that on which
Marx rests his entire theory of human nature. 6 Natural
powers (Kraft) are those that humans share with every living
thing.

Species powers and needs (Bedurfnins) are possessed

only by humans.
naturalism.

In this way Marx sets humanism apart from

Humanity itself is seen by Marx as a process of

development from completely natural beings guided only by
natural powers to fully human beings guided by species
powers.

Thus for Marx humanity is a process of becoming,

and this becoming of humans is the movement of history.
This idea of humanity as becoming is seen in Marx's
conception of power.
"'Power' . • . suggests potential, the possibility-particularly in changed conditions--of becoming
more of whatever it already is. As elements in
Marx's conception of reality, powers are related
to their own future forms as well as to other
theories." Bertell Ollman Alienation: Marx's Conception of
Man in Capitalist Society (Cambridge: At The University
Press, 1971), 75.
5

Ibid.

I

76.

5

entities in the present. . . .Marx sees them in
the process of change and, through a study of
their organic law, knows in a general way what
they are changing into. At each stage their
progress can be charted by the evidence of the
individual's skills and achievements. 7
Human development can be measured by the extent to
which humans realize their species powers; human history is
the progression of these powers.

This is what Marx means

when he writes, "The forming of the five senses is a labor
of the entire history of the world down to the present.

118

The way in which people realize these powers is the way in
which people relate to nature.
While power is a faculty, ability, function, or
capacity, needs are drives or desires often for things that
are not readily available.

According to Marx, people become

aware of their powers through their needs.

Marx says "the

production and satisfaction of these needs is an historical
process." 9 The progress of history can thus be measured by
the progress of human needs.
According to Marx, each stage in history creates
its own distinctive needs in man, and with the
passing to the next stage these needs disappear,
along with their owners, to be replaced by new

7

Ibid.

I

77.

8

Karl Marx, The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of
1844, trans., Martin Milligan (Moscow, 1959), 108, quoted in
Bertel! Ollman, Alienation, 279.
9

Karl Marx, The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of
1844, trans. T.B. Bottomore, in Erich Fromm Marx's Concept
of Man (New York: Unger, 1966), 199-200.

6

people and new needs. 10
This is what is meant by Marx's "material dialectic".
As people progress from natural beings to species beings,
they work within nature, and they transform nature.

In the

process of transforming nature, they create new needs, which
they then transform nature to realize.
says

This is why Marx

that in communism people are rich in needs, because it

is in the creation of needs that humans expand their power.
As they transform nature, they realize the capacity of their
powers.
People's powers, according to Marx, exist in them as
"tendencies and abilities, impulses" (Anlagen und

Fahigkeiten, als Trieb) . 11 It is in the creation of needs
that these powers are increasingly actualized.

According to

Marx, this process of developing needs and powers is the
process of becoming human.

Richard Schmitt writes:

Here, then, is Marx and Engels' conception of
human nature: At any particular historical stage,
human beings have certain specific material needs
that they meet in particular ways and with very
specific forms of social organization. As the
ways change in which needs are met, the needs
themselves as well as the forms of social
organization change. One result of those changes
is that human nature itself changes. 12
For Marx what makes us human is that we produce our

10

0llman, Alienation, 78.

11

Karl Marx, "The Bourgeoisie and the CounterRevolution" quoted in Bertel! Ollman, Allienation, 274.
12

Schmi tt, Introduction, 2 6.

7

means of existence.

How we produce what is necessary to

satisfy our needs determines who we are, and as we produce,
we develop our powers, and we develop new needs.

This in

turn leads to development of social organization and new
modes of production.

As a result of a change in needs, an

increased capacity of our species powers, and a
transformation in our social organization, human nature
develops and changes.
Marx is a "historical materialist" in that he believes
our social existence determines our consciousness.
create the world, we create ourselves.

As we

This dialectical

movement between needs and powers is expressed in people's
relationship to nature.

We create ourselves in the process

of transforming nature.

"The growth of man's capabilities

toward the ends inherent in them, in each individual as in
history itself, is primarily the result of productive
activity." 13 It is productive activity that allows human
powers to develop to their full capacity.

Marx writes, "By

thus acting on the external world and changing it, he at the
same time changes his own nature.

He develops his

slumbering powers and compels them to act in obedience to
his sway. " 14
According to Marx individuals are always determined by
13

0llman, Alienation, 102-103.

14

Karl Marx, Capital, vol 1, A Critical Analysis of
Capitalist Production (New York: International Publishers,
1967)

I

177 •

8

their social function and their relationship with nature.
For Marx, while there is an essential human nature, it is
capable of developing and changing; it is not static.

For

Marx, even though our nature or essence is changing, we do
have an essence--our powers developed through our
work/labor.
powers.

Work is the combined action of all human

"It is the need of all man's powers for the most

direct means to their combined fulfillment, and it is common
to people in all societies. " 15 It is also part of our
essence to need each other, i.e. we are fundamentally social
beings.
Marx, in a sense, gives a (loosely interpreted)
constructed account of human nature, i.e. we create
ourselves through our labor activity. As Gould writes, "Marx
holds that individuals create this nature in their activity,
and therefore it is neither fixed nor presupposed.

This

eventuates in a conception of a changing and developing
essence." 16 During this labor activity we create and develop
our natural powers and transform and expand them through our
action.
According to Marx what distinguishes us as humans is
that we produce ourselves through our labor activity.

We

create ourselves by producing our means of subsistence.

15

0llman, Alienation, 101.

Carol c. Gould, Marx's Social Ontology (Cambridge: MIT
Press, 1978), 34.
16

9

According to Marx our human nature is formed through our
work, specifically what we do to meet our needs in
productive activity.
humans to nature.

Work is the active relatedness of

He writes:

[Human beings) themselves begin to distinguish
themselves from animals as soon as they begin to
produce their means of subsistence, a step which
is conditioned by their physical organization. By
producing their means of subsistence men are
indirectly producing their actual material
life. . . .
This mode of production must not be
considered simply as being the reproduction of the
physical existence of the individuals. Rather it
is a definite form of activity of these
individual, a definite form of expressing their
life, a definite mode of life on their part. As
individual express their life, so they are. What
they are, therefore, coincides with their
production, both with what they produce and with
how they produce. The nature of individuals thus
depends on the material conditions determining
their production. 17
According to Marx, our mode of production determines
who we are. As we produce things to satisfy our needs, we
produce ourselves as well, and since different people
produce things in different ways, they develop into
different types of people.

Through this process of

production, or work, people develop their essential powers.
Changes in the mode of production lead to changes in human's
essential powers, and changes in human's essential powers
lead to changes in the mode of production in an attempt to
satisfy newly created needs.
17

Karl Marx, "The German Ideology" in The Marx-Engels
2d ed., ed. Robert c. Tucker (New York: W.W. Norton
& Company), 150.

Reader,

10
Changes in the mode of production lead to changes in
the social organization of society. According to Richard
Schmitt,
What is distinctive about the conception of human
nature held by Marx and Engels is . . . . that human
beings make themselves be who they are . . . .
Central to human nature, then, is this ability of
human beings to determine who they will be. 18
Through the process of work human beings not only produce
their means of subsistence but they produce themselves.
Unlike classical materialists, who stress the impact of
environment on essentially passive human subjects, for Marx
human beings actively shape reality and are shaped by it.
As they produce, they change reality, and they create new
needs for themselves, which they then develop new means of
production to satisfy, and in the process they create
themselves as humans.
It is important to notice that human beings determine
who they are in the context of their natural and economic
environment.

To say that human beings construct themselves

by changing nature is to say that human beings appropriate
nature.

In Marx's sense "appropriation means to utilize

constructively, to build by incorporating.

1119

People

appropriate nature by making it in some way a part of
themselves. 20 We can now see how Marx begins to erase the
18

Schmitt, Introduction, 8.

19

0llman, Alienation, 91.

20

Ibid.

11
subject object distinction.

People are defined through

material conditions and the appropriation of nature, while
at the same time material conditions (nature) is defined
through people.
What is distinctive about the productive activity of
humans is that it is a conscious intentional activity. Human
labor is premeditative, as Engels says, "premeditated,
planned action directed toward definite ends known in
advance. " 21
Marx writes:
What distinguishes the most incompetent architect
from the best of bees, is that the architect
raises his structure in imagination before he
constructs it in reality. The labor process ends
in the creation of something which, when the
process began, already existed in the workers
imagination, already existed in an ideal form in
natural objects, but he also realizes, in the
nature that exists apart from himself, his own
purpose to which he has to subordinate his own
will. Nor is this subordination a momentary act .
. . his purposive will, manifesting itself as
attention, must be operative throughout the whole
duration of the labor.n
Marx is here distinguishing human labor activity from that
of animals.

The actions of animals are driven by instinct,

or "natural powers," whereas the actions of humans are
conscious and driven by conscious or species powers. "If
natural powers can be viewed as establishing the framework

21 Engels, Dialectics of Nature quoted in Vernon Venable,
Human Nature: The Marxian View (New York: The World
Publishing Company, 1966), 66-67, n. 137.
22

Marx, capital, 17 8.

12

in which life itself goes on, then man's species powers
express the kind of life which man, as distinct from all
other beings, carries on inside this framework.

1123

In The

German Ideology Marx writes, "consciousness takes the place
of instinct or . . • his instinct is a conscious one."M
Another thing that distinguishes human productive
activity from that of animals is that, unlike animals, human
beings are species beings, and because they are species
beings they are free.

In the manuscript "Alienated Labor,"

Marx clarifies what he means by species being:
Human beings are species beings, not only because
in practice and in theory they adopt the species
as their object . . . but also because they treat
themselves as the actual, living species . . . .
The animal is immediately identical with its lifeactivity.
It does not distinguish itself form it.
It is its life-activity. Human beings make their
life-activity itself the object of their will and
of their consciousness.~
As species beings, understood as beings who define their own
nature, human beings are free. 26

Human beings are not

determined, they are free to create themselves.

This

ability to create themselves and define what it means to be
a human being is, according to Marx what all human beings
have in common.

23

0llman, Alienation, 85.

24

Marx, "German Ideology," in Marx-Engels Reader, 158.

25

Marx, The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, in
Marx-Engels Reader, 75-76.
26

Ibid., 75.

13

Marx and Engels in contrast to many philosophers,
claim that human beings have in common only very
general characteristics such as the potentiality
for freedom-for defining what it means to be a
human being--or the inclination to think before
acting. . . . Human nature--that is, what
differentiates us from animals-does not consist of
specific traits but concerns our ability to change
our traits and thus to define our human nature in
new and different ways by changing our
circumstances. 27
Human beings, as species beings, think of themselves as
a species; they are aware of their ability to define who
they are.

Human beings are self conscious; they are aware

of themselves as individuals active in pursuing their own
ends.a

This awareness involves "mutual recognition, the

act of seeing oneself in others, extends each individual's
awareness to cover the whole human race; he realizes that
the actions of others have aims similar to and even
connected to his own. " 29 Thus human beings make all of
nature, including each other, their objects.
Species being does not mean that the individual is
subordinated to the species; rather it means that human
beings see themselves as part of a species, and develop
their species powers in mutual cooperation with one another.
"Human beings do not determine the meaning of being human
each for him- or herself.

They do that collectively.

27

Schmitt, Introduction, 12.

28

0llman, Alienation, 84.

29

Ibid.

Human

14

beings are fundamentally social beings.

1130

It is important to note that Marx is against both
collectivism and individualism.

Of collectivism--and by

this I mean the view that societies, states and nations are
superpersons--Marx writes, "Just as society itself produces

human beings as human beings, so is society produced by
What is to be avoided above all is the

them.

reestablishing of 'society' as an abstraction vis a vis the
individual. " 31
Marx is also against individualism:
The individual and isolated hunter and fisherman,
with whom Smith and Ricardo begin, belongs among
the unimaginable conceits of the 18th century • .
The human being is in the most literal sense
a zoon politikon, not merely a gregarious animal,
but an animal which can individuate itself only in
the midst of society.n
According to Marx human beings are social animals; they can
create themselves as human beings only in a social context.
In this sense Marx distinguishes himself from other
Enlightenment philosophers such as Descartes who
characterize human beings as rational agents independent of
social, economic or political functioning.

30

For Marx, since

Schmitt, Introduction, 12.

31

Marx, The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts in The
Marx-Engels Reader, 86. This establishing of society as a
superperson is precisely what Freud begins to speculate
about at the end of Civilization and Its Discontents when he
brings up the idea of the cultural superego.)
32

Karl Marx, The Grundrisse in The Marx-Engels Reader,
222-223.

15

human beings are species beings, they are essentially bound
to nature, objects and each other.

This idea of humans as

zoon politikon also distinguishes Marx's idea of revolution:

if people are inherently social and cooperative, then their
work towards social intervention will be cooperative, rather
than individualistic.
In his "Sixth Thesis on Feuerbach" Marx writes,"the
human essence is no abstraction in each single individual.
In its reality it is the ensemble of social relations."n
Similarly, in the Grundrisse Marx states that "Society
expresses the sum of interrelations, the relations in which
individuals stand." 34 As Gould writes, "Marx is operating
with an ontology of both real individuals and real
relations.""

Gould goes on to argue that for Marx the

"individual" and "relation" are not separable concepts.
This is seen in the discussion of both labor and species
being.

If we recall from the previous discussion that for

Marx individuals create themselves through their laboring
activity, and if we remember that the "fundamental mode of
this (labor] activity is social,"~ then we can see that as
beings who define themselves concretely through their
33

Karl Marx, Theses on Feuerbach in The Marx-Engels
145.

Reader,
34

Karl Marx, The Grundrisse, trans. M. Nicolaus (New
York: Vintage Books, 1973), 265.
35
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Gould

laboring activates human beings are social beings.
writes:

[T)he primary attributes that characterize the
concretely existing individual and the primary
activity of this individual involve his or her
relations with other individuals. These
relationships constitute these individuals as
social individuals.
Since sociality is the mode
of being of these individuals, to take individuals simply as human and not as social is to
abstract them from the concrete context that makes
them the individuals they are. 37
In order to understand humans as fundamentally social, we
must remember that for Marx we cannot examine human nature
independently of concrete social structures within which
human nature develops.

As has been argued, for Marx it is

in the nature of individuals to act cooperatively as they
work to appropriate nature and transform themselves as they
develop their species powers.
For Marx human beings are not only inherently social,
but they are also fundamentally rational.

It is in this

emphasis on rationality that ultimately Marx's conception of
human nature falls within the Enlightenment tradition.
Ollman argues that ultimately Marx is saying that the
distinguishing characteristic of human beings is their
ability to think rationally.

The previous discussion

established that what characterizes species power (in
distinction to natural power) for Marx is the ability to
engage in conscious, purposeful, planned activity.

37 I

b'd
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Ollman
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argues that this could be called rational activity. And
since such activity is, according to Marx, the
distinguishing characteristic of human nature, then it can
be argued that Marx goes along with the Enlightenment
tradition in saying that all human beings share a common
essential defining characteristic, which is rationality.
Ollman states it this way:
If life activity, in its most general sense , is
life itself, the energy, movement, change of pace
and rhythm devoted to satisfying natural needs,
then species life activity stands out as its
conscious, willed, purposive, flexible,
concentrated and social facets which enable man to
pursue the unique demands of his species.
All the qualities Marx attributes to species
life activity fit rather neatly into a category
which Marx never used for this purpose. What have
I said but that Marx view work as 'rational,' in
the sense that man grasps the nature of what he
wants to transform and is able to direct his
movements accordingly?B
Unlike Descartes and other Enlightenment rationalists Marx's
conception of humans as rational is a contextual,
materialist rationality.

The capability of human beings to

fully realize their rational capabilities is determined by
their relationship with nature, i.e. determined by what
stage human beings are at in their historical development
characterized by their social relationships and mode of
production.

Unlike the more traditional Enlightenment

conception of human nature, Marx sees human nature, not as
something fixed, but as something that develops and changes.
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He puts great stock on human freedom, and does not--contrary
to popular belief--think the individual should be
subordinated to the state.
There are certain elements in Marx that have an almost
postmodern ring, particularly the notion of the individual
as an ensemble of social relations.

In spite of the non-

fixity of Marxian human nature, there are, however, some
constants.

Humans are fundamentally rational.

Moreover,

humans, at least all those belonging to a given class, are
fundamentally the same.

Each of these assumptions are, from

a postmodern feminist perspective, problematic.

Not only

are they problematic in their own right, but they will
suggest a concept of social transf ormation--the classical
Marxian revolution--which, as I will later discuss, is also
highly problematic.
The idea that we are constructed within power
configurations is a notion Marx shares with postmodernism.
Marx would say that this laboring activity is our essence,
shared by all people, but, our nature as laborers is
affected by the power configurations of our society.
However, for Marx, these power configurations are first and
foremost

economic power structures, as opposed to the power

structure of gender or race, for example.
It is this emphasis on economic power structures that
allows Marx to privilege labor over any other form of human
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activity. 39 His emphasis on labor as the cons ti tuti ve human
activity is what leads him to determine that identity within
each class is uniform.

While he does in some places

indicate that heredity plays a role in identity, 4°his
general theory holds that it is the conditions of class that
determine identity.
A further, implicit, assumption made by Marx is that
all members of a class (whether, for example, male or
female, Jew or Christian, Black or White) experience the

same oppression. "By exaggerating the determining role of
economic factors,

1141

Marx can argue that all members of a

class will for the most part develop similar powers and have
similar needs.

Marx assumes that economic factors will

eclipse differences of gender and race, "Even the natural
diversity of species, as, for example, the differences of
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analysis concentrates on the oppression of workers under
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analysis of women under the oppression of patriarchy. See
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race, etc • • . . are and must be checked historically."a
Marx fails to recognize power differentials within
classes, examining only those between classes. It is just
such an analysis that postmodern theory demands.

The

Marxist concept of political intervention, therefore,
involves a wide-scale mass cooperative effort of one class
to overthrow another.

But there are not simply unified

classes but differential power distributions among classes.
Postmodern theory calls for an examination of the
interaction of multiple sites of oppression, not just the
oppression of one class by another. According to Marx there
is a single fundamental division to consider in political
theory--the division between the proletariat and bourgeois.
Postmodern theory permits us to consider this fissure, but
does not emphasize it.

There are many important

relationships to examine and possible sites of oppression.
It follows, as we shall see, that it is a mistake,
conceptually and politically, to overemphasize the
importance of one large, unified revolution in effecting
major social change.
Marx and Engels on Private Property and Gender
For Marx all human development takes place within the
context of specific modes of production, which shape both
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individual consciousness and social relationships.
consequently we must examine what happens to human nature
with the introduction of private property.

According to

Marx the introduction of private property ultimately
alienates human beings from their species powers, and thus
from the essence of their human nature.

In this section I

will discuss the introduction of private property and what
effect this has on a fundamental social relationship: that
between women and men. I will first briefly examine Marx's
original account of private property and gender as stated in
The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, and in The
German Ideology.

I will then look at how this position is

developed by Engels in The Origin of the Family, Private
Property and the State.

In all of these works Marx and

Engels argue that the determining factor in history is the
mode of production and the property relations that define
it.

The structure of society, including the family, depends

on how people produce their means of existence through
developments in the mode of production.
In The German Ideology Marx gives his first
systematic statement of historical materialism.

As part of

this metanarrative he examines the historical development
of, among other things, the family.

One of Marx's main

concerns in this work is to examine the division of labor.
It is in developing this concept that he introduces his
discussion of the family.

In this work Marx gives a
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succinct account of the role of the family in terms of
establishing private property and the division of labor.
Marx's basic thesis here is that division of labor is the
basis of private property.

Division of labor was initially,

"nothing but the division of labor in the sexual act, then
that division of labor which develops spontaneously or
•naturally' by virtue of natural pre-disposition (e.g.,
physical strength), needs, accidents, etc., etc."~

We

observe that Marx bases his analysis on the assumption that
there is a "natural" division of labor.

This is a profound

and unexamined assumption about human nature--that men and
women are naturally different and that this difference is
partially responsible for the division of labor.

He offers

no argument for this crucial point, but like Engels will do
in The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State,
simply states it as a fact.

This unproven fact then becomes

the basis for his analysis of the origination of private
property and the division of labor, two crucial aspects to
his entire philosophy.
This analysis also shows Marx's inattentiveness to
gender roles and the development of patriarchy.

For a

philosopher whose analysis of the origination of capitalism
is voluminous, he devotes very little space to the
"naturally" occurring division of labor based on the
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differences in the two sexes.

He simply says it is based on

"natural predispositions" and substantiates his argument
with "etc. etc.".

One can hardly imagine Marx casually

putting forth the claim that humans have a "natural
predisposition" toward class distinctions and substantiating
this claim with "etc. etc.".

Marx goes on to say that the

division of labor, which is what alienates humans from their
own nature, is based on these "natural predispositions."
Marx writes:
(T]he division of labor . . . . is based on the
natural division of labor in the family and the
separation of society into individual families
opposed to one another, is given simultaneously
the distribution, and indeed the unequal
distribution . . . . of labor and its products,
hence property: the nucleus, the first form, of
which lies in the family, where the wife and
children are the slaves of the husband. This
latent slavery in the family . . . . is the first
property. 44
Marx continues his analysis stating that, "division of
labor and private property are, moreover, identical
expressions: in the one the same thing is affirmed with
reference to activity as is affirmed in the other with
reference to the product of the activity."tj According to
Marx private property and the division of labor are both the
cause and the result of alienation.

Marx also states that

the natural division of labor is the cause of private
property and the division of labor.
44
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the degradation of women.

At the nexus of this analysis is

the unexamined assumption that there was an original and

natural division of labor.
There are positive aspects to Marx's account which are
worth noting.

Marx does recognize that women are indeed

oppressed (unlike the vast majority of the philosophers of
his day).

Furthermore, according to Marx the oppression of

women is not an eternal condition, but rather one that can
and will be changed.

This is one of the liberating aspects

of historical materialism, and one reason Marx tells the
metanarrative the way he does in The German Ideology and in
The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844.

Since

Marx has linked "the slavery" of women to the origination of
private property, he argues that with the abolition of
private property we will also see the abolition of the
women's degradation.

According to this Marxian

metanarrative the division of labor and private property
lead to both alienation (on which Marx focuses most
extensively and explicitly) and the degradation of women (on
which Marx focuses rarely and cryptically).

Thus he can

argue that by abolishing both (as would happen in communism)
we end both alienation and the degradation of women.
While for the most part Marx ignores women in his
philosophy, he does make the important claim that one can
judge the level of development of culture by the "humanity"
of the woman-man relationship.

In the third of The Economic
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and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, "Private Property and
Labor," Marx makes one of his rare comments about women:
In the relationship with woman, as the prey and
the handmaid of communal lust, is expressed the
infinite degradation in which man exists for
himself; for the secret of this relationship finds
its unequivocal, incontestable, open and revealed
expression in the relation of man to woman and in
the way in which the direct and natural species
relationship is conceived. The immediate, natural
and necessary relation of human being to human
being is also the relation of man to woman . .
From this relationship man's whole level of
development can be assessed.
It follows from the
character of this relationship how far man has
become, and has understood himself as, a speciesbeing, a human being. The relation of man to
woman is the most natural relation of human being
to human being.
It indicates, therefore, how far
man's natural behavior has become human, and how
far his human essence has become a natural essence
for him, how far his human nature has become
nature for him.
It also shows how far man's needs
have become human needs, and consequently how far
the other person, as a person, has become one of
his needs, and to what extent he is an individual
existence at the same time a social being. 46
The vast majority of Marx's philosophy focuses on
economic factors and the political division between the
proletariat and bourgeois, yet here Marx makes a profound
statement about the relationship between women and men.
What I have briefly introduced in this section and what I
will consider more thoroughly in the next is to what extent
is Marx and Engels' overall argument distorted in order to
link the introduction of private property to the
relationship of women and men?

4

If we put together what they

6Marx, The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844
in Marx's Concept of Man, 126-127.
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wrote in The German Ideology and what Marx wrote in "Private
Property and Labor," it becomes apparent that it is crucial
for

Marx and Engels to establish that the degradation of

women is linked to the origination of private property, so
that they can show that by abolishing private property, we
will move towards becoming species beings and human beings.
This Marxian metanarrative undergoes a major shift when
Engels discovers the anthropological work of Lewis Henry
Morgan, who published Ancient Society in 1877.

The Origin

of the Family, Private Property and the State is based on
Morgan's Ancient Society.

About Morgan Engels wrote in

1884, "in his own way . . . [he] discovered afresh in America
the materialistic conception of history discovered by Marx
40 years ago."

The central idea in Morgan's Ancient Society

is, according to Eleanor Leacock,
that human history can be defined in terms of
successive stages. . . . He stated that it was
the 'successive arts of subsistence which arose at
long intervals' which were responsible for the
development of the three major stages. He
proposed parallel sequences in the history of
social, economic and political institutions.
By
implication, they were closely related to the
economic sequence.~
Morgan's work offered concrete data to support Marx and
Engels' metanarrative of historical materialism first
outlined in The German Ideology.

Morgan's analysis offered

anthropological evidence of the development of private
47
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property and how this effected family structures and other
social and political interactions.
The evidence provided by Morgan was extremely important
to Engels and is the reason for the difference between the
account of the origination of private property given in The
German Ideology and that given later by Engels in The Origin
of the Family. Private Property and the State.

Prior to

Morgan, Marx and Engels assumed that humanity had always
been divided into classes.

(Hence the opening lines of the

communist Manifesto: "The history of all hitherto existing
society is the history of class struggles. 1148 )

So in the

beginning Marx and Engels posit the division of labor as
coterminous with private property, and since they see the
gender division as "natural," they see woman as the first
form of property.

Morgan provided anthropological evidence

indicating that early humanity was in fact communistic.
With this data the metanarrative first told in The German
Ideology can now take on a more Hegelian dialectical form.
As Engels develops the metanarrative in The Origin of the
Family, Private Property and the State history moves from
primitive communism (thesis) to class society (antithesis)
to ultimate communism (synthesis).
In The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the
State Engels argues, in accordance with basic Marxian
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doctrine, that historical development can be traced in terms
of changes in the mode of production.

All structures in

society, including the family, and all human relationships,
including relationships of class and gender, depend on how
people produce their means of existence through developments
in the mode of production.

Human progress is measured in

terms of changes in this production.
Drawing on data from Morgan, Engels constructs a
metanarrative to establish that the origin of the family,
like the origin of everything else, is economic.

He

postulates that there was a time when land and property were
owned communally, inheritance was through the mother, women
were strong and powerful leaders, and when women's work was
valued as much as men's work.

According to Engels, the

monogamous family as we know it came into existence with
private property, which brought about the "world historical
defeat of the female sex.

1149

Engels begins by going through a narrative of the
development of the family from the most primitive, which is
group marriage, to the contemporary form of monogamy.

The

overall trend in the development of the family is that the
acceptable sphere of sexual relationships (above all for
women) is increasingly narrowed.
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We observe that in this account private property is no
longer conterminous with the sexual division of labor, nor,
as seems to be the case for Marx and Engels earlier, is the
monogamous family taken to be "natural."
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is group marriage--characterized by promiscuous sexual
intercourse and an absence of prohibitions and restrictions
on sexual partners.

The next form of family is the

consanguine family.

In this arrangement marriage groups are

separated according to generation.

The only exclusion in

terms of sexual relationships is that between parents and
children.

The next stage is the punaluan family in which

brothers and sisters cannot mate.

After this comes the

pairing family in which one man and one woman mate; however,
men are allowed both polygamy and occasional infidelity.
Growing out of the pairing family is the monogamous family,
the first form of family to be non-communistic, patrilineal,
and patriarchal.

All forms of family before monogamy are,

according to Engels, communistic.

And in the communistic

society production was centered around the household.

As

long as women control the mode of production, which during
this time was centered in the household, women will remain
in power.

Thus Engels maintains that before monogamy

society was communistic, matrilineal, and matriarchal.
Engels wants to show that the origin of the family is
economic and that changes in the mode of production lead to
changes in the organization of society.

Consequently he

must establish an economic basis for matriarchy, which can
then be replaced with patriarchy.

If he can show that

patriarchy is based on the establishment of private
property, then he can show that if we eliminate private
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property we will also eliminate patriarchy.

In order to

understand the steps Engels takes in his argument, I will
briefly discuss how he thinks private property comes about
and what effect this has on the power of women.
In describing the communistic household Engels' writes:
Communistic housekeeping . . . means the supremacy
of women in the house; just as the exclusive
recognition of the female parent, owing to the
impossibility of recognizing the male parent with
certainty, means that the women--the mothers--are
held in high respect. One of the most absurd
notions taken over from the 18th century
enlightenment is that in the beginning of society
woman was the slave to man. 50 Among all savages
and all barbarians .... the position of woman is not
only free, but honorable. 51
The last stage of marriage groupings to be communistic
(before the non-communistic monogamous family)

is the

pairing family. Engels emphasizes that in the pairing
arrangement, as in all communistic households, women were
supreme in the house, they were held in high respect, they
were free and honorable, and were the "great power among the
clans, as everywhere else.
occasion required,

They did

not hesitate, when

'to knock off the horns,' as it was

technically called, from the head of a chief, and send him
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back to the ranks of the warriors. " 52 While in the pairing
family women were powerful, free, and honorable, Engels also
states that
after.

" women had now become scarce and highly sought

Hence it is with the pairing marriage that there

begins the capture and purchase of women.
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The progression from the pairing family

to the

monogamous family takes place, according to Engels, with the
advent of private property.

Engels argues that the

domestication of animals, as well as metal working, weaving,
and agriculture were the changes in the mode of production
that led to this change in the structure of society.

With

the introduction of these new technologies labor power began
to produce surplus over and above the subsistence.
surplus led to the accumulation of wealth.

This

In addition to

this, the center of production moved outside the household.
We observe that Engels, like Marx in The German
Ideology, assumes that there is a natural division of labor.
Based on this assumption, he postulates that women worked
within the household while men were responsible for
activities outside the household--such as gathering food and
domestication animals.

In the communistic family production

was centered around the household, so women were in charge
and society was matriarchal.
52
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changed to include agriculture and the domestication of
animals, the center of production moved to outside the
household, where men were in charge.

Thus society moves

from matriarchy to patriarchy.
According to the division of labor within the
family at that time, it was the man's part to
obtain food and the instruments of labor necessary
for the purpose. He therefore also owned the
instruments of labor, and in the event of husband
and wife separating, he took them with him, just
as she retained her household goods. Therefore,
according to the social custom of the time, the
man was also the owner of the new source of
subsistence, the cattle, and later of the new
instruments of labor, the slaves. 54
Here Engels sets up an explanation as to how and why men
came to own property and rule over women.

He bases this on

an original sexual division of labor.
In communistic societies inheritance was passed down
through the mother.

Yet as men's wealth increased (because

they were the ones who owned the private property, namely
cattle, which is now producing surplus), their position in
the family became more important than that of the women's.
Men wanted to overthrow the power of women and ensure that

their property would be inherited by their children.

Yet,

according Engels, communistic societies were matrilineal;
decent was determined through the mother--called "mother
right"--thus men had to first overthrow "mother right.''"
~Ibid.,
55
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Thus on the one hand, in proportion as wealth
increased it made the man's power in the family
more important than the woman's, and on the other
hand created an impulse to exploit this
strengthened position in order to overthrow, in
favor of his children, the traditional order of
inheritance. This however, was impossible so long
as descent was reckoned according to mother right.
Mother right, therefore, had to be overthrown, and
overthrown it was. 56
How did this revolutionary shift in power take place?

Engels' answer to this is worth quoting in full.
This [the overthrow of mother right] was by no
means so difficult as it looks to us today.
for
this revolution--one of the most decisive ever
experienced by humanity--could take place without
disturbing a single one of the living members of
the [clans]. All could remain as they were.
A
simple decree sufficed that in the future the
offspring of the male members should remain within
the [clans], but that of the female should be
excluded by being transferred to the (clans] of
their father.
The reckoning of descent in the
female line and the matriarchal law of inheritance
were thereby overthrown, and the male line of
descent and the paternal law of inheritance were
substituted for them.~
It was this "simple decree" that brought about "the
world historical defeat of the female sex."

Matriarchy was

replaced by patriarchy, matrilineality by patrilineality,
and communism by private property.
and reduced to servitude."

And women were "degraded

It was this overthrow of mother

right which marked the transition from the pairing family,
which was communistic, to the monogamous family, which is
not.

According to Engels, monogamous marriage is not based
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on love but on property; it is a way for a man with property
to make sure he has someone to pass it on to.

The

monogamous family is based on the supremacy of the male.
Men give their property to their male children.

According

to Engels, the origin of monogamy is economic:
It was the first form of the family to be based
not on natural but on economic conditions--on the
victory of private property over primitive,
natural communal property . . . . the sole exclusive
aims of monogamous marriage were to make the man
supreme in the family and to propagate , as the
future heirs to his wealth, children indisputably
his own. . . .monogamous marriage comes on the
scene as the subjugation of the one sex by the
other; it announces a struggle between the sexes
unknown throughout prehistoric period. 58
Not only is the subjection of women based entirely on
economic conditions, but this subjection is the prototype
for all class oppression.

He continues:

And today I can add: the first class opposition
that appears in history coincides with he
development of the antagonism between man and
woman in monogamous marriage, and the first class
oppression coincides with that of the female sex
by the male. 59
Since Engels equates the subjugation of women to the
economic circumstances of private property, he argues that
the communist revolution will ameliorate the oppression of
woman.

He writes, "The modern individual family is founded

on the open or concealed domestic slavery of the wife, and
modern society is a mass composed of these individual
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families as its molecules. 1160

In order to liberate women,

Engels argues, it is necessary to bring them back into the
public realm.

This requires that the monogamous family as

an economic unit be abolished.

Monogamy arose from the

concentration of wealth in the hands of men.

Engels

proposes to transfer the wealth from individual men to
society as a whole.

Then men do not have to worry about

their children inheriting their private property. This
transfer of wealth calls for a social revolution.

Once the

means of production is owned in common, the single family
ceases to be the economic unit of society.
There are some logical problems with Engels' narrative
which bear consideration. 61 In his discussion of the pairing
family Engels' description of the social arrangements makes
many assumptions only explained by the patriarchal context
from which he theorizes.
Engels states that in the pairing marriage there is the
"capture and purchase of women." This statement raises two
questions. If women were strong and powerful and could
"knock off the horns" of a chief, how could they so easily
be captured?

Doesn't the "capture and purchase of women"

negate Engels statement that at this stage "the position of
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women is not only free, but honorable"?~ Free, honorable,
and powerful people do not get captured and purchased. 63
The implications of this are important.

On the one had

Engels needs to claim that women in communistic societal
relations are free and honorable so that he can blame their
downfall on private property and the consequent mode of
production and social organization.

On the other hand his

own argument is so entrenched in a patriarchal context that
he is not able to support his basic claim (that woman were
powerful before the advent of private property and it was
changes in the mode of production which led to their defeat,
not independent social changes).
Engels also makes the assumption that it is men and not
women who want sex. 64 He states, "In this stage [the pairing
62
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family], one man lives with one woman, but the relationship
is such that polygamy and occasional infidelity remain the
right of the men, even though for economic reasons polygamy
is rare, while from the woman strictest fidelity is
generally demanded throughout the time she lives with the
man and adultery on her part is cruelly punished."M
cruelly punished by whom? Engels claims that women are the
head of the household, they are free and honorable, they can
knock the horns off a chief, and yet they are cruelly
punished.

Engels continues:

"The marriage tie can,

however, be easily dissolved by either partner; after
separation, the children still belong as before to the
mother

alone."~

On the one hand women are not allowed

sexual freedom and are cruelly punished, and on the other
hand they are automatically allowed to keep their children.
This does not make sense except as support for Engels'
argument.

Again, it is essential for Engels' overall

argument to claim that before private property societies
were matrilineal and matriarchal so that he can show
female prudery could explain the actions and attitudes of
women at the dawn of civilization." Gerda Lerner, The
Creation of Patriarchy (New York: Oxford University Press,
1986), 22.
Sigmund Freud makes a similar assumption in
Civilization and Its Discontents, trans. and ed. Peter Gay
(New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1989), especially in
Chapter Four where he contends that in civilization men want
sexual relations with women and women want to be with their
children.
{This is stated explicitly on page 56.)
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patriarchy stems from private property. But the evidence he
is giving for matrilineal and matriarchal societies does not
support his claim that they actually existed.~ On the one
hand he claims matriarchy and matriliniality and on the
other he keeps giving examples that show women were
controlled by men.

If Engels cannot prove matriarchy,

however, then he cannot prove that private property is the
cause of patriarchy.
Engels' explanation of the "world historical defeat of
the female sex" is based on an assumption of a "natural
division of labor" and "social custom".

Throughout this

work Engels unquestionably assumes a basic division of labor
in which women work inside the house, producing most of the
material goods, while men hunt.
The man fights in the wars, goes hunting and
fishing, procures the raw materials of food and
the tools necessary for doing so. The woman looks
after the house and the preparation of food and
clothing, cooks, weaves, sews. They are each
master in their own sphere: the man in the forest,
the woman in the house. 68
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0n the question of whether or not matriarchies existed
see Johann J. Bachofen, Myth, Religion and Mother Right:
Selected Writings of J.J. Bachofen, trans. Ralph Manheim
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967); Robert
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rt is this arrangement that, "according to the social custom
of the time" leads to men owning "the new source of
subsistence, the cattle."

What social custom?

How can

man's ownership of private property, which led to the world
historical defeat of the female sex, be explained simply as
a social custom of the time?

Doesn't a statement of such

magnitude require a better argument, or at least an
argument?

Does the fact that Engels doesn't feel the need

to argue this point more carefully indicate that he and Marx
do not place too much value on the introduction of
patriarchy per se and the defeat of woman?

Could it be that

they gloss over this because they see the introduction of
private property as the main problem?
Engels states that "a simple decree" sufficed to
overthrow mother right.

He further states that not a single

member of the clan was disturbed by this revolution and that
all could remain as they were.

But this is incorrect, since

obviously the daughters do not remain as they were.
are now compelled to leave the maternal clan.

They

Moreover, he

is talking about an overwhelming change in the power
structure of society, calling it one of the most decisive
revolutions in human history, yet according to Engels this
does not have a major effect on human nature.

This seems to

contradict Marx's own argument about human powers needing to
be free to develop and developing within the context of a
specific society.

The fact that women are now going to be
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"slaves of lust" does not seem to strike Engels as a major
infringement on their basic human freedom.

One can hardly

imagine Marx and Engels describing the proletariat
overthrowing the bourgeois, and saying it "could take place
without disturbing a single one of the living members of
society," or that it could take place by "a simple decree".
The fact that Engels can so casually dismiss the overthrow
of matriarchy and the establishment of patriarchy indicates
the lack of importance he ultimately places on the equality
of women. By Engels own account the women at this time were
respected and powerful, they "could knock the horns off"
someone, so why would their overthrow be so easily
accomplished?

The consequences were, after all, immense:

The overthrow of mother right was the world
historical defeat of the female sex. The man took
command in the home also; the woman was degraded
and reduced to servitude; she became the slave of
his lust and a mere instrument for the production
of children. This degraded position of the
woman .... has gradually been palliated and glossed
over, and sometimes clothed in a milder form; in
no sense has it been abolished.~
This passage, besides announcing the decisive decline of the
power of women, makes another profound assumption.

"the

woman was degraded ... a mere instrument for the production of
children".

Engels is obviously placing no value on this

form of production. He is all too causally dismissing the
value of women's reproductive function.

Furthermore, while

Engels carefully examines changes in the mode of production
69
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throughout Origins of the Family, Private Property and the
state he ignores the history of reproduction.

This seems

like a case, similar to what we will see with Freud, where
the patriarchal context within which Engels and Marx are
theorizing clouds their rationality.

For thinkers who place

so much emphasis on material circumstances and surplus, how
could they not even examine the value of women's
reproductive functioning?m
In addition to these logical problems with Engels
narrative, recent anthropological evidence indicates that
factually it is incorrect as well.

According to Gerda

Lerner's The Creation of Patriarchy, the ethnographic data
on which Engels' based his analysis has been largely
discredited. 71 According to Lerner, "the assumption that
there is one formula and one pattern for the sexual division
of labor is erroneous.

The particular work done by men and

women has differed greatly in different cultures, largely
depending on the ecological situation in which the people
find themselves.

1172

This

challenges Engels' argument that

men are the original possessors of private property (cattle)
7

°Many socialist feminists think that one way to
incorporate Marxism and feminism is to examine the value of
reproduction as well as that of production.
71

Lerner, Creation of Patriarchy, 22.
See pages 22-24
for a discussion of Engels.
For a more detailed account of
the archeological, ethnographic, and anthropological data
both supporting and disproving Engels' account see Eleanor
Burke Leacock's Introduction to origin.
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because they work outside the household, an assumption
central to his entire argument.

While Engels' analysis

greatly simplifies the division of labor between women and
men and his conclusions are not supported by Lerner's data,
she does find his analysis a useful one.

She states that

"his great merit was to point up the impact of societal and
cultural forces in structuring and defining sexual
relations."n

In other words, by connecting the world

historical defeat of the female sex to economic conditions,
he opens up an analysis of gender to social interpretation
and disrupts the idea that biology is destiny, or that
because women have children they are destined to be
inferior.

This is an extremely important contribution and

should not be overlooked.
My fundamental criticism of Engels' account is that
this is just a story, not a careful, rigorous analysis.

It

is a metanarrative, which serves as an important orienting
devise for a political project.
without worth.

This is not an account

Engels shows that the subjection of women is

a socially constructed situation and one that can change.
However, this account is deeply flawed and the consequences
have been enormous.

Engels subordinates women's struggle

to overcome their oppression to the class struggle to
overcome private property.

Engels' metanarrative obviates

the need to explore the complex interactions of class and
TIIbid., 23.
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sex, because, according to his analysis, the opposition
between the sexes is based solely on economic conditions and
in a state of communism will be erased.
Engels constructs his metanarrative in such a way as to
make the oppression of women coextensive and commensurate
with the advent of private property.

A serious flaw in the

work of Marx and Engels, however, is that their work largely
ignores the specific aspect of women's oppression and
focuses almost exclusively on class oppression and the need
to abolish private property.
need to abolish patriarchy.

There is no discussion on the
This is why understanding the

flaws in this argument are so crucial to the overall focus
of this work, which is an examination of ways to disrupt
patriarchy.

If, as many Marxists argue, patriarchy is based

on the establishment of private property, then one would
logically argue that social intervention aimed at
challenging patriarchy would logically begin with the
overthrow of private property.

I would argue that

patriarchy is not dependent on private property and thus I
claim that by getting rid of private property we will not
necessarily get rid of patriarchy.n
The issue to consider is where does one locate the
source of oppression and thus where does one locate efforts

nThere is an ongoing debate among some feminist
theorists about the relationship between capitalism and
patriarchy. The nuances of this debate are beyond the scope
of this work.
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to bring about changes in society.

Marx and Engels argue

that the major source of oppression is class oppression,
based on unequal relationships of property (the owners of
the mode of production verses those who lose their freedom
and themselves because they do not own the means of
production) .

I am not here arguing that this is not a major

source of oppression, but rather I am arguing that it is not

the source of oppression.

Patriarchy is a source of

oppression, connected in many ways but not identical to
capitalism.

I therefore disagree with Engels' conclusion

that the "world historical def eat of the female sex" is
based solely on economics.
It is clear from this examination of Engels that he
does not give careful enough consideration to the
origination and role of patriarchy.

His analysis of the

overthrow of matriarchy and matriliniality is deeply flawed.
This does not mean we dismiss Marxian economic theory
because it lacks a cohesive theory of patriarchy.

It means

Marx and Engels and their definition of human nature and
their concept of revolution cannot stand alone; it must be
read along with those of other thinkers such as Freud,
Foucault, Flax, and Butler.
Marx's Concept of Revolution
As we can see, the conception of human nature implicit
in Marx's writings of 1844 is that human beings are free and
continually developing beings whose spirit is embodied in

45

their labor activity.

Human beings express their nature in

their labor, for labor is the way humans develop their
species powers by transforming nature.

Through labor human

beings are able to appropriate nature; they make nature
their object.

Human beings are unique in that they make all

of nature, including each other their object.

Human labor

is an essential expression of human nature because,
according to Marx, human beings create themselves as they
transform nature.

But, Marx argues, under capitalism

conditions of alienated labor separates us from our "true"
nature.

This analysis would lead to the conclusion that in

order to free human nature, it is necessary to abolish the
capitalist system, a system in which capitalists owns the
means of production and workers are forced to work for them.
In fact, the abolition of capitalism is seen to be both
necessary and sufficient for human emancipation.

Marx

writes towards the end of the "Alienated Labor" manuscript:
From the relation of alienated labor to private
property it also follows that the emancipation of
society from private property, from servitude,
takes the political form of the emancipation of
the workers; not in the sense that only the
latter's emancipation is involved, but because
this emancipation includes the emancipation of
humanity as a whole.
For all human servitude is
involved in the relation of the worker to
production, and all the types of servitude are
only modifications or consequences of this
relation. 75
This is an important and revealing passage.
75

Here Marx

Marx, The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844
in Marx's Concept of Man, 107.
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is saying that emancipation of workers will lead to the
emancipation of society as a whole because, as he says, "all
human servitude is involved in the relation of the worker to
production, and all types of servitude are only
modifications or consequences of this relation."

Here Marx

is obviously giving priority to the emancipation of the
workers, and saying that if workers are emancipated, then

all other forms of emancipation will follow.

One can assume

here he would mean that the emancipation of women would
follow the emancipation of workers.

In other words he is

saying that if we get rid of the structural domination of
capitalism, then the structural domination of patriarchy
will follow.
This is a point where I and most other feminist
scholars disagree with Marx. It may be true that Marx's
analysis of capitalism,

and the project of overthrowing

this system, are essential aspects of any genuine theory of
liberation, but these elements do not in themselves comprise
a complete theory of liberation.
Marx's concept of human nature leads to his concept of
political intervention.

He thinks that the way to bring

about fundamental change is to engage in a large scale,
socio-political revolution, in which the workers unite to
overthrow the capitalists and thus gain control of the means
of production, "The first step in the revolution by the
working class is to raise the proletariat to the position of
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ruling class. " 76 Marx thinks that we are species beings,
that we are essentially cooperative.

With this conception

of human nature, he can conceive of workers uniting and
forming a massive, united group which can act as a unified
force to overthrow capitalism.
Two elements need to be interrogated here, Marx's
concept of agency, and his concept of revolution.

These two

areas are fundamentally connected, so that reconceiving
agency requires reconceiving our concept of emancipatory
strategies of political intervention.

I would argue that it

is in Marx's limited conception of agency, limited to agency
primarily constructed within economic power configurations,
that has made Marxists overlook the forms of political
intervention waged by some feminists.

Indeed as David

Schweickart has observed, "Marxism, the philosophy of
revolution, has missed what is perhaps the greatest
revolution of our century, 1177 {Schweickart, 350) namely the
revolution against patriarchy.

Marxism has missed this

revolution because of its concept of agency.

Marx believed,

as expressed in the passage quoted above, if we eliminate
class domination and capitalism, all other forms of
oppression will likewise disappear.

Marx can say this,

because he is not looking at the differential power

76
77

Marx and Engels Communist Manifesto, 9 3 .

David Schweickart, Against Capitalism {Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1993), 350.
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configurations within each class.

He sees class

consciousness as a unified concept, because, in his view,
all people of the same class are dealing with the same basic
form of oppression.
Among the differential power configurations Marx's
analysis eclipses are the gender relations within classes.
women and men are not equal within the working class.

Marx

overlooks the oppressive force of patriarchy, independent
from capitalism, which leads to the oppression of women qua
women.

This is not to say that Marxism has been hostile to

feminism.

Most Marxists accept the basic legitimacy of the

feminist project.

There is a recognition that women have

been oppressed and that they have the right to challenge
this oppression.

The difficulty arises in conceiving how

the struggle of women relates to class struggle.

If women's

struggle is subsumed under the rubric of class struggle,
then it can be argued that a revolution which leads to class
liberation will automatically lead to women's liberation as
well.

On the other hand if women's struggle is thought of

independently of class struggle, it is difficult for many
Marxists to conceive of women making a revolution--in the
Marxist sense of this term (armed uprising, large scale
general strike, etc.)--as women.

If, however, we reconceive

of agency, and what we mean by the category of women
(something I will develop in subsequent chapters), then, as
we shall see, it is possible to reconceive ''revolution" as a
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network of alternative strategies of political intervention,
not all of which are modeled on the political revolutions of
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (or the Russian and
Chinese revolutions of the twentieth century) .
Part of reconceiving political intervention involves
reconceiving power.

What I will argue in the following

chapters is that what postmodern feminism brings to the
discussion of emancipatory politics is both a reconception
of agency (both one that explicitly thematizes gender and
one that looks at how our concept of human nature is
constructed within various matrices of power, one of which
is patriarchy) and, a more nuanced understanding of power.
Once we understand how agents are constructed within various
power configurations, then our idea of political
intervention can change.

"Seizing power" is no longer the

only model of emancipatory political practice.

If we think

of power in the postmodern terms of Foucault, Flax, and
Butler, not as something to be seized, but rather as
something in which we already are embedded, something within
which our identity is constructed, then rather than seizure,
the project becomes one of reconfiguration, redeployment,
and renegotiation.

This is a contribution that postmodern

feminist theory makes to the discussion of emancipatory
politics.
There is also the problem of Marx's concept of class.
It can be argued that this idea, in uniting a large group of

50

people under the rubric of "class," marginalizes the
differences inherent in this group of people.

Revolution in

the Marxian sense relies on a universalizing and thus
totalizing concept of human nature, whereas postmodern
feminist theory, as we shall see, wants to focus on the
differences that are eclipsed in such a concept of human
nature.

Schweickart has noted that,

[I]t quite difficult for most Marxists
(particularly male Marxists) to grant equal weight
to the two struggles [feminists challenging
patriarchy and Marxists challenging capitalism]
and hence to regard with sufficient seriousness
the theoretical research and practical actions of
feminists that have no obvious or immediate
bearing on class.
It is difficult to grant equal
weight because it is difficult to see how the
feminist agenda contributes to the Revolution
(capital R) . 78
It is only hard to see how feminist contribute to the
Revolution, if we remain in the context that has been laid
out by Marx, namely that the major force of human oppression
is capitalism, that the fundamental agent of change is a
united working class, and that the model of revolution is an
abrupt seizure of political power.

According to Marx's

conception of the person, labor is the fundamental
constituent of human subjectivity and humans are
fundamentally rational as well as social.

The postmodern

feminist critique of this line of thought interrogates these
three major premises of Marx's conception of human nature:
What if labor is not the only or most central constituent of
78
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human nature?

What if we are not fundamentally rational?

What if we are as asocial as we are social-- or rather
neither by nature?

What if we are not all (in the same

class) fundamentally the same?

By challenging and

disrupting Marx's concept of agency, postmodern feminist
theory opens up new avenues of political intervention and
broadens possibilities for resistance to various systems of
structural domination such as patriarchy and capitalism.
In the following chapters I will argue that the new
notion of radical transformation needed by Marxism is
provided by a postmodern feminist conception of self and
political intervention.

I will argue that ''performativity"

is just such a new practice, one that will use some of the
insights of Marxism and provide a plausible notion of
effective emancipatory political practice.
Marxism is an important revolutionary theory dealing
with economic oppression, but we need other theories of
political intervention to deal with issues such as gender.
What postmodernism allows is a plurality of intervention
strategies.

Unlike Marxism, which insists that all current

forms of oppression are linked to capitalism, postmodernism
allows for, and indeed demands, multiple sites of
intervention.

This is because postmodernism does not see

power as univocal.

In this way postmodernism has a place

for Marxism, since postmodernism is a "pluralistic
philosophy of liberation".

It is therefore incorrect to see

52

postmodernism as antithetical to Marxism, as many theorists
do; rather postmodernism allows for the practice of various
strategies of intervention, among them Marxist revolutionary
strategies.

But it is a modified, because non-hegemonic

Marxism, that postmodernism allows for.

Chapter Two
Freud
Freud's theory of the unconscious and his attention to
the role of the body and of desire in forming the self has
played an important role in disrupting the classical modern
philosophical idea associated with Descartes that the
transcendental subject is a unified rational agent with
unmediated self-knowledge.

In this chapter I will give a

summary and critical analysis of three aspects of Freud's
work that are particularly relevant to my project:

his

structural model of the mind, his theory of the construction
of gender identity, and his metanarrative of civilization,
attending to any possibility of social intervention that
these concepts reveal.
I will pay particular attention to the way in which
gender is developed in these various parts of Freud's theory.

Freud's anxiety about female sexuality extends

throughout his work.

While his theories challenge many

previously held notions of rationality and sexuality, I will
argue that his own ambivalence about female sexuality
pervades and at times distorts his analysis.

He remains

constrained within the patriarchal ideology that presumes
men to be superior to women biologically and culturally.
53
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Freud's Structural Model of the Mind
Freud's concept of the self both disrupts and
reinforces Enlightenment concepts of subjectivity.

His

theory challenges the Enlightenment concept that the self is
a unified rational agent capable of full self-awareness; he
develops a model of the mind that is radically decentered.
Rather than of a unified rational agent, Freud's model is
one of a divided mind that is constantly in conflict with
itself.

Moreover, this mind is primarily unconscious and

permeated by irrationality.
Freud's work is, however, permeated by the
Enlightenment conception of science.

He insists on

positivist notions of science, and he wants psychoanalysis
to be accepted as such a science. 1 The issue of the
scientific status of Freud's thought is a major one in the
literature, but from a postmodern feminist point of view,
this is not the important issue.

First of all postmodernism

is highly suspicious of "scientific" rationality, especially
in the social sciences ("sciences of man'').

Secondly,

whether or not Freud's theory is scientifically wellgrounded--meaning that there have been controlled

1

But while the Enlightenment concept of science privileges the
disengaged rational observer, Jane Flax makes the provocative
a~gument that Freud's own, "[a)nxieties about gender deeply affect
his supposedly gender-neutral concepts of knowledge and the nature
of psychoanalytic practice." Thinking Fragments: Psychoanalysis,
Fe~inism, and Postmodernism in the Contemporary West (Berkeley:
University Of California Press, 1990), 67.
•
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experiments verifying his basic claims--the fact remains
that Freud's model of the mind seems to accord with many
people's experience.

Whatever the scientific status of

Freud's theory, it is safe to say that many people have been
influenced to think of themselves as Freudian subjects.

One

can think of themselves this way. The important question for
a postmodern feminist is should one? 2
There are three basic parts that make up Freud's model
of the mind: the id, the ego and the superego. 3 Each is
formed by both inner and outer experiences and is at once
psychic, somatic, and socio-historical. 4

These multiple

forces influencing the formation of self are significant in
terms of understanding the relationship of Freud's model of
the mind to his conception of society.

Freud's subject is

2

0n psychoanalysis as a science see Jane Flax, "Psychoanalysis
and the Philosophy of Science: Critique or Resistance," Journal of
Philosophy, LXXVII, 10 (October 1981) : 561-569; Jane Flax, "Final
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Gay, Freud: A Life for our Time (New York: W.W. Norton, 1988);
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(Madison: International Universities Press, 1993); Frederick Crews,
Skeptical Engagements (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986);
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Analytic Press, 1990).
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4
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inherently embodied and can and should be understood within
the context of culture and history.

This model challenges

the Enlightenment conception of the subject as an entity
that is unaffected by embodiment.

Moreover, Freud's subject

is ultimately socially constructed, although unlike
postmodernists, Freud tempers this social construction of
the self with a significant degree of biological
determinism.
The basic tenet of Freud's model of the mind is, "[t]he
division of the psychical into what is conscious and what is
unconscious[.]" 5 It is this idea of the unconscious that is
most disruptive of traditional rational philosophical
thought.

Freud himself realizes this:

To most people who have been educated in
philosophy the idea of anything psychical which is
not also conscious is so inconceivable that it
seems to them absurd and refutable simply by
logic. 6
The reservoir of the unconscious, according to Freud,
is primarily the id.

The id is the most primitive part of

the mind, and it is the part from which the other parts,
over time, develop.

The id is completely unconscious and is

the repository of most of our
and desires.
is inherited.
5

drives, instincts, wishes,

The id contains everything psychological that
It is also the reservoir of the libido, the

Sigmund Freud, The Ego and the Id, ed. James Strachey, trans.
Joan Riviere (New York: W.W. Norton, 1960), 3.
6
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psychic energy of the entire mind, and thus the energy of
both the ego and superego are derived from the id.

The id,

as the locus of the instincts, is connected to the somatic
functioning of the organism
this area as well.

and supplies energy to satisfy

We can see that the id is significant in

terms of the movement away from the Enlightenment notion of
disembodied rational subjectivity.
unconscious and irrational.

The id is both

Moreover, being intricately

connected to the somatic functioning of the person, it is
necessarily embodied.
The ego is "that part of the id which has been modified
by the direct influences of the external world through the
system of Pcpt.-Cs [perception-consciousness].

.the ego

seeks to bring the influence of the external world to bear
upon the id and its tendencies." 7

The ego comes into

existence so that the organism can mediate between itself
and the external world.

While the id has no awareness of

the external world, the ego, through perception and
consciousness, is able to take in and process information
from the external world: "For the ego, perception plays the
part which in the id falls to instinct.

118

The ego moves

into and negotiates through the world of objective reality.
While the id operates solely on the basis of the "pleasure

7

Ibid., 15.

8
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principle," the ego obeys the "reality principle. 119 The
pleasure principle is the immediate gratification of
instinctual needs, while the reality principle is the
sublimation of instincts into socially acceptable behavior
that conforms to the conventional expectations of parents,
authority figures, and society in general.
The ego, which is partly conscious and partly unconscious, is the site of the rational part of the mind.

It is

the ego that is responsible for the self-preservation of the
person.

It contains the capacity to calculate, plan,

execute action, common sense and reason. 10

While the ego is

the locus of rationality, it is, "ultimately derived from
bodily sensations, chiefly from those springing from the
surface of the body.

It may thus be regarded as the mental

projection of the surface of the body . . . . besides
representing the superficies of the mental apparatus.

1111

Here we see another aspect of Freud's disruption of the
traditional Enlightenment concept of self.

The part of the

mind which is responsible for rationality has an embodied,
relational character, which is in stark contrast to the
disengaged, disembodied subject employed by thinkers such as
9

For a discussion of the reality principle and the pleasure
principle see Sigmund Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents,
trans. and ed. James Strachey, with an Introduction by Peter Gay
(New York: W.W. Norton, 1961), 14, 26-29.
1
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oescartes.
Another striking element of Freud's discussion of the
rational element, which has implications for postmodern
feminist theory, is that it is inseparable from the irrational.

According to Freud, "The ego is not sharply sepa-

rated from the id; its lower portion merges into it. " 12
with this we get to one of the most important, radical, and,
I think, most useful elements of Freud's thinking.

Our

subjective position is not a stable, rule-governed, wholly
logical and rational position providing a solid foundation
from which we can theorize.

Rather it is inextricably bound

to the unconscious and irrational as well as to the body and
to the psycho-social aspects of our present culture.

Within

this context the ability to think objectively and in a
"purely" rational fashion becomes a rather messy project.
To further complicate this issue, the ego's position,
according to Freud, is precarious.

Freud writes,

We see this . . . ego as a poor creature owing
service to three masters and consequently menaced
by three dangers:
from the external world, from
the libido of the id, and from the severity of the
super-ego. 13
The final part of the mind to develop is the superego.
The superego is both a biological and a cultural construct.
If we consider . . . the origin of the super-ego as
we have described it, we shall recognize that it
12

Freud, Ego and Id, 14.
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is the outcome of two highly important factors,
one of a biological and the other of a historical
nature: namely, the lengthy duration in man of his
childhood helplessness and dependence, and the
fact of his Oedipus complex. • . . We see then,
that the differentiation of the super-ego from the
ego is no matter of chance; it represents the most
important characteristics of the development both
of the individual and of the species; indeed, by
giving permanent expression to the influence of
the parents it perpetuates the existence of the
factors to which it owes its origin. 14
The superego is fundamentally a social construction.
It is the internalized representation of the authority
structures operating in society.

(A fundamental structure

which is internalized during development of the superego is
patriarchy, though Freud himself seems not to have realized
this.)
The superego is the internalized representative of
parents and other authority figures. It is the moral aspect
of the mind and is responsible for our conscious and
unconscious feelings of guilt.

The superego represents

society's interest in maintaining social order.

It should

be noted that patriarchy is a basic assumption in the
development of the superego, for as Freud says, "The superego arises, as we know, from an identification with the
father taken as a model.

1115

The superego is developed as a resolution of the

14

Ibid., 25.

15
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Oedipus complex.

Freud's basic theory of the Oedipus

complex differs significantly for boys and girls.

In this

section I will discuss the Oedipus complex in boys, which
Freud takes as the "standard" model.

For boys, "an

ambivalent attitude to his father and an object-relation of
a solely affectionate kind to his mother make up the content
of the simple. .

. Oedipus complex in a boy. 1116

The boy's

primary attachment is to his mother, and he sees his father
as a threat to his relationship to his mother.

The fact

that the boy has intense sexual feelings towards his mother
makes him aggressive towards his father, for he sees his
father as a competitor for his mother's affection.

In order

to successfully resolve this conflict, the boy must switch
his primary attachment from his mother and begin to identify
with his father.

Since the boy is attracted to his mother,

he fears that his father will know this and try to harm him.
He fears, in fact, that his father will castrate him.

The

key to the successful resolution to the Oedipus complex in
boys, according to Freud,
is the discovery of the possibility of castration,
as proved by the sight of the female genitals,
which forces on him the transformation of his
Oedipus complex, and which leads to the creation
of his super-ego and thus initiates all the
processes that are designed to make the individual

16

Ibid.

I

22.
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find a place in the cultural community. 17
This fear of castration leads to a repression of the sexual
feelings for the mother and those of hostility and
aggression towards the father.

These feelings are

transformed into an identification with the father.

The boy

notices that he, like the father, has a penis, and therefore
that he, like his father, is a man.

The resolution of the

Oedipus complex is an internalization of the father's
authority, and the creation of the superego.

Freud holds

that the superego while later modified by the
internalization of other authority figures, maintains the
character of the father.

18

It should be noted that the

resolution of the Oedipus complex and the formation of the
superego are the boy's initiation into patriarchy, and
indeed into misogyny. "One thing that is left over in men
from the influence of the Oedipus complex is a certain
amount of disparagement in their attitude towards women,
whom they regard as being castrated. 1119
Freud's structural model of the mind poses important
challenges to Enlightenment concepts of subjectivity.

In

introducing the notion that the mind is not a fully self-

17

Sigmund Freud, "Female Sexuality, 11 in The Standard Edition of
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James Strachey (London: The Hogarth Press, 1961), 229.
18
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19

Freud, "Female Sexuality," 229.

63

present rational entity, he has significantly disputed the
traditional philosophical concept of subjectivity.

His

model is one which conceives of the self as non-unitary,
with a large irrational and unconscious component.

For

Freud the self is fundamentally an embodied entity, and
therefore gendered.

Another essential dimension of the self

for Freud is its social construction.
model, the self is developed over time.

According to his
Although Freud does

not stress this fact--indeed he sometimes writes as if his
model is timeless and universal--it is easy to see, given
the importance Freud places on family structure and
authority figures, that the socio-historical context in
which it develops is crucial.

From a postmodern feminist

perspective these are valuable contributions to an analysis
of subjectivity.

A problematic aspect of his model,

however, is that it is excessively biologistic.

Throughout

he assumes the male model to be normative and arrives at
some troubling conclusions regarding women.

In the next

section I will examine Freud's analysis of the Oedipus
complex in girls and his discussion of the construction of
female sexuality.

Female Sexuality and Gender Construction
According to Freud it is more difficult for girls to
overcome the Oedipus complex than it is for boys.

This

difference is significant, since it is the resolution of the
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Oedipus complex that leads to the development of the
superego and thus to the child's being able to fully
participate in society.

"The development of a little girl

into a normal woman is more difficult and more complicated,
since it includes two extra tasks, to which there is nothing
corresponding in the development of a man.

1120

These two

extra steps involve the girl switching her primary erotic
zone from the clitoris to the vagina, and switching from the
mother to the father as the primary object of desire. 21
Just as the boys resolution of the Oedipus complex is
initiated with his fear of castration, this is the same in
girls, but without the positive results.

While the boy

resolves his Oedipus feelings by identifying with the father
and internalizing his father's values and thus integrating
himself into society, the girl cannot come to this same
conclusion:
Quite different are the effects of the castration
complex in the female.
She acknowledges the fact
of her castration, and with it, too, the
superiority of the male and her own inferiority;
but she rebels against this unwelcome state of
affairs. 22
It is important to note that Freud thinks that such
rebellion can easily lead to neurosis or an "abnormal"
20

Sigmund Freud, "Femininity," in New Introductory Lectures on
Psycho-analysis
in
The
standard
Edition
of
the
Complete
Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud vol. XXII, ed. and trans.
James Strachey (London: Hogarth Press, 1965), 117.
nFreud, "Female Sexuality," 225.
22

Freud, "Female Sexuality," 229.

65

masculinity complex.
The discovery that she is castrated is a turningpoint in a girl's growth. Three possible lines of
development start from it: one leads to sexual
inhibition or to neuroses, the second to change of
character in the sense of a masculinity complex,
the third, finally, to normal femininity. 23
The little girl thus begins her journey into adulthood with
the knowledge that she is inferior since "her self-love is
mortified by the comparison with the boy's far superior
equipment. " 24

According to Freud, this recognition of her

lack of the coveted penis can have three possible outcomes
in the adult women. She may cease her sexual desire
entirely, and thus become frigid, she may defiantly overemphasize her masculinity (often leading to lesbianism); or
she may take the first steps toward definitive femininity by
accepting her father as a primary love object and become
more passive sexually. 25

Ultimately, however, a woman does

not become "normal" until she has a baby, and preferably a
boy.
The wish with which the girl turns to her father
is no doubt originally the wish for the penis
which her mother has refused her and which she now
expects from her father.
Their feminine situation
is only established, however, if the wish for a
penis is replaced by one for a baby, if, that is,
a baby takes the place of a penis[.]M
23
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Freud continues,
A mother is only brought unlimited satisfaction by
her relation to a son; this is altogether the most
perfect, the most free from ambivalence of all
human relationships. A mother can transfer to her
son the ambition which she has been obliged to
suppress in herself, and can expect from him the
satisfaction of all that has been left over in her
of her masculinity complex. Even a marriage is
not made secure until the wife has succeeded in
making her husband her child as well and in acting
as a mother to him.n
The fact that a girl resolves her Oedipus complex
differently from a boy has far-reaching social consequences.
According to Freud,
In the absence of fear of castration the chief
motive is lacking which leads boys to surmount the
Oedipus complex. Girls remain in it for an
indeterminate length of time; they demolish it
late and, even so, incompletely.
In these
circumstances the formation of the super-ego must
suffer; it cannot attain strength and independence
which give it its cultural significance, and
feminists are not pleased when we point out to
them the effects of this factor upon the average
feminine character 28
This account, we observe, is exceedingly biologistic.
Freud insists that he is only being scientific.

In opening

his discussion of female sexuality and of the Oedipus
Complex Freud writes that he is, "bring[ing] forward nothing
but observed facts, almost without any speculative

nibid., 133-134.
28
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additions. " 29

But clearly there is more going on here than

just careful attention to "observed facts."

And Freud

himself knows this, for later in the same essay he writes,
"If you . .

. regard my belief in the influence of the lack

of a penis on the configuration of femininity as an idee
fixe, I am of course defenseless.

1130

Thus Freud is

admitting to being defenseless at one of the most crucial
junctures in his thought.

Almost his entire theory about

the roles of women and men in society depend precisely on
this idee fixe of Freud's, yet, while he finds it an
important enough idea on which to base his theory of
sexuality, he cannot provide an argument to defend this
position.

Freud's theory of gender formation depends on the

basic assumption that men, simply by virtue of possessing a
penis, are superior to women.

And because men have this

biological attribute, it follows that they are better suited
to running society, which is the basic assumption of
patriarchy in Freud's work.
So when Freud says that he is bringing nothing forward
but the observed facts and not making any speculations, it
is essential to notice the context within which he observes
these facts.

The context is an implicit assumption that

patriarchy is the natural, and in fact the only possible,

3
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structure of society.

In developing his theory of

sexuality, which is inseparable from his theory of
subjectivity (since all subjects are embodied and the
various aspects of the mind are, as has been shown,
inextricably bound to both the body and to the culture, past
and present), Freud is incapable of escaping the confining
theoretical framework of patriarchy and misogyny.
Nowhere in this detailed discussion of the construction
of gender identity does Freud provide an argument to support
his contention that the girl's "equipment is inferior" or
that having a penis is in itself something to be desired.
While he provides some interesting ideas about the social
construction of gender identity (for example, in observing
that gender identity is not something given from birth, and
in thinking about what it means for a child to think of
herself or himself as a girl or a boy) his theory ultimately
rests on a biological determinism that is not argued for or
supported.
Many feminists have criticized Freud's treatment of
female identity formation in general, and his concept of
penis envy in particular.
such critique.

Simone de Beauvoir offers one

In the Second Sex Simone de Beauvoir

critiques the overall lack of philosophical justification in
Freud's work.

She points to Freud's lack of concern for the

independent destiny of women, claiming that Freud simply
adapted his account of the psycho-sexual development of
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boys/men to that of girls/women without adequate theoretical
support.

Beauvoir maintains that Freud simply assumes, with

no philosophic or scientific explanation, that "woman feels
that she is a mutilated man."

Beauvoir continues,

Many psychoanalysts today admit that the young
girl may regret not having a penis without
believing, however, that it has been removed from
her body; and even this regret is not general.
It
could not arise from a simple anatomical
comparison; many little girls, in fact, are late
in discovering the masculine construction, and if
they do, it is only by sight. The little boy
obtains from his penis a living experience that
makes it an object of pride to him, but this pride
does not necessarily imply a corresponding
humiliation for his sisters, since they know the
masculine organ in its outward aspect only--this
outgrowth, this weak little rod of flesh can in
itself inspire them only with indifference, or
even disgust. 31
Beauvoir's point is that Freud assumes the male model
as normative and thus assumes girls, in comparing themselves
to this normative model, feel abnormal or mutilated.

Freud

gives no consideration to the idea that boys, when comparing
themselves to girls,
extra growth.

might feel alarmed that they have an

This is because Freud always assumes the male

body and male development to be standard and "normal".
Beauvoir criticizes Freud for failing to account for the
social origin (as opposed to a purely biological one)

of

male sovereignty.n

31
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Throughout Freud's discussion of female sexuality, from
the Oedipus complex to penis envy, he introduces "normality"
as a normative concept that can (and is) used against women.
This operates in two ways.

First of all, permeating Freud's

discussion of female sexuality is the basic idea that male
psycho-social-sexual development proceeds along (and indeed
establishes) the "normal" trajectory, while female
development is "abnormal" in that it deviates from the male
route.

Male sexual development is put forth by Freud as the

standard normative model, leaving females to be classified
as "mutilated" deviants.

Secondly, there is the notion of

"normal" femininity, which, as we have seen, culminates
successfully only when a woman becomes compliantly
heterosexual and gives birth to a son.

A woman who does not

follow the prescribed path is not only "abnormal" in the
neutral sense of being different, but in the clinicalnormative sense of having something wrong with her, and in
need of treatment.
Because girls/women cannot follow the regulative model
of male sexuality Freud concludes that they often suffer
from neurosis.

But because Freud is so firmly entrenched in

a patriarchal context, he demonstrates a blindness to the
possibility that patriarchy is the cause of neurosis and
should be changed.

In Civilization and Its Discontents when

Freud is discussing the etiology of neurosis he writes,
It was discovered that a person becomes neurotic

71

because he cannot tolerate the amount of
frustration which society imposes on him in the
service of its cultural ideals, and it was
inferred from this that the abolition or reduction
of those demands would result in a return to
possibilities of happiness.n
Given this description of the etiology of neuroses it is not
surprising that Freud found more women then men "neurotic".
What is surprising is that Freud himself shows a remarkable
lack of insight about how patriarchy and misogyny are
factors in the formation of this neurosis.

In his

discussion of female sexuality, Freud states that a woman
can only feel complete and obtain happiness if she has a
male child so that she can possess the coveted penis.

Freud

remarks that with a male child, "a mother can transfer to
her son the ambition which she has been obliged to suppress
in herself."

It seems important to ask why is such a

suppression demanded at all.

Freud does not seem to think

this an issue in need of explanation.

Might the explanation

be that it is patriarchal society, which does not allow the
full participation of women in the public sphere, that
demands the suppression and sublimation of women's ambition
into socially acceptable behaviors such as raising children.
If women were allowed to fully participate in the affairs of
society, might this not result in "the return to the
possibility of happiness."

Therefore, rather than having

male children and suppressing their ambitions, it seems that
33
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a more effective strategy for women to feel complete and
avoid neurosis, even in Freud's own terms, would be the
"abolition or reduction" of the demands of a patriarchal
society on the submission of women.
According to Freud's model of female sexuality, women,
because of their "abnormal" psycho-sexual development, are
unable to fully participate in civilization.
articulated in his discussion of

This is first

the superego.

As we have

seen, the superego is the result of the successful
resolution of the Oedipus complex.

The superego is

important for a person to succeed within society, since it
is the superego that allows people to "find a place in the
cultural community. " 34

The problem, of course, is that

Freud has said that it is harder for girls to resolve the
Oedipus complex and since successful resolution of the
Oedipus complex is necessary in order to develop a strong
superego, we can see that Freud will argue that women are
not as able to participate fully in civilization.

For Freud

the superego "answers to everything that is expected of the
higher nature of man. " 35 "Religion, morality, and a social
sense" are to be found in people (men) because of their
superego. 36 Thus he can confidently state, "It seems that

34
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women have made few contributions to the discoveries and
inventions in the history of civilization."n
Freud's theory of female sexuality, despite its obvious
misogynist tone, still has much to offer to a postmodern
feminist analysis.

The major contribution Freud makes is

his recognition that sexuality and gender identity are
indeed constructed and multi-determined.

Freud, however,

does not examine how this construction takes place within
existing socio-cultural power configurations, much less how
his own theories are influenced and constructed within these
same power dynamics.

He tries to claim scientific

legitimacy for his ideas, and maintains that they offer
universal explanations, rather than recognizing them as
culturally specific.

What he does not examine, therefore,

is how his own ideas are deeply rooted in patriarchal
assumptions, and thus he is led to establish male sexuality
as normative and male anatomy as the ideal.

Ultimately his

concept of gender as constructed is distorted and flawed by
his biological determinism.

By challenging this biological

determinism with a more comprehensive examination of the
effects of socialization, we can have a more complete
picture of the development of gender and self.n

nFreud, "Femininity," 132.
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Freud's Metanarrative of Civilization
According to Freud's analysis in Civilization and Its
Discontents

no one can be truly happy in civilization,

because civilization goes against our basic instinctual
impulses--sexuality and aggression.

These impulses,

originating from the id, want immediate satisfaction.

Freud

calls this immediate gratification of our instinctual
impulses "the pleasure principle."

Civilization, however,

demands that we sublimate our instinctual desires into
socially acceptable behavior, what Freud terms "the reality
principle."

According to Freud no one is ever truly happy

in civilization because the fundamental human impulse
towards individual happiness is in opposition to the basic
aim of civilization.

In other words, within civilization

there is always a conflict between the pleasure principle
and the reality principle.
In order to explain why individual happiness is
antithetical to the demands of civilization, Freud
constructs a theory as to the origin of civilization. 39
Freud claims that the first acts of civilization were tool
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usage, the building of dwellings, and the control over
fire. 40 Of these, Freud maintains that the control over fire
is most "extraordinary" and "unexampled". 41 He speculates
that primal man had a habit of putting out fires by
urinating on them.

According to Freud this is both

satisfaction of infantile desires and an engagement in a
homosexual competition of sexual potency.

Fire, says Freud,

was originally thought of as phallic; indeed Freud says that
there is, "no doubt about the originally phallic view taken
of tongues of flame as they shoot upwards.

1142

Thus by

urinating on the fire, men were engaging in a homosexual
competitive activity-- the phallus of the man who put out
the fire was more potent than the phallus of the fire.
However, the first person to control his desire and not put
out the fire, was able to gain an important advantage--he
gains control over nature and makes use of the fire.
While men conquered nature by refraining from
micturating on fire, "woman had been appointed guardian of
the fire which was held captive on the domestic hearth,
because her anatomy made it impossible for her to yield to

4
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the temptation of this desire. " 43 Freud maintains that there
is a connection between, "ambition, fire and urethral
eroticism."

Freud concludes from this analysis that men are

naturally more ambitious than women.
Freud asserts that civilization first appears as an
attempt to regulate social relationships.

The decisive step

in this process is the "replacement of the power of the
individual by the power of the community.

1144

This institutes

a form of order in which behavior is regulated by law, and
no one is at the mercy of brute force.

"The first requisite

of civilization, therefore, is that of justice--that is, the
assurance that a law once made will not be broken in favor
of an individual.
of such a

law."~

This implies nothing of the ethical value
The individual's claim for freedom and

liberty is in conflict with the cultural claims of the group
as a whole, and in order to maintain order, law is
introduced. 46
The first enactment of this crucial replacement of the
power of the individual with the power of the community
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77

takes place within the family.

In the primitive family, 47

the father had complete control and ruled without
restriction.

Above all, he had complete control over all

the women, which he kept to himself.

In order to limit the

authority of the father, the sons banded together to
overpower him, thus making the discovery "that a combination
can be stronger than a single individual. " 48

Freud

continues, "The totemic culture is based on the restrictions
which the sons had to impose on one another in order to keep
this new state of affairs in being.

The taboo observances

were the first 'right' or ' law. ' " 49 In banding together to
kill the father, a strong sense of fraternity developed, as
well as a sense of guilt.

Freud contends that this guilt,

resulting from this original act of patricide, continues to
be stored in our unconscious and is often expressed in
religious rituals.
This initial act of patricide marked the transition
from the primitive family (or primal horde) to civilization.
According to Freud, civilization comes about because man
wanted woman--or, as Freud calls it, "his sex object"-available to him on demand, and woman wanted to be with her

47 In

Civilization and Its Discontents Freud refers to this as
the "primitive family" where elsewhere, such as in Totem and Taboo,
he speaks of this as the "primal horde."
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children.

Thus he says that the "parents" of civilization

are Eros and Ananke--Love and Necessity.~
Ultimately, however, civilization comes into conflict
with the erotic or sexual love of a man and a woman.

Erotic

love is the relationship between two people, while
civilization depends on the relationship between groups of
people.

This conflict between erotic love and civilization

is expressed in the conflict between the family and the
larger community.

And it is this conflict that leads to

women "retarding and restraining" the development of
civilization.
Women . . . . in the beginning, laid the foundations
of civilization by the claims of their love.
Women represent the interests of the family and of
sexual life. The work of civilization has become
increasingly the business of men, it confronts
them with ever more difficult tasks and compels
them to carry out instinctual sublimations of
which women are little capable. 51
Freud claims that men have only a limited amount of
libidinal energy, which they must distribute between
civilization (culture), and women.

The more a man uses his

libidinal energy for the works of civilization, the less
energy he has for his family; consequently, "woman finds
herself forced in the background by the claims of

50

Ibid.

51

Ibid.

I

59.

79

civilization and then adopts a hostile attitude towards
it."ll
In the previous discussion of the Oedipus complex and
the consequent development in woman of a weaker superego, we
saw the precursor to this analysis.

Freud claims that

because women are not as capable as men of sublimation, or
channeling their libidinal energy into socially acceptable
activities, they are not capable of fully participating in
that civilization.
This Freudian metanarrative regarding the origins of
civilization has, at its foundation, numerous problematic
assumptions.

In almost all places his analysis is gendered

and either based on, or relates back to, his analysis of the
sexual differences between males and females.

Freud applies

his analysis of penis envy and the Oedipus complex to his
analysis of civilization.

The lack of a penis is the reason

why women are unable to fully participate in civilization,
because it is the lack of a penis which ultimately leads to
women developing weak superegos, and their inability to
successfully sublimate libidinal desires.
and Its Discontents

In Civilization

Freud goes so far as to say women

"retard" and "restrain" the development of civilization.~
Freud's conception of the origin of civilization is built on

llibid.
~Ibid.
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his assumption of traditional gender roles, i.e. that men
want sex and women want to be with their children.

He never

questions these traditional ideas about sex roles.

He

doesn't propose that women might want sexual satisfaction or
that men might want to be near their children.

Like Engels,

Freud's metanarrative presumes a sexual division of labor.
Women remain in the home and take care of the children,
while men work outside the home.

Like so many of his basic

assumptions, he never examines, argues for, or explains this
one.

He just takes it as his implicit starting point.
Freud, like Engels, tries to take seriously the latest

findings (in his time) of anthropology.

He justifies his

primal horde myth by citing Darwin: "Darwin deduced from the
habits of the higher apes that men, too, originally lived in
comparatively small groups or hordes within which the
jealousy of the oldest and strongest male prevented sexual
promiscuity. 1154 This Darwinian thesis, however, is generally
considered false by contemporary anthropologists and
biologists.

According to Peter Gay, "the conjectures of

Darwin and others about the prehistoric horde governed
autocratically by a polygamous and monopolitic male did not
stand up well to further research.

Freud's stirring

portrayal of that lethal fraternal rebellion against

~The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of
Sigmund Freud, trans. and ed. James Strachey, vol. XIII, Totem and
Taboo (London: Hogarth Press, 1964), 125.
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patriarchy seemed increasingly implausible.

1155

Freud, while critical of Lamarck, was at the same time
strongly influenced by him.

Freud believed that a

primitive, originary patricide was reenacted over and over
again during early human history and that each male, even
now, has "stored this phylogenetic legacy in his
unconscious, including the resulting sense of collective
guilt over the primal crime.

1156

Contemporary biology

disputes this latter contention.

Developmental biology has

shown that acquired traits cannot be genetically passed on
from one generation to the next. 57
In addition to the factual inconsistencies in the
Freudian metanarrative, we should also note that its overall
import is deeply pessimistic about the possibility for human
happiness, now or ever.

For Freud any organized society

runs counter to individual happiness.
The two urges, the one towards personal happiness
and the other towards union with other human
beings must struggle with each other in every
individual; and so, also, the two processes of
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Peter Gay, Freud: A Life For Our Time (New York: W.W. Norton

& Company, 1988), 333.
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The standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of
Sigmund Freud, trans. and ed. James Strachey, vol. XXIII, Moses and
Monotheism:
Three Essays,132 as quoted in Adolf Grunbaum,
Validation in the Clinical Theory of Psychoanalysis (Madison:
International Universities Press, 1993), 277.
57

For discussions of the anthropological basis of Freud's
conjecture on the beginning of civilization see: Grunbaum,
Validation in the Clinical Theory of Psychoanalysis, 276-277; Peter
Gay, Freud: A Life for our Time, 332-335.
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individual and of cultural development must stand
58
in hostile opposition to each other. .
Because of how he conceives subjectivity--as inherently
egoistic and as striving toward individual satisfaction--he
cannot see this subject as happy within the context of any
society.
It is important to notice that for Freud it is

individual happiness which is emphasized.

In contrast to

Marx, Freud does not think that it is natural to have a
communal sense or "species being".

The fact that he sees

the individual as 'egoistic' influences his idea of social
intervention.

For him the individual cannot be happy in any

type of civilization because "the main aim of individuals is
'egoistic' or the urge toward happiness, while the main
emphasis in the development of civilization is 'altruist' or
the urge towards union with others in the community.

1159

Thus he has no concept of political intervention in the
sense that Marx does, that individuals can come together and
overthrow a repressive regime and bring about a society that
is more conducive to human growth.
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It would seem that Freud forecloses all possibility for
meaningful intervention that would increase human happiness,
58

Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, 106.
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Ibid.
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~arx and Freud also have very different views regarding work
(Civilization and Its Discontents, 55) and
private property
(Civilization and Its Discontents, 70-71).

83

since he sees civilization as inherently restrictive of
individual happiness.

He does, however, offer a curious

idea for political intervention at the end of Civilization
and Its Discontents.

After discussing the similarities and

differences between the individual and the cultural superego, Freud suggests:
If the development of civilization has such a farreaching similarity to the development of the
individual and if it employs the same methods, may
we not be justified in reaching the diagnosis
that, under the influence of cultural urges, some
civilizations, or some epochs of civilizationpossibly the whole of mankind- have become
•neurotic'? An analytic dissection of such
neuroses might lead to therapeutic recommendations
which could lay claim to great practical interest.
I would not say that an attempt of this kind to
carry psycho-analysis over to the cultural
community was absurd or doomed to be fruitless. 61
Here we have Freud suggesting that some societies
(one presumes he is speaking of our own) have become
excessive in their repression of sexuality, and hence might
be able to relax some of their restrictions, making them
less neurotic.

Still and all, changes of this nature cannot

be expected to make to large a difference.
overall the Freudian metanarrative of civilization is
highly conservative: the group is bound to assume ascendancy
over the

61

62

individual;~people

will never really be happy--so

Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, 109-110.

Again a comparison with Marx's more optimistic vision is in
order: for Marx real individuality is enhanced, not crushed, in a
truly human society.
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why try?

The best he can do is suggest that certain

societies might themselves be neurotic.

Most importantly

Freud's metanarrative seems particularly oppressive to
woman, since it posits women as relatively incapable of
participating fully in the world of politics and work, given
their limited capability for the instinctual sublimations
upon which civilization is based.
Freud's theories, for all their flaws, do hold some
value for a postmodern feminist political praxis.

His

concept of the self--as decentered, divided, embodied, with
a significant irrational component--undermines the
Enlightenment idea that the self is primarily a selfreflective rational agent.

His concept of the unconscious

challenges the Enlightenment idea of knowledge, in that it
shows that fully transparent reason is not possible.

He

introduces the idea that the self is heterogeneous and
multidetermined.

According to his analysis both the self

and gender are constructed by complex forces.
Ultimately, however, Freud's theories are deeply
flawed.

He attempts to establish the male model of psycho-

sexual development as universal and normative.

In

attributing universality to his concepts of self and
sexuality, he consistently ignores the fact these concepts
are

gender specific and culturally and historically

relative.

And because he himself is oblivious to the over-
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arching patriarchal dimensions of his analysis, he is blind
to the possibility of radically altering patriarchal
structures.

Chapter Three
Foucault
Michel Foucault's postmodern philosophy criticizes
both Marx and Freud for creating "global, totalitarian
theories. " 1 He thinks that both Marx and Freud offer
totalizing metanarratives of the subject and of history that
obscure the operation of power. 2

There is no concept in

Foucauldian philosophy more basic than power.

According to

Foucault the subject is constituted within various matrices
of power.

For Foucault there is no subject position outside

of these fields of power.

If his conception of power is

correct, it becomes necessary to reconceive strategies of

1

Michel Foucault, "Two Lectures," in Power/Knowledge:
Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977, ed. Colin
Gordon, trans. Gordon et. al. (New York: Pantheon Books,
1980), 80. For a discussion of Foucault's concept of
totalizing theory as it relates to Marx and Freud, see Jana
Sawicki, Disciplining Foucault: Feminism, Power, and the
Body (New York: Routledge, 1991), 51-53; Barry Smart,"The
Politics of Truth and the Problem of Hegemony," in Foucault:
A Critical Reader, ed. David Couzens Hoy (London: Basil
Blackwell, 1986), 157-173; Barry Smart, Foucault, Marxism
and Critique (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983),
especially 162-167; see also Paul Rabinow Introduction to
The Foucault Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon
Books, 1984), 4 and 7.
2

For a discussion of totalizing metanarratives see
Jean-Francios Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on
Knowledge, trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984).
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political intervention.

The revolutionary model described

by Marx is inadequate in terms of this reconception of
power.

Other forms of resistance must be given more

prominence.
In this chapter I will first examine Foucault's
critique of Marx and the problem of globalizing discourse.
Next I will discuss the genealogical method, which Foucault
presents as an alternative to such discourses.

I will then

examine Foucault's discussion of the repressive hypothesis
and his critique of Freud.

After analyzing Foucault's

critique of Marx and Freud, I will look at Foucault's
alternative conception of power and of truth and how this
relates to his concept of constructed subjectivity.

I will

examine how his reconceptualization of power, truth, and
subjectivity informs his idea of political resistance.
Finally, I will defend Foucault against an important
criticism levelled against him by Nancy Fraser.
Foucault's Critique of Globalizing Discourse
Much of the literature on Marx and Freud is comprised
of various scholars arguing whether or not these theories
are really scientific.

Scholars try to prove that a

discourse such as Marxism or psychoanalysis qualifies as
"scientific"

in order to appeal to the status and authority

of science to legitimate the knowledge and truth established
by these discourses.

Other scholars challenge the

scientific status of the theories in order to deny them such
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legitimacy.

Foucault claims that in order to establish a

discourse as scientific, however, an artificial continuity
is imposed by including certain forms of knowledge and
excluding others.

The narrative structure enforced by these

globalizing discourses is one which imposes a rigid, linear
analysis that subsumes all theoretical and practical issues
under a single rubric of knowledge. 3 Foucault therefore
maintains that debating the scientific status of a Marxism
or psychoanalysis is the wrong issue to address.

Indeed,

the very fact that such an issue is raised is indicative of
the problem with scientific discourse.

The question

Foucault asks, as a genealogist, is why do these discourses

want to be recognized as scientific?
I would remind you how numerous have been those
who for many years now, probably for more than
half a century, have questioned whether Marxism
was, or was not, a science . . . . the same issue
has been posed . . . in the case of psychoanalysis. . . . But to all these demands of: 'Is
it or is it not a science?', . . . the genealogist
would reply: 'If you really want to know, the
fault lies in your very determination to make a
science out of Marxism or psychoanalysis . . . '·
If we have any objection against Marxism, it lies
in the fact that it could effectively be a
science.
(I]t is surely necessary to question
ourselves about our aspir-ations to the kind of
power that is presumed to accompany such a
science.
It is surely the following kinds of
questions that would need to be posed: What types
of knowledges do you want to disqualify in the
very instant of your demand: 'Is it a science'?
Which speaking, discoursing subjects--which
subjects of experience and knowledge--do you then
3

According to Foucault Marxism is the metanarrative of
wealth and economics and Freudian psychoanalysis is the
metanarrative of sexuality.
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want to 'diminish' when you say: 'I who conduct
this discourse am conducting a scientific
discourse, and I am a scientist: Which
theoretical-political avant garde do you want to
enthrone in order to isolate it from all the
discontinuous forms of knowledge that circulate
about it? 4
To proclaim that a certain discourse is scientific is
to claim that it is distinguishable as a unified, rational,
continuous, hierarchized discourse.

According to Foucault,

in order to establish such discourses, one ignores the
myriad discontinuous, "illegitimate" discourses which also
occupy the terrain of knowledge.

The proclamation that a

discourse is scientific is, according to Foucault, an
attempt to bestow authoritarian power upon certain types of
knowledge.

When certain discourses are seen as

authoritarian, the truth that they proclaim is legitimated
and becomes hegemonic.

The truth of the unauthorized,

discontinuous discourses is then seen as illegitimate and
subordinate.

These illegitimate discourses are thus

marginalized.

In order to establish a discourse as

scientific, therefore, knowledge is unnecessarily delimited
and truth circumscribed, which is why Foucault states that,
"the attempt to think in terms of totality has in fact
proved a hindrance to research." 5

4

Michel Foucault, "Two Lectures," in Power/Knowledge:
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Gordin, trans. Gordon et al. (New York: Pantheon Books,
1980)
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It is important to note that it is not the "scientific
method" to which Foucault objects, nor does he rule out all
science as illegitimate.

What he is above all concerned to

call into question is the pretence that "science" is neutral
and unaffected by the operations of power.

This problem is

particularly acute when what is claiming to be science is a
totalizing metanarrative:
We are concerned . . . with the insurrection of
knowledges that are opposed primarily not to the
contents, methods or concepts of a science, but to
the effects of the centralizing powers which are
linked to the institution and functioning of an
organized scientific discourse within a society
such as ours.
Nor does it basically matter all
that much that this institutionalization of
scientific discourse is embodied in a university,
or, more generally, in an educational apparatus,
in a theoretical-commercial institution such as
psychoanalysis or within the framework of reference that is provided by a political system such
as Marxism; for it is really against the effects
of the power of a discourse that is considered to
be scientific that the genealogy must wage its
struggle. 6
A major problem with totalizing metanarratives is that any
position which challenges the authority of such a narrative
is either subsumed into the sameness of the totalizing
discourse or is ignored as being illegitimate.

According to

Foucault, there is a hierarchy to knowledges, and within
this structure, the totalizing narratives such as
Enlightenment rationality, Marxism, and psychoanalysis, are
given a privileged status leaving alternative narratives

6

Ibid., 84.
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(such as feminism) marginalized. 7
What Foucault objects to about totalizing
metanarratives that claim scientific status is the operation
of power which legitimizes certain truths.

The power

operation within the scientific discourse is the top down
juridico-discursive model of power.

Truth is said to

emanate from these authoritative metanarratives.

What is

characteristic of the theories of both Marx and Freud is
that they fit many disparate concepts under the rubric of
their respective theories. What Foucault is interested in
exposing through his genealogical critique is both what is
left out of these narratives, and what truths are created.
Genealogical Method
Foucault's genealogical method involves an examination
of how we get to where we are, but without any extrapolating
into the future.

This method is anti-causal in the sense

that it tends to highlight sharp ruptures that could not
have been predicted.
over continuity.

Genealogy emphasizes discontinuity

Thus the Marxian dream of "a science of

history" is debunked.

To understand Foucault's use of the

term "genealogy" it might be fruitful to think of the
literal meaning of the word.

When you trace a person's

7of

course Marxism is far more marginalized itself
these days than when Foucault was writing about it. Marxism

is no longer the official ideology of a world's superpower,
of all of Eastern Europe, or of powerful Communist Parties
in Western Europe.
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genealogy, you come up with a list of ancestors--a linkage
of the past with the present.

But there is no narrative

structure here, there is no "logic" to the development--and
hence no way of extrapolating into the future.

There is

something random and accidental about a family tree--so and
so happened to marry so and so, and they happened to have
children, one of which then married so and so, etc.

The

lives of one's ancestors are not the precursors of your own,
in the sense that they are leading up to yours, and receive
their meaning from your life.

The lives of each must be

evaluated in her or his own terms.

Foucault's genealogical

method allows us to understand an institution or an epoch
(including the present one) as related to the past, but
without assuming that we are somehow the culmination of the
past, or a stage on the way to something even better.
Genealogy is anticausal (and so antideterministic,
anti-reductive) and pays attention to marginal figures and
knowledges.

These later Foucault terms subjugated

knowledges.
[B]y subjugated knowledges one should understand .
. . . namely, a whole set of knowledges that have
been disqualified as inadequate to their task or
insufficiently elaborated: naive knowledges,
located low down on the hierarchy, beneath the
required level of cognition or scientificity.
I
•.. believe that it is through the re-emergence of
these low-ranking knowledges, these unqualified,
even directly disqualified knowledges . . . . and
which I would call a popular knowledge . . .
. though it is far from being a general common
sense knowledge, but is on the contrary a
particular, local, regional knowledge, a different
knowledge incapable of unanimity . . . . that it is
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through the re-appearance of this knowledge, of
these local popular knowledges, these disqualified
knowledges, that criticism performs its work. 8
Foucault puts forth genealogy as an alternative to the
tyranny of globalizing knowledges.
What [genealogy] really does is to entertain the
claims to attention of local, discontinuous,
disqualified, illegitimate knowledges against the
claims of a unitary body of theory which would
filter, hierarchize and order them in the name of
some true knowledge and some arbitrary idea of
what constitutes a science and its objects. 9
Genealogical critique reveals the power operating in the
construction and maintenance of these metanarratives.

It

therefore serves as "traps, demands, challenges" to
scientific discourses.

Genealogy allows the emergence of

these subjugated knowledges to disrupt the hegemony of
globalizing discourse.

Part of the "tyranny of globalizaing

discourses" is that they produce normative accounts of both
truth and subjectivity.
Repression, Truth, and Power
One of the major ways to see how subjects are
constructed through scientific discourse is to look at
sexuality.

As Foucault writes:

[T]he project of a science of the subject has
gravitated, in ever narrowing circles, around the
question of sex.
Causality in the subject, the
unconscious of the subject, the truth of the
subject in the other who knows, the knowledge he
holds unbeknown to him, all this found an
8

Foucault, "Two Lectures," 82.

9

Ibid., 83.
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opportunity to deploy itself in the discourse of
sex. Not, however, by reason of some natural
property inherent in sex itself, but by virtue of
the tactics of power immanent in this discourse. 10
According to Foucault the science of the subject begins with
the question of sex. 11 It is in Foucault's discussion of
sexuality, especially as it appears in his first volume of
The History of Sexuality, that one can see how the subject
is constructed through the interplay of power and knowledge,
and how power produces truth.

One of the reasons that the

science of the subject begins with the question of sexuality
is that, as Foucault states in an interview, "people are
told that the secret of their truth lies in the region of
their sex. " 12

What is particularly important about people's

truth being linked to their sexuality is that this truth of
one's sexuality is one that is revealed only through the
intervention of expert discourses.

One needs the expert

then, be it the priest, the analyst, the teacher, to tell
one what one's sexuality means and who one "really" is.
Foucault begins his discussion in the first volume of
The History of Sexuality with a discussion of the Repressive

1

°Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume I:
trans. Robert Hurley ((New York: Vintage
Books, 1978), 70.

An Introduction,
11

See Alan Sheridan, Michel Foucault: The Will To Know
(London: Tavistock Publications, 1980), 164-194, especially
179.
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Michel Foucault, "The Confession of the Flesh," in
Power/Knowledge, 214.
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Hypotheses.

Foucault's analysis here represents a deep and

original criticism of Freud, who was the first to give the
term "repression" its current sexual connotation.
According to Foucault the Repressive Hypotheses begins
with the claim that the seventeenth century initiated an age
of sexual repression that continues to this day.

This

hypotheses asserts that sex increasingly becomes something
which one is forbidden to discuss, and that sexual behavior
is severely curtailed.
The repression of sexuality is linked to the
development of capitalism.
By placing the advent of the age of repression in
the seventeenth century, after hundreds of years
of open spaces and free expression, one adjusts it
to coincide with the development of capitalism: it
becomes an integral part of the bourgeois order . .
A principle of explanation emerges after the
fact: if sex is so rigorously repressed, this is
because it is incompatible with a general and
intensive work imperative. At a time when labor
capacity was being systematically exploited, how
could this capacity be allowed to dissipate itself
in pleasurable pursuits, except in those .... that
enabled it to reproduce itself? 13
The political point drawn from the Repressive Hypotheses is
that sex itself, and discourse on sex, are repressed,
stifled and thus in need of liberation.

Moreover, since

sexual repression is linked to capitalism, the struggle for
sexual "liberation'' is part of an even larger political

13

Foucault, History of Sexuality, 5-6. Foucault returns
to this theme of linking the repressive hypothesis to the
development of capitalism several times in the History of
Sexuality, see 36-37, 114, 120.
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struggle.

Foucault, however, does not believe that it was

the advent of capitalism that required the repression of a
workers' sexuality so that the worker could use all of her
or his energy for work.

One of the reasons he disagrees

with this is that controls on sexuality were strongest among
the bourgeois, not among the working class. 14
What most interests Foucault is the concept of power
implicit in the Repressive Hypothesis.

It is a repressive

form of power, as opposed to a form of power that would
produce something.

When one talks of sex as being

repressed, the assumption is that there is a true, natural
sexuality that is being somehow stifled or distorted by
various forms of power.
the case.

Foucault argues that this is not

Rather, the various apparatuses of "repression"--

confession, schools, church, etc.--are in fact producing
sex.

He argues that what is supposedly repressing sex is

actually creating it, and that there is no original
sexuality that needs to be set free from the bonds of
various discourses and acts of repression. 15

14

15

See Foucault, History of Sexuality, 120-121.

The idea of the Repressive Hypotheses has some
important implications for feminist theory.
There is much
debate in feminist circles as to whether there is an
essential element to female sexuality that serves to inform
what it means to be a woman. Theorists who have this view
see society as serving to repress female sexuality, and they
see women's liberation lying in the free expression of
female sexuality. on the other hand postmodern feminist,
such as Judith Butler, do not think that there is an
original sexuality which is in need of liberating.
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Throughout The History of Sexuality Foucault attempts
to discredit the Repressive Hypotheses.
a genealogy of sexuality.

He does so by doing

He looks at how discourses of

sexuality came about, how truth became linked with
sexuality, and how a science of confessional practices was
built.

In doing this he undercuts the idea that there is

any such thing as an original sexuality that is repressed.
This analysis is part of his demonstration that the idea of
an original essential subject is a false notion, for he
continually links subjectivity and sexuality.
According to the Repressive Hypothesis, sex becomes a
question of truth; the truth of the subject is revealed
through sexuality, specifically in how others interpret the
sexuality of one who confesses her or his own sexuality.
The essential point is that sex was not only a
matter of sensation and pleasure, of law and
taboo, but also of truth and falsehood, that the
truth of sex became something fundamental, useful,
or dangerous, precious or formidable: in short,
that sex was constituted as a problem of truth. 16
It was in the nineteenth century that sex and truth became
most explicitly and consciously linked.

We can see this

linkage of truth and sex in the discourse of Freud.

For

Freud the major way of understanding the self is through
understanding sexuality.u According to Freudian theory
virtually all personality structures can be explained
16

17

Foucault, History of Sexuality, 56.

For Freud, as we have seen, sexuality is the major way
to understand the whole of civilization.
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through sexuality, but it is a sexuality that is not
manifest.

According to Freud, the energy force of the human

being is the libido, which is sexual, but it is also largely
unconscious.

So not only is the truth of subjectivity to be

found in sexuality, but much of sexuality is unconscious.
The problem then becomes one of bringing what is unconscious
to consciousness.
psychoanalysis.

This, according to Freud is the goal of
Such a process requires both a patient, or

analysand, and a psychiatrist, the analyst, or to put it
into Foucault's words, a confession and an interpreter of
that confession.
For Foucault the link between truth and confession--a
link strongly preserved in psychoanalysis--has far-reaching
implications.

"[I]t is in the confession that truth and sex

are joined, through the obligatory and exhaustive expression
of an individual secret. " 18

What is unique about the

confession is that the individual produces the truth of her
or himself through the narrative of confession, and this
"truth" is then interpreted and confirmed by an outside
"expert".

Through this process discourse creates subjects.

Subjects tell of themselves, and through this telling their
subjectivity is entwined with the relations of power
inherent in the discursive practice.

18

Subjectivity is

Foucault, History of Sexuality, 61.
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created through the discursive practice of confession. 19
Foucault argues that, while the confession is supposed
to be a way for an individual to get to the essential truth
of her/himself and lay this bare, it is in fact the
confessional practice that produces this truth, and
constructs the individual.

The sciences of confession, such

as psychoanalysis, makes it seem as if there is a core self
which is being brought forth through this confessional
practice,

whereas in fact confessional practices are

producing subjects and truth.

As Foucault writes, "The

truthful confession was inscribed at the heart of the
procedures of individualization by power."w

This is a

productive concept of power which produces both the subject
and truth.
What Foucault is trying to show is that the subject is
necessarily defined within many power relationships, the
confession being one of these.
The obligation to confess is now relayed through
so many different points, is so deeply ingrained
19

According to Foucault this practice of confession,
which is then taken up by psychoanalysis, became prominent
in the middle ages with the codification of the sacrament of
penance by the Lateran Council in 1215. (History of
Sexuality, 58.)
"Confession" is by no means confined to religious
rituals or psychotherapy.
In the late twentieth century we
see mass media magnifying confessional practices. Talk
shows abound with confessions both of the "ordinary person"
and of the celebrity.
"Tell all" books have become
increasingly popular.
Politicians are confessing. Our
society is one increasingly permeated by confession.
2

°Foucault, History of Sexuality, 58-59.
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in us, that we no longer perceive it as the effect
of a power that constrains us; on the contrary, it
seems to us that truth, lodged in our most secret
nature, 'demands' only to surface; that if it
fails to do so, this is because a constraint holds
it in place, the violence of a power weighs it
down, and it can finally be articulated only at
the price of a kind of liberation. 21
When one is confessing, therefore, one feels as if one is
revealing the truth of one's being, the truth that has been
repressed, and through the act of confession one is
overcoming a repressive power that would keep one from the
truth of oneself.

Through the act of confession, therefore,

one unveils the very truth of one's subjectivity.

These,

says Foucault, are traditional themes in philosophy:
"Confession frees, but power reduces one to silence; truth
does not belong to the order of power, but shares an
original affinity with freedom . . . " 22 It is precisely these
traditional themes "which a 'political history of truth'
would have to overturn by showing that truth is not by
nature free--nor error servile--but that its production is
thoroughly imbued with relations of power.

1123

In this crucial statement Foucault challenges the
conception of truth so deeply ingrained in Western
philosophy.

He is saying that the philosophical notion that

truth is free of power, that it is somehow removed from the

21

Ibid.
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taint of power relationships, is a false one.

Truth,

according to Foucault, does not exist independently of human
relationships and social practices in a universal
metaphysical, metapolitical realm.

There are no Platonic

Forms nor any Cartesian grounds for apodictic certainty.
Rather truth is something that is produced, and this
production takes place within a terrain of various
relationships of power.
Foucault challenges the basis of traditional
philosophy, which holds that truth is something which
operates beyond the dynamics of power.

It should be noted

that the "truth" Foucault is talking about here is not what
Anglo-American philosophers tend to think of as the problem
of truth, namely the relationship between propositions and
"facts," the sort of thing that occupies epistemologists and
philosophers of science, but a different conception also
inherent in Western philosophy, the "truth" of one's being
or of one's society or of one's epoch, and the notion that
if one can penetrate the world of appearances to grasp these
"truths," that this is a step toward liberation.

According

to Foucault, there isn't any "true" nature that is being
suppressed and that can serve as a foundation for ethical or
political critique.
Foucault is also challenging the Cartesian notion of
subjectivity.

He is saying that both truth and subjectivity

are produced through power.

Foucault urges us to reconceive
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power.

As he says, "'Sexuality' is far more of a positive

product of power than power was ever repression of
sexuality.

I believe that it is precisely these positive

mechanisms that need to be investigated, and here one must
free oneself of the juridical schematism of all previous
characterizations of the nature of power.

1124

That power is productive and not merely repressive is a
basic theme in much of Foucault's work

In Power/knowledge,

for example, he writes:
But it seems to me that repression is quite
inadequate of capturing what is precisely the
productive aspect of power.
In defining the
effects of power as repression, one adopts a
purely juridical conception of such power, one
identifies power with a law which says no, power
is taken above all as carrying the force of a
prohibition.
Now I believe that this is a wholly
negative, narrow, skeletal conception of power,
one which has been curiously widespread .... What
makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is
simply the fact that it doesn't only weigh on us
as a force that says no, but that it traverses and
produces things, it induces pleasure, forms
knowledge, produces discourse.
It needs to be
considered as a productive network which runs
through the whole social body, much more than as a
negative instance whose function is repression. 25
Foucault calls the traditional form of power the
juridico-discursive model of power.

This is the model of

power with which both Marx and Freud operate.

In

Disciplining Foucault Jana Sawicki gives a good summation of
the three basic assumptions of this model of power.

24

Michel Foucault, "Truth and Power, " in

Power/knowledge, 120-121.
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1. Power is possessed (for instance, by the
individuals in the state of nature, by a class, by
the people) .
2. Power flows from a centralized source form top
to bottom (for instance, law, the economy, the
state.
3. Power is primarily repressive in its exercise

(a prohibition backed by sanctions) . 26
This is the type of power that is assumed in the repressive
hypothesis.

It is then assumed that the practices of

confession allow one to overcome this juridico-discursive
model of power.
productive power.

Foucault's model of power is that of
Sawicki summarizes productive power in

this way:
1. Power is exercised rather than possessed.

2. Power is not primarily repressive, but
productive.
3. Power is analyzed as coming from the bottom
up. 21

According to this analysis of power as productive and
omnipresent, nothing, including discourses of rationality
and truth, is free of power.
Subjectivity
Adherents of Enlightenment philosophy tend to conceive
of subjectivity as pertaining to a unified agent, a unified
"self," acting within a horizon that is ultimately rational.
As Jane Flax has observed,
26

sawicki, Disciplining Foucault, 20.
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In the modern West, being a self and subjectivity
are inseparable. Hence our understandings of
subjectivity are necessarily affected by the
concept of self we adopt. Two views of the self
have been dominant in post-seventeenth century
Western cultures. One is the Cartesian concept of
the self as an ahistoric, solid, indwelling entity
that grounds the possibility of rational thought
and in turn is accessible and transparent to such
thought. The defining characteristic of this self
is its ability to engage in abstract rational
thought, including thought about its own thought.
such thought is said to be undermined by the
empirical, social or bodily experience of the
thinker. The second view is the Humean-empirical
one.
In this view, the self and its knowledge are
derived from sense experience. Any adequate
account of subjectivity and thought must therefore
be rendered in terms that can be expressed in,
referred to or tested by intersubjectively
transmissible empirical experience. 28
Foucault's concept of subjectivity is, among other
things, a reaction to the cogito as conceived by Descartes.
Cartesian philosophy establishes the cogito as an absolute
foundation of knowledge.

The cogito is a rational agent

that is completely present to itself.

As Descartes writes

in his "Reply to the First Objections, ''I can affirm with
certainty that there is nothing in me of which I am not in
any way

conscious.''~

The purpose of Descartes meditations

is to establish a firm foundation for knowledge. The cogito
is just such a foundation.

Descartes thus moves from the

knowledge of the cogito to knowledge of the external world.

3

Jane Flax, "Multiples: On the Contemporary Politics of
Subjectivity," Human Studies 16 (April 1993): 35.
29
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s. Haldane and G.R.T. Ross, vol II, (London: Cambridge
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For Descartes knowledge of the self comes first.

We then

pass from knowledge of the self to knowledge of the external
world.

The existence of the cogito is not determined by or

founded on the external world.

The cogito is the foundation

of knowledge.
Like Descartes, Foucault also places an emphasis on the
self.

Unlike Descartes, however, Foucault does not see the

self as establishing a foundation for knowledge.

The

directionality of Foucault's philosophy is the opposite of
Descartes.

For Descartes the existence of the cogito is

independent of the material world, including, of course, the
body (which is necessarily part of the material world) .

For

Foucault the self is necessarily imbedded in the material
world and indeed constructed by the world.

Descartes'

methodology in establishing the foundation of the cogito is
radical doubt.

Through his method of radical doubt

Descartes wants to establish an absolute foundation for
knowledge. The method of radical doubt is a means of
establishing a criterion of truth. The purpose of radical
doubt is to establish an absolutely certain foundation for
knowledge.
Foucault's philosophy questions almost every aspect of
Descartes' project.
genealogical.

Foucault's method is, as we have seen,

His genealogical method is also a way of

questioning "the conditions of possibility, modalities and
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constitution of the 'objects' and domains 1130of knowledge and
the self, but his approach is fundamentally different from
Descartes'.

For Foucault the self and his genealogical

method are related as follows:
one has to dispense with the constituent subject,
to get rid of the subject itself, that's to say,
to arrive at an analysis which can account for the
constitution of the subject within a historical
framework. And this is what I would call
genealogy, that is, a form of history which can
account for the constitution of knowledges,
discourses, domains of objects etc., without
having to make references to a subject which is
either transcendental in relation to the field of
events or runs in its empty sameness throughout
the course of history. 31
Foucault's genealogical method requires that one look
at how the self is constructed through history; one should
not rely on the self as a foundation for knowledge.

For

Foucault, any concept of an unchanging, essential first
principle is suspect.

When Foucault says that we must

"dispense with the constituent subject, to get rid of the
subject itself," he is not saying that we no longer have an
operative notion of subjectivity or that there is no subject
of thought, or subject who can think and act.

What he is

saying is that we must "account for the constitution of the
subject within a historical framework." This is not to say
that one is to look at how the essential rational agent
posited by Descartes evolves over time, or how our

3
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understanding of that subjectivity evolves over time.
Rather Foucault's genealogical method, being one which goes
from the outside world to the inner world, or from the
material world to the subjective world, looks at how the
subject is constructed in and through the material world-specifically by the operation of the various power
configurations that constitute the world.
Unlike Descartes, Foucault does not think that we can
appeal to a disengaged subject who can serve as the
foundation for knowledge.

His genealogical approach is a

reaction to just such a concept of a foundational
transcendental agent.

Genealogy "can account for the

constitution of knowledges, discourses, domains of objects
etc., without having to make reference to a subject which is
either transcendental in relation to the field of events or
runs in its empty sameness throughout the course of
history. 11 n

Rather then looking for a certain foundation of

knowledge, Foucault wants to examine how various forms of
knowledge develop and become hegemonic.

His examination of

subjectivity follows the same pattern.
While Foucault says he wants to "get rid of the subject
itself," his analysis is focused on the idea of
subjectivity.

In "The Subject and Power,'' Foucault writes,

"[W]hat has been the goal of my work during the last twenty
years has been to create a history of the different modes by
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which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects.

1133

Foucault goes on to outline some of the major themes of his
work and how they have been related to the question of
subjectivity. "My work has dealt with three modes of
objectification which transform human beings into
subjects."M Notice from this wording, we see that for
Foucault human beings are not automatically subjects, rather
we become subjects through the process of socialization, of
being inserted in, and defined by, the many power dynamics
that make up our world.

Our subjectivity is something that

is inscribed on us from the outside, it is not an essential
element of our nature that we learn through introspection.
The first of the three modes of objectification of the
modern subject is scientific classification.
The first in the modes of inquiry which try to
give themselves the status of sciences; for
example, the objectivizing of the speaking subject
in_grammaire generale, philology, and linguis
tics . . . the objectivizing of the productive
subject, the subject who labors, in the analysis
of wealth and economics . . . the objectivizing of
the sheer fact of being alive in natural history
or biology. 35
With these examples Foucault outlines a theme which we have
already discussed.

33

The natural and social sciences,

Michel Foucault, "The Subject and Power," Afterward in
Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond
Structuralism and Hermeneutics (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1982), 208.
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Foucault argues, are not value free objective discourses.
Rather, they are totalizing narratives bisected by value
judgments and power dynamics.

It is through these

scientific classifications that human beings gain knowledge
of themselves, how they think, speak, act, relate, etc.
By examining these ''scientific" disciplines from a
genealogical perspective, Foucault shows that they are not
completely autonomous coherent narratives dealing with
universals of human social life, but rather that they are
necessarily embedded in multiple and intersecting
relationships of power, which prevent them from progressing
logically, but rather cause them to undergo abrupt changes
at specific historical junctures.

As the disciplines

through which we categorize human nature go through abrupt
changes, so does our understanding of specific aspects of
human nature.
The second mode of objectifying the subject is what can
be called "dividing practices".

''The subject is either

divided inside himself or divided from others.
objectivizes him.

This process

Examples are the mad and the insane, the

sick and the healthy, the criminals and the 'good boys.'"~
These dividing practices are another way that social norms,
communicated through scientific knowledges and practices,
are inscribed on the individual.

The discourses of science

help to create categories through which we classify and
~Ibid.
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identity human beings.
subject is created.

It is through this process that the

It is not that there are essential

human differences, and human beings are then divided up
according to these differences, but rather it is the
knowledge we gain through various "scientific" discourses
that we use to classify human beings.
To give but one example, consider Foucault's discussion
of the effect on (creation of) family and morality through
the architecture of houses.
(T]he house remains until the eighteenth century
an undifferentiated space. There are rooms: one
sleeps, eats, receives visitors in them, it
doesn't matter which. Then gradually space
becomes specified and functional. . . . The
working-class family is to be fixed; by assigning
it a living space with a room that serves as
kitchen and dining-room, a room for the parents
which is the place of procreation, and a room for
the children, one prescribes a form of morality
for the family.
Sometimes . . . you have a boys'
and a girls' room.n
The division of spaces leads to a division of people and to
the creation of subjects.

An important element in this

discussion as well, is the creation of morality.

Not only

are subjects created through dividing practices, but so are
concepts of morality.

Sexual mores are created with the

implementation of a separate space for boys and girls as
well as for parents.

A certain idea of family is created by

this spacing, and a particular idea of sexuality.

When boys

and girls are separated into separate rooms, and adults and
37

Michel Foucault, "The Eye of Power, " in
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children are separated, the idea is constructed that boys
and girls need to be divided, that they are different and
that they should remain so, that things go on privately
between boys and girls that neither should know about.
the same for the adults.

And

Things go on between parents in

the privacy of their room which children should not know
about.
What is important here is the idea that this separation
of people through spatial arrangements is not according to
some inherent element in subjects or according to some
transcendent moral principle, but rather that the dividing
practices themselves create both subjectivity and morality.
What is at stake here is the operation of power through
spaces.
A whole history remains to be written of spaces
which would at the same time be the history of
powers . . . . from the great strategies of geopolitics to the little tactics of the habitat,
institutional architecture from the classroom to
the design of hospitals, passing via economic and
political installations.
It is surprising how
long the problem of space took to emerge as a
historico-political problem.
Space used to be
either dis-missed as belonging to 'nature'-that
is, the given, the basic conditions, 'physical
geography', in other words a sort of 'prehistoric'
stratum; or else it was conceived as the
residential site or field of expansion of peoples,
of a culture, a language or a state.n
The third mode of objectification of subjects is the

38 I
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way human being turns him/herself into a subject. 39 The
other two modes of objectifying the subject are passive.

In

the scientific discourses and in the dividing practices the
subject itself is not active in its own creation.

In this

third mode the subject is active. One of the key elements of
Foucault's discussion of this mode is that we gain knowledge
of who we are by looking at discourses outside ourselves.
In particular, for modern subjects, we try to find out who
we are by learning what various experts, psychiatrists,
biologists, etc., say we are.

We then attempt to take this

external knowledge and apply it to ourselves.

We are

separated from ourselves through lack of knowledge.
Consequently we need the intervention of outside discourses
and experts in order to get to know ourselves. The
consequence is that we construct ourselves with the help of
external "expert'' narratives about how we are supposed to
be.~

In this way subjects partake of their own self39

This is one of the few places in which Foucault refers
to human beings as both male and female.
Something that is
lacking in this examination of subjectivity is the gender
specific aspect of subject formation.
Foucault's lack of
discussion of gender in his discussion of subjectivity has
been criticized by many feminist scholars.
Some aspects of
this critique will be examined in the following two
chapters.
·~ current example of this would be the proliferation
of self-help books. One reads these books in order to find
out how one is "supposed to be" or how one can fix oneself.
Women's magazines in particular abound with experts telling
women how to apply various knowledges to herself, such as
knowledge of sexuality, fashion, emotions, and how she can
then create herself according to these sanctioned normative
standards.
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formation.

A subject position is constructed through these

various knowledges that subjects rely on to understand
themselves.

While the subject thinks that there is an

inherent self that these various practices such as
confession and psychiatry may help her to understand or
exhume, Foucault maintains that there is no original subject
that these knowledges help us to understand, but rather that
we construct ourselves in the process of applying knowledges
to ourselves.
Resistance
Foucault makes an important contribution to political
philosophy in that he shows that all relationships are
relationships of power, and that all discourses are always
already conducted within this terrain of power.

There is no

sacred realm which is free of these operations of power.
What makes this important in terms of politics (and
particular emancipatory politics) is that it opens up points
of contestation and of resistance.

Foucault's analysis of

power, in showing that power goes from the bottom up, that
power is everywhere, even in the very construction of truth,
sexuality, and subjectivity, opens up these areas to
politically engaged critique.

Philosophy traditionally goes

from the macro-level to the micro-level, from the
metaphysics of truth down to its local and particular
applications.

Foucault argues that power relationships at

the micro-level of society produce these macro-level
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discourses; thus the political project is not to free truth
from its contestation within power, but to expose the
constructed hegemony of certain discourses which claim the
authority of being true:

"It's not a matter of emancipation

truth from every system of power (which would be a chimera,
for truth is already power) but of detaching the power of
truth from the forms of hegemony, social, economic and
cultural, within which it operates at the present time.

1141

Some of Foucault's critics have maintained that because
power is everywhere, there is little or no room for
resistance.~

To the contrary the multiplicity of power

relationships opens up the field of resistance, and it is in
this that I find its greatest benefit for postmodern
feminist emancipatory political praxis.

Foucault writes:

Where there is power, there is resistance, and
yet, or rather consequently, this resistance is
never in a position of exteriority in relation to
power. . . . These points of resistance are
present everywhere in the power network. Hence no
single locus of great Refusal, no soul of revolt,
source of all rebellions, or pure law of the
revolutionary.
Instead there is a plurality of
resistances, each of them a special case;
41
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resistances that are possible, necessary,
improbable; others that are spontaneous, savage,
solitary, concerted, rampant, or violent. 43
In his essay "The Subject and Power" Foucault states much
the same thing, "[T)here is no relationship of power without
the means of escape or possible flight.

1144

Once he has

reconceptualized power, Foucault can open up the field of
viable resistance.

Marx's concept of power, as we have

seen, suggests only the model of revolution, whereas
Foucault's concept of power opens up the possibility for
various acts of resistance--while at the same time not
foreclosing the possibility of revolution.
What Foucault's analysis points out is that resistance
can take many forms at the same time.

We can have local

resistances as well as large scale resistances.
analysis allows for,

What his

indeed demands, is multiple strategies

of resistance, including the practices of our everyday life.
Are there no great radical ruptures, massive
binary divisions, then? Occasionally, yes.
But
more often one is dealing with mobile and
transitory points of resistance, producing
cleavages in a society that shift about,
fracturing unities and effecting regroupings,
furrowing across individuals themselves, cutting
them up and remolding them, marking off
irreducible regions in them, in their bodies and
minds. 45
While not dispensing with the idea of a revolution in the

43
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Marxian sense, Foucault's analysis opens up new avenues of
resistance, such as that of reconceiving subjectivity.

As

we have seen, neither truth nor subjectivity are free of
power relationships.

It now becomes clear how Foucault's

notion of subjectivity is related to his concept of
political intervention.

Just as truth and knowledge and

sexuality are constructed, so is subjectivity.

And the

subject is constructed within the terrain of power
operations.

So the subject itself becomes a point of

political resistance.
Maybe the most certain of all philosophical
problems is the problem of the present time, and
of what we are, in this very moment. . . . The
conclusion would be that the political, ethical,
social, philosophical problem of our days is not
to try to liberate the individual from the state,
and from the states's institutions, but to
liberate us both from the state and from the type
of individualization which is linked to the state.
We have to promote new forms of subjectivity
through the refusal of this kind of individuality
which has been imposed on us for several
centuries. 46
What Foucault is pointing to here, and what is similar
to what he has said in History of Sexuality, is that
reconceiving of subjectivity is itself an act of political
resistance.

This is another place where we see the way

paved for postmodern feminist theory.

Clearly a project of

postmodern feminist theory is to "promote new forms of
subjectivity" through the refusal of the genderless subject
that has been the agent of Western philosophical thought.
46

Foucault, "Subject and Power," 216.
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For Foucault the act of political resistance is inseparable
from subjectivity, because he recognizes that the act of
constructing a subject is always a political act.
It must be said that Foucault does not develop
adequately the gendered aspects of subjectivity, nor the
manner in which a specifically feminist emancipatory
practice can come out of his work.

These issues are

addressed, as we shall see, by both Jane Flax and Judith
Butler.

In the following two chapters I will examine

postmodern feminist critiques and appropriations of
Foucault's philosophy.

I think that Foucault's analysis of

power and resistance, which form his concept of constructed
subjectivity, are highly useful for grounding an
emancipatory postmodern feminist politics.

I think,

however, that the specific feminist implications of his
analysis need to be made more clear.

One also needs to

examine more specifically the role of gender in constructing
subjectivity.
Fraser Critique
Let me conclude this chapter by examining an important
criticism of Foucault.

I will demonstrate that this

criticism, although widespread, fails to grasp the true
nature of Foucault's philosophy.

Foucault's analysis of the

discursive production of truth and power has had a major
impact on social and political philosophy.

Some argue that

his philosophy opens up possibilities of political practice
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(especially for an engaged emancipatory politics), while
others think his deconstruction of metapolitical rationalism
leads to both relativism and nihilism.

In other words, some

contend that Foucault's philosophy is significant precisely
because it deconstructs Enlightenment concepts of
rationalism, while others think this disruption forecloses
possibilities of a just political praxis.
In a series of influential articles, Nancy Fraser has
criticized the normative ambiguities in Michel Foucault's
work, by which she means that he at once suspends and
invokes normative frameworks. 47

She concludes that for

Foucault to have an adequate political philosophy, he must
have a more clearly articulated normative framework.
Nancy Fraser's central critique of Foucault concerns
the alleged normative ambiguity of Foucault's analysis of
power.

Fraser claims that his ambiguous normative framework

renders his philosophy incapable of laying the ground for an
engaged politics. 48

The implicit assumption of Fraser's

critique is that a viable and just political philosophy is
not possible if one cannot appeal to a transcendentally-

47
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grounded normative framework. 49
Fraser questions whether Foucault's work can be
simultaneously politically engaged and normatively
neutral.~

She claims that Foucault's work suspends or

"brackets" the standard modern liberal normative framework,
which distinguishes between legitimate and illegitimate
exercise of power51 •

Fraser is using the term "bracketing"

as it is used in the phenomenological tradition.

Within

this tradition the term bracketing is associated primarily
with Husserl 52 •

As Husserl uses this term, it means

disconnecting assumptions about the existence status of the
spatio-temporal world of our everyday, pre-reflexive
experience, as well as the multitude of theories
(scientific, theological, social, and cultural) which
comprise the natural attitude.

It is this later part of the

49

Fraser is herself ambiguous with regards to
transcendentally grounded normativity.
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a longing for a transcendental trump upon which to ground
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phenomenological reduction--specifically these theories that
comprise the natural attitude--that Fraser invokes.

Fraser

claims that Foucault brackets the normative framework.

One

way he does this is by suspending the categories of truth
and falsity. 53
But in setting up her critique of Foucault based on the
assumption of bracketing, Fraser misses crucial features of
his analysis of power, and misconstrues the purpose of his
genealogies.

Rather than bracketing normativity, I think it

is clear that Foucault is deconstructing the modern liberal
normative framework, together with the categories of truth
and falsity.

Foucault's analysis of power and truth is a

thinking over and against the normative framework associated
with traditional metaphysics.

As we have seen, he shows the

historical and cultural specificity of such a construction
as true/false.

The purpose of his analysis of power via

genealogical method is to challenge the possibility of a
transcendental grounding of truth disengaged from power.
Thus he calls into question the dichotomies true/false and
legitimate/illegitimate, thereby opening up these concepts
to strategic redeployment.
Let me clarify what I mean by "deconstruction." In
"Contingent Foundations" Judith Butler writes, "To
deconstruct is not to negate or to dismiss, but to call into
question and, perhaps most importantly, to open up a term .
"Fraser, "Foucault on Power," pp. 20-1.
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. to a reusage or redeployment that previously has not

been authorized.

1154

Deconstruction is thus a disruption of

foundational, metapolitical, and hegemonic positions such as
"a power-free zone of rights."
simple negation or dismissal.

Foucault's position is not a
Rather it is a calling into

question and an opening up of such concepts of rights,
truth, and legitimacy so that they may be strategically
redeployed in previously unauthorized ways.

Rather than

being a neutral and unengaged suspension of normativity,
such a project is fundamentally an engaged critique.
It is an important question, whether or not one can
deconstruct absolute categories of truth and falsity and
still have a viable and just politics.

However, Fraser

avoids such an engaged critique of Foucault by misreading
him.

Fraser says Foucault refrains "from problematizing the

normative validity of power/knowledge regimes"."

By this

Fraser means that he does not address the question of the
legitimacy of the various institutions and practices which
he studies.

But Foucault's genealogical analysis of power

is a problematizing of the normative validity of
power/knowledge regimes.

He does this, not by questioning

whether or not such regimes are legitimate, but rather by
questioning the framework of normativity for evaluating
54
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social practices.
By saying that he is bracketing the normative framework
Fraser misses the key move of Foucauldian philosophy, namely
the opening up of such terms as normativity, truth, and
legitimacy to a reusage and redeployment.

In other words

Foucault is deconstructing the normative framework, not
bracketing it.

Foucault specifically deconstructs the

traditional question of political philosophy: the scope and
limits of the legitimate exercise of political power.

He

asks instead, what relationships of power are operative in
constructing the truth claims of the normative framework
being invoked.

Foucault attempts to show that the liberal

normative framework of power, legitimate vs. illegitimate
power, points to the wrong question.

The problematic that

shapes Foucault's work is rather, "what rules of right are
implemented by the relations of power in the production of
discourses of truth?"~
In order to examine this problem, he looks at the
production and relationships of power.

This examination is

a deconstruction of the liberal normative framework of
legitimacy/illegitimacy.

This examination of power is meant

to challenge the totalizing narrative on which liberal
notions of normativity are built and to disrupt the

5
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hegemonic metapolitical position of such a normative model.
In challenging the top-down juridico-discursive model of
power, and instead conceiving of power as permeating all
discourses, Foucault necessarily and intentionally disrupts
the liberal normative model.
Fraser notes correctly that
The liberal framework understands power as
emanating from the sovereign and imposing itself
upon the subjects.
It tries to define a powerfree zone of rights, the penetration of which is
illegitimate.
Illegitimate power is understood as
oppression, itself understood as the transgression
of a 1 imi t. 57
It is precisely against such a "power-free zone of rights"
that Foucault is arguing.

He does not think there is any

such zone and is therefore arguing for a reconceptualization
and reusage of the concept of both rights and of domination.
According to Foucault all rights are necessarily constructed
within the matrix of power, so there is no such thing as a
power-free zone of rights.
What is called for here is a reconception of rights, an
opening up of the term which necessarily leads to a
reconception and redeployment of politics.

Political

intervention then becomes a project, not of protecting
inalienable rights, but rather one of waging power in a more
strategically effective matter. 58

57

58

Fraser, "Foucault on Power, " p. 2 6.

This thesis will be elaborated more fully in Chapters
Four and Five.
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As a part of her critique of the normative ambiguities
in Foucault's work, Fraser makes several claims about the
efficacy of his argument for grounding a politics.

One of

her claims is that if Foucault wants to discuss domination
when analyzing power, then he must either invoke the liberal
normative framework or provide some alternative framework.
she concludes that "Foucault's empirical thesis that modern
power is capillary does not by itself dictate the adoption
of any particular normative framework.

At most, it

undercuts one traditional basis of the liberal one."~
This does not seem to be stated strongly enough.
Foucault's theory of power necessarily disrupts any concept
of normativity.

One must always examine the power dynamics

within which the normative is produced.

Examining the

normative as historically and situationally specific is
basic to the genealogical method.
Fraser goes on to say that "in using the term
'domination' at the same time that he is ruling out the
liberal normative framework, it appears that he is
presupposing some alternative framework.

1160

Here she

assumes that any engaged political critique of power must be
based on some concept of normativity.

But this

presupposition betrays Fraser's perhaps unwitting commitment
to the classical liberal normative tradition, a tradition
59

Fraser, "Foucault on Power," p. 27.

60

Fraser,"Foucault on Power," p. 27.
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which I shall argue prematurely forecloses the emancipatory
potential of politics by conceiving of normativity as
metapolitical.

(It is precisely this premature foreclosure

that postmodern philosophy seeks to avoid.)
Fraser concludes that Foucault "fails to appreciate the
degree to which the normative is embedded in and infused
throughout the whole of language at every level and the
degree to which despite himself, his own critique has to
make use of modes of description, interpretation, and
judgement formed within the modern Western normative
tradition". 61

I would argue that most of Foucault's

analysis is directed precisely at deconstructing this
normative framework.
The positive effect of this deconstruction can be seen
by considering the "politics of everyday life," which Fraser
herself calls "probably the single most important feature of
Foucault's thought."
In revealing the capillary character of modern
power and thereby ruling out crude ideology
critique, statism, and economism, Foucault can be
understood as in effect ruling in what is often
called 'politics of everyday life.'
For if power
is instantiated in mundane social practices and
relations, then efforts to dismantle or transform
the regime must address those practices and
relations. 62
One of Foucault's major efforts at dismantling or
transforming social structures involves deconstructing the
61

Fraser, "Foucault on Power," pp. 30-1.

62

Fraser, "Foucault on Power," p. 26.
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concept of normativity operating in the practices and
relations of everyday life.

Foucault's analysis of truth

and power is one which looks at how the hegemonic normative
position has been produced and what operations of power it
conceals.

As I have argued, Foucault does not suspend the

normative framework; rather his politics of everyday life is
a deconstruction of such a framework.
While I disagree with Fraser's contention that Foucault
suspends analysis of the liberal normative framework in his
examination of power and in the end invokes such a framework
in order to establish a foundation for resistance, I do
think she shows the significance of his analysis of power to
feminist theory.

I agree that

he provides the empirical and conceptual basis for
treating such phenomena as sexuality, the family,
schools, psychiatry, medicine, social science, and
the like as political problems.
It thereby widens
the arena within which people may collectively
confront, understand, and seek to change the
character of their lives.~
Fraser praises the importance of Foucault for expanding
the political arena.

This has particular significance for

feminist theorists, much of whose work involves analyzing
the politics of such things as sexuality, family, school,
etc.

What Fraser does not acknowledge, and what is one of

the most important aspects of Foucault's work for postmodern
feminist theory, is that Foucault politicizes the liberal

63

Fraser,

11

Foucault on Power,
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p. 2 6.
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concept of normativity, including the politicization of such
concepts as rights, legitimacy, and truth.
Fraser claims that Foucault is unable to fully suspend
the liberal normative framework, but rather that he
presupposes it.M

I think this conclusion comes from

Fraser's own inability to suspend the liberal notion of
normativity when she reads Foucault.

Her inability to

recognize Foucault's deconstruction of normativity leads her
to conclude that normative ambiguity necessarily forecloses
emancipatory politics and is necessarily unsatisfactory.
Fraser is unable to discern Foucault's discussion of power
as a deconstruction of normativity because she is too firmly
ensconced within the traditional liberal normative
framework.

She cannot conceive of a normatively ambiguous

political philosophy with emancipatory

potential.~

Yet this is precisely what, in my view, is presently
needed. 66
Much of the critique concerning the lack of normativity
in postmodernism is that it makes political practice
impossible because there is no foundation in which to ground
political activity.
MFraser, "Foucault on Power,"

p. 30.

6511

• • • what Foucault needs," writes Fraser,
"and needs
desperately, are normative criteria for distinguishing
acceptable from unacceptable forms of power" (Ibid., p.33).
I think this is clearly Fraser's need, not Foucault's.
66

! will elaborate on and defend this claim throughout
the rest of this dissertation.
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We may question . . . whether Foucault's rhetoric
really does the job of distinguishing better from
worse regimes of social practices; whether it
really does the job of identifying forms of
domination (or whether it overlooks some and/or
misrecognizes others); whether it really does the
job of distinguishing fruitful from unfruitful,
acceptable from unacceptable forms of resistance
to domination; and finally, whether it really does
the job of suggesting not simply that change is
possible but also what sort of change is
desirable. 67
What Foucault argues is that disrupting a foundation
grounded in concepts of transcendental rationality and truth
that themselves conceal relationships of domination is
itself a politically necessary and just move.

It is often

argued that for Foucault there is no possibility of just
political action because there can be no prioritizing of
actions or no basis for choosing between just and unjust
causes: it is assumed, in other words, that if one does not
appeal to transcendental truth or universal justice, then
there will simply be a chaotic situation of free flowing
nonprioritized difference.
what genealogy demands.
one is acting justly.

This is a misinterpretation of

In unveiling power configurations
I think that what critics of

postmodern political practice find most hard to accept is
this unavailability of a "transcendental trump".

It is

incorrectly assumed that without a universal measure of the
good, which provides a foundation for neutrality and
normativity, there can be no justice.
67

What this position

Fraser, "Foucault on Power," p. 43.
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ignores are the systems of domination concealed within the
very foundation they want to claim as constitutive and
therefore necessary to just political practice.
Far from being the nihilistic threat that Fraser and
others would claim, the critique of normative foundations
offered by Foucault, and as we shall see, Flax, and Butler
represents a democratic engagement in the political field.
This requires interrogating the "ruse of authority" of
normative and universal categories such as legitimacy

that

claim to be free of the contestations of power dynamics.

At

the heart of Foucault's radical political project is just
such a deconstructing of foundational premises such as truth
and universality.

It is important to note that questioning,

deconstructing, reconfiguring and resignifying
foundationalist categories is not the same as doing away
with them or bracketing them.

Butler, as we shall see,

reconfigures the universal as a site of permanent contest,
rather than as a politically neutral foundation on which to
base other political contests.

This opening of the

universal to critique, and thereby bringing it into the
democratic process, does not however mean that politics and
philosophy become nihilistic and relativistic; on the
contrary it is a radical democratization of political
philosophy.
It seems to me that Fraser (and most other critics of
postmodernism) appeal, implicitly or explicitly to a
substantive universal presumed to be well-grounded.

But

once the universal becomes a contested category--which it
now is--there can be no metapolitical grounding for
emancipatory politics.

It is precisely in this demand to

interrogate the hegemony of universal categories, among them
normative concepts such as legitimacy and rights, that the
emancipatory potential of such politics lies.

This move of
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deconstructing hegemonic foundations radically reconfigures
both the discursive terrain of politics as well as concrete
practices.

Part of this deconstruction is the

politicization (through genealogical critique) of
metapolitical normativity.

Genealogical critique reveals

that any metapolitical normative framework is always already
politically constituted.

Any normative assumption is

necessarily an authoritative move to cover over operations
of power by labeling them as metapolitical and thus
excluding them from critique.

The liberatory potential of

such radical disruption is great.

For Fraser, ambiguity is

necessarily wrong, whereas I strongly agree with Foucault,
(and Flax, and Butler), that ambiguity is the only position
possible from which to effectively enact an emancipatory
democratic politics.

Chapter Four
Flax
In this chapter I will outline Flax's concepts of
subjectivity, rationality and justice, and examine how she
positions her theory in relationship to Freud, Marx, and
Foucault.

Flax situates her theory of subjectivity with

specific reference to the discourses of psychoanalysis,
feminism, and postmodernism.

While she is clearly a

feminist thinker, as an analysis of gender is central to
most of her theorizing, her relationship to psychoanalysis
and postmodernism is less clear.

Flax's discussion of

subjectivity makes continuous reference to psychoanalysis,
feminist theory, and postmodernism, so it is almost
impossible to look at her work apart from a critique of
these discourses.

Flax's own theorizing moves in and out of

these three discourses, showing how they both reflect and
contribute to the contemporary philosophical debates about
knowledge, power, rationality, and justice, as well as
showing how they can lead to useful concept of subjectivity
for the late twentieth century.
Throughout her examination of these discourses, she,
like myself, places the examination of subjectivity in the
forefront.
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As old ways of understanding subjectivity are
thrown into doubt, crises of representation,
knowledge, power and legitimacy intensify.
Contemporary psychoanalytic, feminist and postmodernist theorists both reflect and contribute to
these crises . 1
Flax's concern with subjectivity mirrors that of my
overall project.

Throughout this work I have been examining

the relationship of various concepts and theories of
subjectivity to political praxis, with the aim of
determining which concept of subjectivity is most useful for
grounding an emancipatory feminist politics, Flax states a
similar objective:
Considering the weight the modern subject is
expected to carry, it is not surprising that a
central debate in contemporary political discourse
concerns the nature of subjectivity and its
possible relations to emancipatory action. One
recurrent question in these debates is what kind
of self is required for effective struggles
against domination. 2
Flax herself concludes that, "a unitary self is unnecessary,
impossible and a dangerous illusion." 3 What is important
about Flax's attention to the often conflicting discourses
of psychoanalysis, feminism and postmodernism is that in her
attempt to situate her own concept of subjectivity within

1

Jane Flax, "Multiples: On the Contemporary Politics of
Subjectivity," Nous 16 {April 1993): 33. Reprinted with
some modifications in Jane Flax, Disputed Subjects: Essays
on Psychoanalysis, Politics, and Philosophy (New York:
Routledge, 1993), 92-110. All page numbers in this chapter
will refer to the Nous version of the article.
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the context of these discourses, she allows for the fact
that the subject position can be fluid and variable.
on Freud
Rather than analyzing the entirety of Flax's discussion
of psychoanalysis, I will focus on her discussion of Freud's
concept of subjectivity.

Flax applies elements from

postmodernist and feminist discourses in order to criticize
Freud.

Of course she is not the first thinker to examine

Freud in light of these discourses, but she is dissatisfied
with conclusions commonly drawn:

"Postmodernists

appropriate Freud's concept of the 'decentered' self but
radically reduce its complexity and consequences.

Some

feminists simply reject all of psychoanalytic theory because
of the truly ignorant and offensive ways Freud sometimes
analyzes women.
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Flax begins her own analysis by pointing out that
Freud's work has an ambiguous relationship to Enlightenment
thinking.

In important ways it is disruptive of such

thought, but in other equally important ways it is
conscripted within the Enlightenment narrative.

One of the

major tenets of Enlightenment thought that is challenged by
Freud is the primacy of rationality in the organization of
subjectivity.

4Jane

Rather than saying humans are primarily

Flax, Thinking Fragments: Psychoanalysis,
Feminism, and Postmodernism in the Contemporary West
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 50.
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rational thinkers as would modern philosophers,
in [Freud's] view humans are originally and
primarily desiring creatures. Our being is not
defined by the capacity to reason, as Plato and
Kant believe; by the ability to speak, reason and
engage in political deliberation, as Aristotle
argues; or by the power to produce objects of
value and need, as Marx claims.
'The core of our
being,' according to Freud, consists of . . • •
[u]nconscious wishful impulses, most of which are
forever inaccessible to our preconscious or
conscious, will nonetheless remain the dominating
force in our mental life. 5
Flax emphasizes that for Freud desire, which is often
unconscious, displaces reason as the primary quality of
human beings.

As I discussed in the chapter on Freud,

Freud's introduction of the analysis of desire and the
unconscious into an analysis of self functioned to radically
disrupt the role of rationality.
[T]he self in Freud's theories becomes
increasingly fragmented, decentered, and
heterogeneous in its qualities and dynamics.
Forces are always affecting our 'rational' thought
and behavior, but these forces can be (at best)
only imperfectly known or comprehended. The
agency of our knowing is 'contaminated' by the
influence of these unconscious forces, including
desire. 6
One can read Flax as saying that with Freud, the
Cartesian self becomes 'contaminated.'

Uncertainty and

ambiguity, in the form of the unconscious and desire, are
introduced at the core of the rational subject.

It is

through this displacement of the rational subject and of the

5

Ibid., 53.

6

Ibid., 59.
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centrality of rationality in understanding ourselves and our
world that Freud has affinity with postmodern thinkers.
Flax puts it this way,
As postmodernists argue, Freud's increasingly
complex structural theories undermine the concepts
of mind upon which Enlightenment concepts of
knowledge depend. . . . Unlike many philosophers
Freud conceptualizes the mind as full embodied,
inherently conflictual, dynamic, nonunitary, and
constituted in and through processes that are
intrinsically different and cannot be synthesized
or organized into a permanent, hierarchical
organization of functions or control. Both the
rationalist's faith in the powers of reason and
the empiricist's belief in the reliability of
sense perception and observation are grounded in
and depend on the mind's capacity to be at least
partially undetermined by the effects of the body,
passions, and social authority or convention.
However, Freud's theories of mind render such
beliefs highly problematic. 7
One of the most significant aspects of Freud's concept
of subjectivity for Flax is that it allows for, and indeed
introduces the necessity of, ambiguity.

For Flax it is also

important that while Freud decenters the self, he neither
says the self does not exist, nor does he reduce the
complexity of an analysis of subjectivity.

Unlike Foucault,

who focuses on external relations of power and their role in
the construction of self, Freud looks at the internal
dynamics of subjectivity, such as the power relationships
between the id, ego, and superego.

Flax emphasizes as well

the fact that Freud focuses on the somatic construction of
self, which is necessarily biological.

7

Ibid., 60.
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While Freud's discourse in many way challenges
Enlightenment concepts, especially the privileging of
rationality, Flax concludes that in important ways he is in
complicity with the Enlightenment metanarrative.
[I]n many ways . . • Freud's thinking remains within
the Enlightenment project. His emphasis on the
liberating power of rational insight; his
individualistic concept of the self; his distrust
of the 'irrational,' including 'illusions' such as
religion as well as the unconscious; and his
insistence on the importance to the individual and
to culture of the defense of the ego and reason
against the 'irrational' demands of desire or
authority place him firmly within the 'master
narratives' of the Enlightenment. Freud's . . .
move to locate and conflate women, the irrational,
desire, and nature 'outside' and against culture
are also congruent with and contribute to the
persistence of these narratives. 8
While she recognizes Freud's contribution to our knowledge
of the irrational and decentered subject, she thinks that
Freud ultimately pulls back from the full implications of
these ideas.

Even though he has an extended discussion of

the irrational, he ultimately contends that rationality is
normative. 9 Flax's concept of a multiple and fluid self,
which learns to thrive among ambiguities, is one which does
not privilege the rational over the irrational, nor the
individualistic self over the relational self.
Flax systematically attacks the gendered dichotomy in
Freud's work.

According to this analysis Freud associates

femininity with nature, other, libido economics, body and
8

Ibid., 228-229.

9

See my discussion of this in Chapter Two.
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patient.

Masculinity, on the other hand, is associated with

culture, self, object relations theory, mind, and analyst. 10

Flax, who does not want the 'master narratives' of the
Enlightenment to predominate, thinks that one needs to have
a dialogue between feminism and both Freudianism and
postmodernism so as to erode the hegemony of any one of
these theories.

She thinks that both postmodernists and

Freudian discourse can benefit from a more rigorous analysis
of gender.

Not only have "Postmodernists . • . paid

insufficient attention to many of the obscuring effects of
the riddle of sex on and within psychoanalytic discourses"
but also "the evidence that even Freud's supposedly genderneutral concepts are affected by gender relations ought to
encourage more psychoanalysts and postmodernists to attend
more seriously to feminist theories. " 11 Flax maintains that,
while much of Freud's analysis concerning gender is deeply
flawed, his analysis also opens up the space for debate and
allows for ambiguity.

Flax summarizes the relationship of

feminist theorists to Freud's work by acknowledging this
ambiguity.
Feminist theorists offer ambivalent and
conflicting evaluations of psychoanalysis.
Some
simply reject it because of Freud's patently
masculinist biases. Other feminists have found
1

°For a discussion of these "gendered antimonies"
pervading Freud's work see Thinking Fragments 77-88.
11

Flax, Thinking Fragments, 77.
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the paradoxes in psychoanalytic theory a useful
and revealing object of analysis.
The
second approach is more fruitful.
Unexamined
anxieties about gender and gender relations do
pervade, structure, and constrict the entire body
of Freud' s work. 12
On Marx
While Flax applies the discourses of postmodernism and
feminism to critique Freud, she applies Freud to critique
Marx.

She writes,
Psychoanalysis illuminates some of the
deficiencies and failures of Marxism.
From a
psychoanalyst's perspective, Marxist accounts of
human subjectivity and intersubjectivity appear
particularly thin and impoverished. Psychoanalysts investigate the importance of fantasy,
desire, families, and sexuality in the
constitution of individual subjectivity, in the
behavior of persons in the 'outside' world, and in
the structure of social institutions such as the
state. Once one begins to identify the effects of
unconscious processes class conflict forfeits its
privileged (or exclusive) role as the dynamic
force of human history. 13
The failures and deficiencies that psychoanalysis

illuminates in Marxism are the absence in Marxism of an
analysis of sexuality and fantasy. Flax also criticizes Marx
from both a Foucauldian and a feminist perspective.

Like

Foucault, Flax is concerned that Marx's analysis claims the
authority of a transcendental truth and does not recognize
the historically specific power relationships within which

12
13

Ibid., 76.

Jane Flax, Disputed Subjects: Essays on
Psychoanalysis, Politics, and Philosophy (New York:
Routledge, 1993), 11.
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the analysis is constructed.
Claims to neutrality or knowledge of objective
scientific laws violate Marx's own accounts of the
historical and social constitution of knowledge.
Their plausibility eventually relies on a
transcendental trump. Marxist theorists employ
such trumps as positing mental access to the 'iron
laws of history' or the ontological and
epistemological privilege of a particular sort of
'labor' (or of the class that engages in it).
Alternatively one is required to make a leap of
faith that 'in the last instance' certain
(economic) factors will be determinative. . • .
Everyone might be better off if we acknowledge we
are all operating on the terrain of power and not
truth or objectivity. What counts as 'better
knowledge' depends in part on its utility for
particular political ends.M
This critique of objective truth claims and her
conclusion that knowledge is formed within a terrain of
power and is therefore not neutral or transcendental is
identical to Foucault's analysis.
genealogical critique.

It is essentially a

Flax applies this methodology to

criticize Marx's idea of human nature.

She is suspicious of

"Marx's promotion of sensuous practical activity (or labor
defined as the production of use values) as the human
essence. " 15 Flax thinks that this "reflects rather than
provides a thorough critique of capitalist societies." 16 In
doing a genealogical critique she challenges the claims to
transcendental truth on which Marx establishes his theory by
exposing the power relationships that are operating to form
14

Ibid. , 12.

15

Ibid.

16

Ibid.
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such truths.

She concludes,

Theorists will evaluate these arrangements
according to the ethical, psychological, and
political commitments that pervade and motivate
their work. While such arrangements are necessary
they may not always be considered the definitive
human activity.
'Materialist' accounts of history
may appear more appealing to us precisely because
we live in capitalist cultures in which other
vocabularies and ways of life, for example, ones
based on civic virtue, kinship, faith, or
aesthetics, are marginalized. After all, why
should Marxism be less marked by the social
determination of thought than any other theory? 17
Flax is also critical of Marx from a feminist
perspective.

Her analysis of Marxism in terms of gender is

similar to my own.

She concludes that "the gender biases in

Marxist theories are foundational, necessary, and disabling.
Especially important are the gendered character of its
constituting ideas such as labor, class, and history.

None

of these ideas seem to account to or include the effects of
male-dominant gender systems or many of the activities
historically performed by women. " 18
came to a similar conclusion.

My own analysis of Marx

Flax concludes that Marx's

theory is "fatally flawed"--although she acknowledges the
perspectival and postmodern character of her judgement: "My
belief that Marxist theory is fatally flawed, rather than
usefully imperfect, undoubtedly has many irrational,
aesthetic, and idiosyncratic determinants.

It is certainly

possible to arrive at a different position from the same set

18

Ibid.

I

13.
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of 'facts. '" 19
On Foucault
While much of Flax's own analysis relies on basic
Foucauldian conceptions of power and knowledge, and her own
method is an adaption of Foucault's genealogical critique,
she does offer some insightful criticisms of Foucault.
Applying her usual method of critiquing one discourse from
the perspective of the another, she employs feminist
discourse to critique postmodernism, specifically Foucault,
for not giving adequate consideration to issues of gender,
including the construction of the category of woman, and she
uses psychoanalytic discourse to critique Foucault's concept
of a socially constructed self.
Flax criticizes Foucault because, while his philosophy
stresses retrieval of the marginalized and repressed, he
rarely mentions women.

His own analysis is uninformed by

any explicit or implicit reference to feminist theory.
Foucault mentions women as one of the subjected or
marginalized and resisting elements within
contemporary culture. He stresses the need to pay
attention to the minute, local, and differentiated
forms of events and power that are said to
constitute 'history.' However he does not
consider the feminist claim that in important ways
the histories of men and women are themselves
differentiated and heterogeneous.
Foucault's
histories seem totally uninformed by any awareness
of feminist narratives of his major subjects . . .
Systematic consideration of gender relations
would profoundly effect his genealogies of

19

Ibid.
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sexuality, subjectivity, power, and knowledge. 20
In critiquing Foucault's concept of self, Flax argues
that Foucault ignores the role of intimate social
relationships in the construction of self as well as the
role of gender. Flax claims that Foucault can ignore the
role of these relationships in the formation of self,
because they are "displaced" by Foucault's "insistence on
self as an effect of discourse.

1121

Flax offers an

alternative conception:
A social self would come to be partially in and
through powerful, affective relationships with
other persons. These relations with others and our
feelings and fantasies about them, along with
experiences of embodiedness also mediated by such
relations, can come to constitute an 'inner' self
that is neither simply fictive nor 'natural.'
Such a self is simultaneously embodied, gendered,
social, and unique.
It is capable of telling
stories and of conceiving and experiencing itself
in all these ways.u
Flax sees this neglect of intimate social relations as
linked to postmodernisms inadequate attention to gender.
Postmodernist narratives about subjectivity are
inadequate. As postmodernists construct
subjectivity, only two alternatives appear: a
'false' unitary and essentialist self or an
equally nondiff erentiated but totally
historically . . . constituted 'true' one. The
nature of this dichotomy itself is partially
determined by the absence of any systematic
consideration of gender or gender relations.
Within postmodernist discourses there is no
attempt to incorporate or do justice to the
2

°Flax, Thinking Fragments, 212.

21

Ibid., 231.

22

Ibid.
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specificity of women's experiences or desires as
discussed by women ourselves. Women's experiences
of subjectivity suggest there are alternatives to
the two presented within postmodernist
discourses. 23
Flax is particularly critical of Foucault's contention
that the self is the effect of "discourse."

She contrasts a

self derived from concrete social relations with a
postmodern self deriving from "fictions" or "textual"
convention.

She prefers

to argue that 'the self' is social and in some
important ways gendered. Hence any self or
concept of it must be differentiated, local, and
historical. Gender can be used as a lever against
essentialist or ahistoric notions of self. A
feminist deconstruction of the self, however,
would point toward locating self and its
experiences in concrete social relations, not only
in fictive or purely textual convention.N
I agree with Flax that Foucault neglects gender (as I
have already noted).
intimate relations.

I also agree that Foucault has ignored
However, Foucault does not set up a

"false" unitary self against a "true" constructed self-since he deconstructs the concept of "truth.
23

Nor does

Ibid. , 210.

Nibid.
25
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By the time she writes "Multiples" and "Minerva's Owl"
(both found in Disputed Subjects) she becomes less rigid
with this either/or structuring of the subjectivity debate
and more comfortable with ambiguity, fluidity, and
multiplicity.
In these later works she embraces the varied
positionality called for by Foucault. Her views on
Foucault's concept of constructed subjectivity undergo
significant change from her early discussion in Thinking
Fragments, in which she is quite critical of this concept of
subjectivity and does not think it is an adequate theory in
which to ground an emancipatory feminist politics, to her
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"discourse" exclude attention to intimate relationships.
While it is true that Foucault's analysis for the most part
ignores such relationships as parent, friend, or lover, his
analysis emphasizes power, and calls our attention to its
"microphysics," which is appropriate for analyzing these
intimate relationships.

Even intimate relationships need to

be interpreted; hence prevailing discourses do enter in,
even at the intimate level.

By applying his analysis of

power to such relationships, we can add a more nuanced
dimension to our understanding of these relationships. 26
The Multiple self
As we have seen, Freud offers a model of a nonunif ied
self that does not (always) privilege rationality, while
Foucault offers a model of a socially constructed self.

One

of Flax's important contributions to our developing an

later discussion of subjectivity in Disputed Subjects, in
which she employs this concept of constructed subjectivity.
Once she enriches Foucault's concept of subjectivity with an
analysis of gender, she is able to see the potential of this
concept to advance emancipatory feminist politics.
In
Thinking Fragments she intimates that such a move-supplementing Foucault's concept of self with an analysis of
gender--would indeed allow for the adoption of such a
concept of self for feminist emancipatory politics.
uFor example, many contemporary feminist theorists have
used Foucault's analysis of power to analyze the
relationship of mothering. See for examples Jane Flax,
"Forgotten Forms of Close Combat: Mothers and Daughters
Revisited," chap. in Disputed Subjects; Jana Sawicki,
"Feminism and the Power of Foucauldian Discourse: Foucault
and Mothering Theory," and "Disciplining Mothers: Feminism
and the New Reproductive Technologies," chapters in
Disciplining Foucault (New York: Routledge, 1991).
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adequate notion of subjectivity is her attempt to combine
the insights of these two thinkers, giving us a constructed,
non-unitary self.
Contemporary critics of the instrumental, overly
abstract or rationalistic self have undermined the
plausibility and desirability of any form of
transcendental subjectivity. These concepts of
self grew out of and reflect a particular
historical context whose projects, practices and
pressures have either been exhausted or are no
longer useful to us. Their apparent existence is
contingent also upon the repression or denial of
many other, interrelated aspects of
subj ecti vi ty. 27
Flax does not dismiss the concept of a unified rational
subject altogether. "We might want to foreground these modes
of subjectivity [the instrumental, overly abstract or
rationalistic] for certain purposes." However, "they are
insufficient as a regulative ideals and as prescriptions for
the highest level of human maturity or the definitive human
capacity."~

This is an extremely important point.

Enlightenment

philosophy is based not only on the positing

of a unified rational subject and a general privileging of
rationality, but on the demand that this is the only
philosophically viable position.

The unified Cartesian

subject and the discourse of rationality with which this
subject conducts its philosophical speculations becomes the
regulative ideal.

This dual model--Cartesian subject and

rational discourse--becomes prescriptive.
27

Flax, "Multiples," 33-34.

28

Ibid.
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agent is seen by Enlightenment philosophy as the highest
level of subjectivity, and rational thought is the
definitive human capacity.
that Flax challenges.

These are precisely the ideas

But it is crucial to see that by

advocating a fluid, decentered, constructed concept of
subjectivity, one is not dismissing the rational agent and
rational discourse as untenable.

What one is doing is

disrupting the prescriptive, regulative, hegemonic role this
concept of subjectivity has played throughout modern
philosophy and to allow it to be one aspect of what Flax
calls the multiple self.

What she is trying to name is the

denaturalized subject position that is both decentered
within itself in that, unlike Descartes cogito it is not a
logical agent who is completely self-present to itself, and
decentered within the discourses that make up Enlightenment
philosophy.

Unlike Descartes' cogito, which is firmly

embedded in the hegemonic discourse of rationality, the
constructed subject is constructed within multiple
discourses, none of which are hegemonic.
There are many feminist theorists who think that it is
dangerous to eliminate the rational unified self, and that
in so doing we are foreclosing the liberatory potential of
feminist theory. 29 Flax, however, supports the Foucauldian
idea of a constructed subject, but a constructed, multiple,
29

See Jane Flax Thinking Fragments, 230, where Flax
discusses the fact that some feminist think woman need an
Enlightenment.
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gendered, subject.

"Gendered categories cannot be

destabilized if we insist on their necessity as a foundation
for 'emancipatory' knowledge."w For Flax, one does not need
to ground an emancipatory politics in a unified subject, and
she, like Foucault, considers the very need to do so a
politically motivated one.

She extends Foucault's analysis,

however, to specifically consider the gendered aspect of
subjectivity and feminist emancipatory politics.
Contrary to the claims (or fears) of some, I do
not believe the possibility of effective feminist
politics requires the ability to represent a
unitary woman or even a singular multiple category
of women. A number of assumptions and wishes
motivate this hankering for a universal.
It is a
trace of the continuing operation of Enlightenment
belief systems and the absences of useful
alternatives to them. 31
Flax clarifies what she means by the multiple self and
how she situates this concept in reference to
psychoanalysis, feminism, and postmodernism.
Psychoanalysis, feminism and postmodernism all
require concepts of subjectivity that are fluid
rather than solid and process-oriented rather than
topographical. These theories and practices
require a mechanics of fluids in which
subjectivity is conceived as a set of processes
rather than as a fixed entity locatable in a
homogeneous, delimited time and space.
Such
concepts will also be more congruent with and do
more justice to the complexities of subjectivity
that we encounter. Psychic 'structures' are
actually complex clusters of capabilities, modes
of processing, altering and retaining experience,
and foci of affect, somatic effects and
wJane Flax, "Minerva's Owl," chap. in Disputed
Subjects, 24.
31

Ibid., 26.
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transformation of process into various kinds of
languages, fantasy, delusion, defenses, thought
and modes of relating to self and others. These
structures are actually the consequences of the
crosshatching of manly lines of heterogeneous
experience and capacities. When enough lines are
layered over each other, a solid entity amy appear
to form.
Yet the fluidity of the lines remains
and what felt solid and real may subsequently
separate and reform.n
She concludes that the "Subject is a shifting and
always changing intersection of complex, contradictory and
unfinished processes."" The idea of contradiction is an
important one.

These multiple subject positions do not have

to coalesce in a coherent whole; divergent and often
contradictory positions can coexist within a single subject.

On Rationality
The critique of rationality, which Flax shares with
postmodernism, is highly controversial.

It is often argued

that if we do not posit human subjectivity as essentially
rational, it is impossible to argue coherently, or struggle
effectively, for emancipation.

Flax disagrees strongly.

What kinds of subjectivity resist domination and
struggle for something else? Unlike Kant,
Habermas, John Rawls, or some contemporary
feminists I argue that a subject in whom
rationality is the privileged quality cannot
sustain emancipatory struggles.
[We must) explore
the possibilities of fluid, multiple
subjectivities whose desires for differences will
impel them toward resisting (inner or external)
32

Flax, "Multiples, " 3 7.

33

Ibid.
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relations of

domination.~

Flax questions the assumed necessity of the link
between rationality and justice:
It is questionable whether there are any necessary
or intrinsic relations between reason, however
defined, and justice. Why should we believe that
reason is privileged or primary for the self or
justice? There are many factors upon which the
development of subjectivity, self-understanding,
and justice depends. These factors include
political practices; child rearing and education;
the absence of economic, race, or gender-based
relations of domination; empathy; fantasy;
feelings; imagination; and embodiment. Why should
we believe that reason is, can, or should be
independent of the contingencies of
intersubjectivity, embodiment, language, social
relations, or the unconscious?"
It is important to understand that postmodern and
feminist critiques of rationality do not call for the
wholesale abandonment of reason.

But they do point out that

an excessive preoccupation with reason can be
counterproductive. In Flax's view,
rationalistic approaches to justice are doomed to
fail and are counterproductive. They block the
development of other capacities, such as empathy
and appreciation for otherness, which are required
for the effective exercise of justice. They
encourage and depend upon pathological forms of
subjectivity. . . . Thinking is radically split
off and experienced as operating independently of
the rest of subjectivity, including our
relatedness to and dependence on others. The
development and maintenance of such forms of
abstract rationality require intrapsychic and
interpersonal relations of domination. The
effects of such domination cannot be contained by
34

Flax, Disputed Subjects, xii.

35

Flax, "The Play of Justice," chap. in Disputed
116.

Subjects,
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rational principles or law or social structures
devised by philosopher-kings.~
The postmodern feminist critique of rationality is one
of its most important and most controversial positions.
Since this critique is frequently misunderstood, and indeed,
often caricatured, let me clarify some of its components.
There are at least three principle elements to this
critique--rationality as character defect, rationality as an
interpersonal/political weapon, and an over-reliance on
"argument" in discussion.
Defining "man" as a "rational animal," i.e. , making
rationality the cornerstone of humanity, gives impetus to a
personality type obsessed with principles and consistency.
This obsession (as Flax notes in the above quote) can block
the development of other capacities.

The critique of

rationality is not meant to glorify the "irrational"--people
who are truly insane--but rather, to suggest that moral and
psychic maturity means being able to live with a certain
degree of contradiction and confusion.
The second element in the critique of rationality
involves noting how the charge of "irrational" or
"inconsistent'' can be, and regularly is, deployed to silence
disturbing voices--especially, but not exclusively, those of
women.

When a "different voice" is trying to make itself

heard, there is inevitably a groping, an attempt at

y!bid., 116-117.
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articulation that is imperfect.

Such inconsistencies, etc.,

are forgiven or glossed when coming from the dominant
tradition, but are mercilessly pursued when coming from a
marginalized voice.
The third element in the postmodern critique calls into
question an over-reliance on "argument" in discussion.
Instead of developing skills at empathetic listening, or
seeing the point of, for example story telling as opposed to
logical deduction, one is trained to adopt an adversarial
approach to the speaker that involves throwing up
counterexamples, demanding clear and precise definitions,
etc.
The postmodern feminist critique of rationality does
not propose to discard "rationality" altogether.
Inconsistencies, for example, should give one pause.
one does want to be able to dispute a "bad argument."

And
But

to make genuine progress about real issues, one has to be
able to tolerate a certain amount of unclarity and
inconsistency.

One cannot resolve all ambiguities and

paradoxes; one cannot always dot every "i" and cross every
"t".

Ambiguities and inconsistencies are often fruitful

ways of keeping the conversation going.
On Justice
Flax agrees with Foucault as I do, that for theorists
of emancipatory politics there is a danger in assuming that
there is only one correct stance or subject position from
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which to theorize or to wage resistance.

Foucault's

conception of power is most useful in that it suggests the
importance of having many fronts from which to wage battle
against multiple systems of domination.

Flax enriches

Foucault's analysis by adding the dimensions of gender and
interpersonal relationships.

Ambiguity, fluidity, and

multiplicity are a necessity when one understands that the
subject is constructed through multiple matrices of power
and will thus necessarily change as the grids of power
shift.

This is not a weakness, but a strategical necessity.

But a different conception of the subject entails a
different conception of justice.

"Better theories of

justice will require different accounts of what subjectivity
might be.

It is both possible and

necessary to develop

nonrationalist concepts of subjectivity and justice.''n
The question then needs to be addressed as to "what
practices of justice would multiple subjects desire and
sustain?''n Flax addresses this question in her essay "The
Play of Justice."

Many theorists, Nancy Fraser among them,

as we have seen, claim that the postmodern subject lacks the
ability to make normative validity claims and thus eschews
ethically defensible politics.

Flax disagrees.

As she

states, "there is no inherent contradiction between
postmodernist commitments to the play of differences and
nibid., 111.
HFlax, Disputed Subjects, vii.
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ethical ones.

Quite the contrary, full commitment to the

play of differences requires resistance to the relations of
domination and development of new theories and practices of
justice."D What Flax's defense of postmodern ethics claims
is that by deconstructing normative models of subjectivity
and justice one does not eliminate justice; in fact such a
deconstruction enriches it.
One aspect of . . . deconstructive projects is to
loosen the hold of transcendental or rationalistic
theories of subjectivity and justice. There are
good reasons to undermine our belief in such
ideas. We believe that objective truth and
justice are interdependent, but this is not
necessarily the case.
It is unnecessary and even
dangerous to assume that the existence and
practice of justice requires any transcendental
grounding.
Even if we abandon all notions of
transcendental truth and a reason capable of
grasping it, we can still formulate and articulate
theories and practices of justice. Our choice is
not necessarily between grounding justice in
objective truth claims (judged by reason) or
domination. 40
Foucault shows the differential power relationships of
domination that operate to form the traditional
philosophical concept of transcendental truth.

His

analysis, which deconstructs the category of truth, implies
that truth and justice are not inextricably interdependent.
Flax extends this genealogical critique to justice itself.
It was shown in the Foucault chapter that one need not
appeal to a transcendental notion of truth in order to have
39
4

Ibid.

°Flax, "The Play of Justice," 115.
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a viable philosophy.

Flax extends this argument to show

that one need not appeal to a rational subject with access
to a transcendental notion of justice in order to have a
viable political theory.

What is required is a

reconceptualization of justice.

For Flax (and I agree) not

only is non-normative ethics possible, it is necessary.
Much of the critique concerning the lack of normativity
in postmodernism is that it makes political practice
impossible because there is no foundation in which to ground
political activity.

What Foucault and Flax argue, however,

is that disrupting a foundation grounded in concepts of
transcendental rationality and truth that themselves conceal
relationships of domination is itself a politically
necessary and ethically just move.

It is often argued then

that there is no possibility of just political action
because there can be no prioritizing of actions or basis on
which to choose between just and unjust causes.

It is

assumed that if one does not appeal to a transcendental
truth, then the there will simply be a chaotic situation of
free flowing nonprioritized difference.

This too is a

simplified reading of what postmodern feminism demands.
Postmodernism does not entail a belief that all
differences are equal or reconcilable. The number
of forms of life that can coexist peacefully is
necessarily limited.
Conflict and power (in its
generative and constraining modes) are intrinsic
to all social relations, including politics.
However, postmodernists recognize the
unavailability of any transcendental trump or
universal measure of the good. They forsake the
hope that there could be transdiscursive rules or
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neutral procedures to resolve disagreements.
Rules are discourse specific and have limited and
heterogeneous effects. The possibility always
exists that some conflicts cannot be resolved
peacefully or to the satisfaction of all
disputants. 41
As I argued earlier, what critics of postmodern political
practice, such as Fraser, find most difficult to accept is
this unavailability of a "transcendental trump".

It is

incorrectly assumed that without a universal measure of the
good to provide a foundation for neutrality and normativity,
there can be no justice.

What this position ignores are the

systems of domination concealed within the very foundation
they want to claim as constitutive of just political
practice.

It does not follow that all situations are equal,

or that we cannot choose any political action because we
have no transcendental concepts to which we can appeal.
Flax writes, "All differences are not equal nor do they
deserve the same political consideration.

However, positing

abstract principles or essentialist claims about human
nature will not help us sort out which differences ought to
be respected within particular political arrangements. 110 On
the contrary, "it is . . . likely that the plausibility of any
universal claim depends upon its congruence with existing
relations of power.

The appearance of universality may

require that the qualities central to the least powerful are

41

Flax, Disputed Subjects, vii.

42

Flax, "The Play of Justice," 111.
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rendered invisible."~
It is important to notice how Flax's discussion of
justice is inseparable from a discussion of subjectivity.
According to Plato, Kant, Rawls among others, it is
necessarily the rational agent that grounds a theory of
justice.

This is why the postmodern disruption of such

agency is considered irreconcilable with any concept of
ethical political practice.

Flax builds on her concept of

subjectivity as constructed, multiple, fluid, and
relational, and reconceives of justice as a process.
Justice is not a finite state or permanent set of
rules or principles (contrary to the arguments of
writers as diverse as Plato or Rawls).
It is an
ongoing process in and through which our goals and
purposes will change. Justice can be better
understood and approximated if we think of it as
interrelated practices. These practices have the
best possibility of developing and being sustained
and effective within transitional spaces.
such
spaces are generated by, depend upon, and reflect
more than the operation of any form of reason. The
domination of certain forms of reason may actually
inhibit or block their development.«
I think that this is a viable concept of justice (or at
least a viable outline of a concept of justice) on which to
base a postmodern feminist emancipatory political practice.
It is a concept of justice appropriate to the postmodern
feminist project, which is disruptive, playful,
antifoundational, decentered, and fragmented, yet, I think,
profoundly liberatory.
~Ibid.,

113.

«Ibid., 112

By redefining justice, and
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liberating it from its previously enmeshed relationship with
reason, we are free to engage in new kinds of political
practices. The scope of how we conceptualized political
practice has been partially limited by our conception of
justice.

Once we can free subjectivity, political practice,

and justice from the limited narrative of rationality, a
complex and exciting terrain opens up in which we can begin
to invent new forms of theorizing and acting.
Evaluation
Flax's conception of justice as primarily a process and
one that privileges relationships over the individual
rational agent is a conception that emerges directly from
her concept of feminist theory.
Feminists point to the pervasive effects of gender
relations and to a division of labor in which
relationships, nurturance, and caretaking
necessarily conflict with autonomy, reason, and
history making. Relational work and capacities
are assigned to women, defined as irrational or
arising purely out of bodily necessity and
devalued. The isolated agent and (his) pure
reason become the social/political hero.~
We can see that the reconceptualizing of justice as a nonnormative process, which is not based on the rational agent
has not only postmodern resonances but feminist ones as
well.

To the extent that feminist theorists are concerned

with analyzing how gender is constructed and constituted
through various interpretations of biology and sex,

45 I

b.d
.l . , 117.

a

158

theory of justice that allows us to question the
relationships of domination concealed within normative
ideals is necessary.
To the extent that feminist theory is concerned with
analyzing gender, most of Flax's own work is done with
reference to this problematic.

She defines as the goal of

feminist theory, "to analyze gender relations: how gender
relations are constituted and experienced and how we think
or, equally important, do not think about them. " 46 While she
discusses many feminist theories, including psychoanalytic,
standpoint, dual systems theory and socialist feminist, to
the extent that she is concerned with the construction of
the category gender, she is clearly within a postmodern
framework.

In her later work she refers to gender as a

"historical artifact;" and does not think that gender is
"determined by a pregiven, unchangeable biological
substratum but rather reflects structures of power, language
and social practices and our struggles with and against
these structures."~
However in her earlier work she is reluctant to give up
essentialist notions of self and gender.

In Thinking

Fragments, for example, her description of feminist theory
is much more suspicious of the postmodern project and is
~Jane Flax, "Postmodernism and Gender Relations in
Feminist Theory," in Feminism/Postmodernism, ed. Linda
Nicholson (New York: Routledge, 1990), 40.
47

Flax, "Multiples," 3 6.
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reluctant to break completely with the Enlightenment concept
of an essentialist, unified self.
Although feminist theorists seem to undermine
essential properties of the Enlightenment self,
they are also unable to abandon it fully.
The
relations of feminist theorizing to the
postmodernist project of deconstructing the self
and the Enlightenment are necessarily ambivalent.
In many ways women never 'had' an Enlightenment.
Enlightenment discourse was not meant to include
women, and its coherence depends partially on our
continuing exclusion.a
The shift in Flax's position, which goes unremarked by
her, points to something problematic in her work.

Flax

claims that psychoanalysis, feminism, and postmodernism are
transitional ways of thinking, which allow us to challenge
the authority and rigidity of Enlightenment narratives by
disrupting the hegemony of transcendental truth,
rationality, and justice.

Her proposed project, which she

replicates in almost all of her work, is to stage a dialogue
between the narratives of psychoanalysis, feminism, and
postmodernism.

I think that she partially undermines the

usefulness of her own work, however, by replicating what she
most wants to challenge.

By this I mean she tends to

exacerbate the rigidity of the positions of psychoanalysis,
feminist theory, and postmodernism in order to critique
them. 49

48
49

She subsumes radically differing theories under

Flax, Thinking Fragments, 230.

Pamela caughie makes this argument in "Feminism and
the Postmodern Turnabout" {Chicago, IL: Radical Scholars and
Activist Conference, 1990).
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unified rubrics.

If she modified her position by saying

some or even most feminist theorists think x, then she would
not be collapsing such variant theories under a single
rubric.

Her tendency to over-generalize makes her work

unnecessarily imprecise.

For example, when she writes in

her earlier text that feminist theorists are unable to fully
abandon the Enlightenment self, but then in her later text
she abandons this position, and seemingly embraces a
thoroughly postmodern conception of gender and self, it
seems as if all of feminist theory has changed, rather than
just her view.

She sometimes overstates the position of

postmodern theory, feminist theory, and psychoanalytic
theory so that she can critique it, rather than showing the
ambiguities of the very opposition of these discourses.
For example, she writes in Thinking Fragments, "It is
questionable whether any of the spaces opened by
postmodernism would be comfortable to or inhabitable by
those concerned with issues of gender and gender justice."~
This statement contradicts much of what she later writes
about gender construction and justice.

The point here is

not that her work develops and matures; the point is that
she states in all her work that it is necessary to tolerate
ambiguity and to challenge totalizing discourses, yet she
herself enacts both these practices repeatedly.

In

constructing her analysis by separating the categories
SOI bid • I

21 Q•
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psychoanalysis, feminism, and postmodernism, she both
simplifies and rigidifies categorical thinking rather than
challenging such discourses. It seems to me that by
constantly ref erring to these three categories as separate
discourses, she is constantly reenacting dichotomous
thinking in a narrative that is supposed to challenge
precisely such (modernist)thought.
Her separation and naming of these discourses forces
one who is reading and writing about her work to separate,
name and categorize theories into these various rubrics as
well.

It seems that what needs to be done is a genealogy of

the discourses of psychoanalysis, postmodernism, and
feminism that would show how these came to be constituted as
separate discourses, and who and what are being served by
keeping them as discreet narratives.

One conclusion that

would likely emerge from such an analysis is that by
reinvoking the distinction between feminism and
postmodernism, as well as between feminism and
psychoanalysis, one furthers the Enlightenment project of
marginalizing gender.

I would argue that one cannot think

postmodernism without challenging gender, and thus to
separate the discussion of feminism and postmodernism makes
it seem as if the feminist rethinking of gender is
derivative of and marginal to postmodern narratives.
Flax does add an important dimension to the postmodern
feminist conception of subjectivity, namely her
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attentiveness to psychoanalytical insights and to the
psychological well being and happiness of the subject. 51 For
example, it is difficult to imagine the Foucauldian subject
being depressed, having friends, or being a parent.

These

are dimensions of subjectivity Flax herself examines.
Including an analysis of these various aspects of
subjectivity greatly enriches the postmodern feminist
project.
Her concepts of subjectivity and of justice are also
highly useful for feminist emancipatory political practice.
What follows from the claim that subjectivity is
not unitary, fixed, homogeneous or teleological:
it does not follow that subjectivity is an empty
or outmoded category that we can happily discard
along with other modern hangups. To make such a
claim would be to privilege one view of
subjectivity such that if it is not A it is not
anything at all.
It also does not follow that we
can make no claims about what we believe to be
better or worse ways of being a person. While we
cannot fall back on reassuring, universal
standards to justify our beliefs, we can, do and
must make judgments about how to be with and treat
ourselves and others.~
Flax sees the analysis of subjectivity as itself a form of
political intervention, a conclusion with which I completely
agree.
As the lesser others of Western culture- women,
people of color, the colonized- rebel, the unitary
self is increasing exposed as an effect of many
kinds of relations of domination. Our notions of
subjectivity and our choices among them do reflect
and reinforce political and social forces.
In
51

See Flax, "Multiples," 40-46.

52
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this disrupted moment, the ability to tolerate and
the will to encourage fluid and multiple forms of
subjectivity is an imperative and fully ethical
position."
She thus concludes that rooting emancipatory struggles in
fluid, decentered, multiple subjects is not only necessary,
but just.

"Ibid., 46.

CHAPTER FIVE
BUTLER
A major debate in contemporary social philosophy
concerns the nature of subjectivity.

The adherents of

enlightenment philosophy conceive of subjectivity as
pertaining to a unified agent acting within a horizon that
is ultimately rational.

Postmodern theorists on the other

hand see the subject as radically fractured and decentered,
constituted within a matrix of pervasive, non-rational power
relations.

Postmodernists such as Michel Foucault, and as

we shall see, Judith Butler do not think that the subject,
thought of as a unified rational agent, is desirable or even
possible.

They do not think that there is any interior

psychic space in which can be found an ontologically
grounded subject.

In this chapter I will examine Butler's

concept of subjectivity and consider how this is related to
her idea of political praxis.

I will argue that her concept

of subjectivity, which conceives the subject as
performative, is the conception most adequate to the project
of emancipatory feminist politics.

I will argue that the

concept of self first articulated by Foucault as the
constructed self and then developed by Butler into the
performative self is the most useful for grounding an
164
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emancipatory feminist politics.

By deconstructing the

ontologically grounded subject, performative theory allows
for the practical and strategic enactment of various subject
positions and thus provides us with the necessary tools for
carrying out various emancipatory political strategies.

(It

insists, however, that we always examine the political
implications and the exclusionary practices that this
strategic employment entails.)

I will argue, with Butler,

that in order to successfully challenge oppressive systems
we need multiple sites of intervention.

The performative

conception of subjectivity best allows for such political
praxis.
on the Subject of Politics
As we have seen, Flax calls into question the necessity
of grounding a theory of justice on a normative foundation
that presupposes a unified rational subject.
even deeper, more radical question:

Butler asks an

Why should we assume

that politics requires any kind of stable subject?

Why

should we assume that there must be "a doer behind the
deed?" 1
To claim that politics requires a stable subject
is to claim that there can be no political
1

Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the
Subversion of Identity (New York: Routledge, 1990), 25.
Butler quotes from Nietzsche's On the Genealogy of Morals:
"'the doer' is merely a fiction added to the deed--the deed
is everything." Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of
Morals, trans. Walter Kaufman (New York: Vintage, 1969), 45,
quoted in Butler, Gender Trouble, 25.
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opposition to that claim.
Indeed, that claim
implies that a critique of the subject cannot be a
politically informed critique but, rather, an act
which puts into jeopardy politics as such. To
require the subject means to foreclose the domain
of the political, and that foreclosure, installed
analytically as an essential feature of the
political, enforce the boundaries of the domain of
the political in such a way that enforcement is
protected from political scrutiny. 2
Butler here attempts to expand the notion of the political,
to extend the realm of political critique and activity to
include the subject.

Rather than assuming a stable subject

as the ground for political activity, Butler problematizes
this notion of subjectivity and includes the definition of
subjectivity itself as part of her political analysis.

If

one assumes that politics requires a stable subject, one has
in effect posited that subject as foundational to political
critique, rather than including the subject position as part
of the project of political critique.

Rather than accepting

the subject as a universal, normative grounding of
politically informed critique, Butler extends the realm of
politics to include a critique of the subject.

She claims

that the exclusion of the subject from political critique is
a political move.

In accepting the subject as the normative

ground of political critique, one has made a move to exclude
subjectivity from political scrutiny and to accept given
notions of agency as normative.
2

Judith Butler, "Contingent Foundations," in Feminist
Contentions: A Philosophical Exchange, ed. Linda Nicholson
(New York: Routledge, 1995), 36.
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It is important to note, however, that Butler is not
saying that there is no subject of politics.

This is the

move critics of postmodernism often mistakenly assume is
being made: a refusal of the grounding subject of politics
automatically means a refusal or "death'' of subjectivity
altogether.

But to make this move is to remain uncritically

inscribed in the binary mode of Enlightenment rationalism.
Butler does not accept such a simplistic negation.
To refuse to assume, that is, to require a notion
of the subject from the start is not the same as
negating or dispensing with such a notion
altogether; on the contrary, it is to ask after
the process of its construction an~ the political
meaning and consequentiality of taking the subject
as a requirement or presupposition of theory. 3
This is an argument similar to one Foucault makes in
examining how subjectivity is constructed.

Rather than

assuming subjectivity as the unproblematic grounding of
political theory, Butler, like Foucault, looks at the
politics of subject formation.

Like Foucault, Butler claims

that identity is not located in an interior psychic space,
but rather is a social construction.

To understand the

subject as a social construct, one must theorize the systems
of power, among them patriarchy, within which the subject is
defined.

If political critique begins, implicitly or

explicitly, with a concept of stable, universal "human
nature," the possibility of examining the subject itself as
a political construct is foreclosed.
3

Ibid., 39.
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examines the power configurations within which subjectivity
is constructed.

She argues that any subject position,

including the unified rational agent that grounds
Enlightenment philosophy, is necessarily formed within
interconnecting matrixes of power based on exclusionary
practices.
When theorists claim that the subject position is
foundational to political theory, that it forms the
normative grounding for political critique, they assume that
subjectivity itself is free from power relationships.
Butler, like Foucault and other postmodernists, including
myself, argue that there is no foundational universal
position free of power.

She maintains, moreover, that this

fact does not entail nihilism.

She holds that

power pervades the very conceptual apparatus that
seeks to negotiate its terms, including the
subject position of the critic; and further, that
this implication of the terms of criticism in the
field of power is not the advent of a nihilistic
relativism incapable of furnishing norms, but,
rather, the very precondition of a politically
engaged critique. To establish a set of norms
that are beyond power or force is itself a
powerful and forceful conceptual practice that
sublimates, disguises, and extends its own power
play through recourse to tropes of normative
universality. 4
Butler here can be read as addressing Fraser and other
critical theorists such as Benhabib and Habermas, as well as
other Marxist and socialist theorist who are threatened by
the refusal to ground social theory in a theory of the
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subject, and who think that attempts to deconstruct
subjectivity undercuts the emancipatory potential of
political theory.

Butler takes a Foucauldian position, and

argues that far from announcing the end of political theory
and practice, the deconstruction of subjectivity allows for
an expansion of politics.

It is often held by some

Marxists, critical theorists and others who want to ground
emancipatory politics in a subject that the deconstruction
of subjectivity (by holding up subjectivity to political
critique) announces the end of emancipatory politics.

Like

Foucault and Flax, Butler argues that the refusal to ground
emancipatory politics in a concept of subjectivity that is
seen as grounded on universal normative ideals and is itself
outside of the realm of political critique is to prematurely
foreclose the viable realm of political critique, and to
constrict the scope of political intervention.

Like

Foucault and Flax, Butler underscores the point that there
is no neutral normative territory that is foundational to
political critique.

To assume that there is prematurely

delimits the political horizon. Far from introducing
nihilistic relativism, "the critique of the subject is not a
negation or repudiation of the subject, but, rather, a way
of interrogating its construction as a pregiven
foundationalist premise. 115
It is the refusal to allow the subject as a
5

Ibid., 42.
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f oundationalist premise that informs the philosophy of both
Foucault and Butler.

I think this refusal is necessary for

any emancipatory politics to succeed, and particularly for
an emancipatory feminist politics.

When theorists accept

the pregiven foundationalist premise of subjectivity, they
accept uncritically the power configurations and relations
of force that form that subject.

Any theory that

uncritically appropriates unexamined relationships of force
and domination as the foundation of emancipatory politics
cannot truly succeed in overthrowing oppressive systems,
because it insists on always looking for such oppression
externally, rather than disentangling the oppression from
the very subjects who are being oppressed, by deconstructing
and genealogizing how power and force relations form the
subject.
Far from being the nihilistic threat that Fraser and
others fear, Butler's critique of normative foundations
represents a democratic engagement in the political field.
A social theory committed to democratic
contestation within a postcolonial horizon needs
to find a way to bring into question the
foundations it is compelled to lay down.
It is
this movement of interrogating that ruse of
authority that seeks to close itself off from
contest that is, in my view, at the heart of any
radical political project. 6
Universality, Agency, Performativity
It is important to note that to question, deconstruct,
6

Ibid., 41.
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reconfigure and resignify foundationalist categories is not
to do away with them.

Even "universals" have a role to play

in Butler's theory, although they must be approached with
suspicion.
How many "universalities" are there and to what
extent is cultural conflict understandable as the
clashing of a set of presumed and intransigent
"universalities," a conflict which cannot be
negotiated through recourse to a culturally
imperialist notion of the "universal" or, rather,
which will only be solved through such recourse at
the cost of violence? We have, I think, witnessed
the conceptual and material violence of this
practice in the United States's war against Iraq,
in which Arab "other" is understood to be
radically "outside" the universal structures of
reason and democracy and, hence, calls to be
brought forcibly within.
Butler adds,
Within the political context of contemporary
postcoloniality more generally, it is perhaps
especially urgent to underscore the very category
of the 'universal' as a site of insistent contest
and resignif ication. Given the contested
character of the term, to assume from the start a
procedural or substantive notion of the universal
is of necessity to impose a culturally hegemonic
notion on the social field.
To herald that notion
then as the philosophical instrument that will
negotiate between conflicts of power is precisely
to safeguard and reproduce a position of hegemonic
power by installing it in the metapolitical site
of ultimate normativity. 7
Butler insists that it is not sufficient to simply call
for less culturally-constrained universals, but neither is
it appropriate to abandon the concept altogether.
The term "universality" would have to be left
permanently open, permanently contested,
7

Ibid.

I

40.
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permanently contingent, in order not to foreclose
in advance future claims for inclusion.
Indeed,
from my position and from any historically
constrained perspective, any totalizing concept of
the universal will shut down rather than authorize
the unanticipated and unanticipatable claims that
will be made under the sign of "the universal."
In this sense, I am not doing away with the
category, but trying to relieve the category of
its foundationalist weight in order to render it
as a site of permanent political contest. 8
What Butler wants to do is to reconfigure the universal
as a site of permanent contest, rather than to regard it as
a politically neutral foundation on which to base other
political contests.

Once the universal becomes a contested

category there is no metapolitical grounding for
emancipatory politics.

It is precisely in this demand to

interrogate the hegemony of universal categories, among them
subjectivity, that the emancipatory potential of such
politics lies.

This move of deconstructing hegemonic

foundations radically reconfigures both the discursive
terrain of politics as well as political practices.

Part of

this deconstruction is the politicization (through
genealogical critique} of metapolitical normativity.
Genealogical critique reveals that any metapolitical
normative framework is always already politically
constituted.

While the liberatory potential of such radical

disruption is great, this is a demanding task as one must
always be contesting and interrogating foundations including
one's own subjective position.
8

Ibid.' 40-41.
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The traditional philosophical conception of political
change requires not only universal principles but an agent,
and this agency is necessary to ground any political theory.
The postmodern move of disrupting subjectivity also
reconfigures the meaning of agency.

Rather than the agent

being a metapolitical grounding of theory and politics, the
site and construction of subjectivity is seen as a political
move, and thus becomes a site of intervention.

Once the

subject is seen as constructed, its construction is open to
contestation and reinterpretation.
Do we need to assume theoretically from the start
a subject with agency before we can articulate the
terms of a significant social and political task
of transformation, resistance, radical
democratization? If we do not off er in advance
the theoretical guarantee of that agent, are we
doomed to give up transformation and meaningful
political practice? My suggestion is that agency
belongs to a way of thinking about persons as
instrumental actors who confront an external
political field.
But if we agree that politics
and power exist already at the level at which the
subject and its agency are articulated and made
possible, then agency can be presumed only at the
cost of refusing to inquire into its construction.
Consider that 'agency' has no formal existence . .

agency is always and only a political
prerogative. As such it seems crucial to question
the conditions of its possibility, not to take it
for granted as an a priori guarantee. 9
Here Butler addresses another of the major concerns of
the critics of postmodern political theory--the idea that
without a pregiven agent to effect change political
intervention is not possible.

9

Ibid., 46-47.

Butler argues that this
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conception of agency and politics is based on erroneous
political assumptions, which conceal the workings of power
at the level of the agent.

It is a conception of agency

which assumes that the subject is separate from the
political field.

Butler insists that there is no

prepolitical foundational level in which agency exists, but
rather that agency is itself is a political construction.
Thus she says, "For the subject to be a pregiven point of
departure for politics is to defer the question of the
political construction and regulation of the subject
itself. " 10

It is precisely this refusal to defer the

political construction of subjectivity that informs the
postmodern political project.

It is because of this refusal

that I see postmodern political theory as most adequate to
the project of emancipatory politics.

When a political

theory begins by assuming agency, and then looks at how that
agent can effect change in the external political field, it
has already failed at the critical examination of the
oppressive structures that comprise agency.

One must begin

a politically engaged critique at the level of subjectivity,
and one must recognize the reconfiguration of the subject
position as a political intervention.

It is precisely such

a strategy that Butler advocates:
Where are the possibilities of reworking the very
matrix of power by which we are constituted, of
reconstituting the legacy of that constitution,
lOibid. , 4 7.
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and of working against each other those processes
of regulation that can destabilize existing power
regimes? For if the subject is constituted by
power, that power does not cease at the moment the
subject is constituted, for that subject is never
fully constituted, but is subjected and produced
time and again.
That subject is neither a ground
nor a product, but the permanent possibility of a
certain resignifying process, one which gets
detoured and stalled through other mechanisms of
power, but which is power's own possibility of
being reworked. 11
Here we encounter one of Butler's most central and
significant ideas.

The subject is not the metapolitical

ground of politics, as Enlightenment philosophy would have
it, nor is it simply a product of various political
configurations, as Foucault suggests.

Rather the subject is

a site of resignification, reinterpretation, and
reorganization of the matrixes of power.

In this way

Butler's concept of subjectivity breaks from the apparent
determinism of the Foucauldian concept of constructed
subjectivity.

For Butler, the subject is not simply

constituted by power, but is the active site of resignifying
power relationships and of performing this reworking of
power.

Thus, it becomes possible to inquire as to the

political implications of asserting or privileging a certain
subject position over another.

What are the consequences

for emancipatory politics of enacting different subject
positions?

It is the freedom to move within and among

competing interpretations of subjectivity that Butler's
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position allows.

Such movement is necessary for

emancipatory politics.
Butler's concept of performativity is central to her
conception of political practice.
agency.

It is also her concept of

She introduces the concept as follows:

The term "performativity" in my usage is taken
from J.L. Austin's How to Do Things With Words and
read through Derrida's "Signature, Event, Context"
in Limited, Inc. as well as Paul de Man's notion
of "metalepsis" articulated throughout his essays
on Nietzsche in Allegories of Reading. A
performative act is one which brings into being or
enacts that which it names, and so marks the
constitutive or productive power of discourse. To
the extent that a performative appears to
"express" a prior intention, a doer behind the
deed, that prior agency is only legible as the
effect of that utterance. For a performative to
work, it must draw upon and recite a set of
linguistic conventions which have traditionally
worked to bind or engage certain kinds of effects.
The force or effectivity of a performative will be
derived from its capacity to draw on and reencode
the historicity of those conventions in a present
act. 12
Recall that for Austin, a performative utterance is one
that, in being uttered in a certain prescribed manner,
brings about a specific effect; for example, "I do take this
man to be my husband," uttered during a marriage ceremony.
According to Austin,

"the uttering of the sentence is, or

is a part of, the doing of an action." 13 For Butler it is
12

Judith Butler, "For A Careful Reading," in Feminist
Contentions: A Philosophical Exchange, ed. Linda Nicholson
(New York: Routledge, 1995), 134.
13

J.L Austin, How To Do Things With Words (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1962), 5. While the whole book
discusses "the performative" he outlines the basic concept
of the performative on pages 4-7.
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important to note that
this power of recitation is not a function of an
individual's intention, but is an effect of
historically sedimented linguistic conventions.
In "Signature, Event, Context," Derrida links the
notion of performativity to citation and
repetition:"could a performative utterance succeed
if its formulation did not repeat a 'coded' or
iterable utterance, or in other words, if the
formula I pronounce in order to open meeting,
launch a ship or marriage were not identifiable as
conforming with an iterable model, if it were not
then identifiable in some way as a 'citation'?" He
writes further, "in such a typology, the category
of intention will not disappear; it will have its
place, but from that place it will no longer be
able to govern the entire scene and system of
utterance. " 14
As Butler emphasizes,
when words engage actions or constitute themselves
a kind of action, they do this not because they
reflect the power of an individual's will or
intention, but because they draw upon and reengage
conventions which have gained their power
precisely through a sedimented iterability. The
category of "intention," indeed, the notion of
"the doer" will have its place, but this place
will no longer be "behind" the deed as its
enabling source.
If the subject--a category
within language and, hence, distinct from what
Benhabib will call a "self"--is performatively
constituted, then it follows that this will be a
constitution in time, and that the "I" and the
"we" will be neither fully determined by language
nor radically free to instrumentalize language as
an external medium. 15
Saying that a subject is performative is not abandoning
any concept of agency.

According to Butler it is in the

14

Butler, "For a Careful Reading," 134. Jacques
Derrida, "Signature, Event, Context," in Margins of
Philosophy, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press, 1982), 326, quoted in Butler, "For A Careful
Reading," 134.
15

Butler, "For A Careful Reading," 134-135.
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performance that agency is constituted.
To be constituted by language is to be produced
within a given network of power/discourse which is
open to resignif ication, redeployment, subversive
citation from within, and interruption and
inadvertent convergences with other such networks.
"Agency" is to be found precisely at such
junctures where discourse is renewed. 16
We can now begin to see the political potential opened
up when the subject is understood as performative.

A

discursive subject is always already within a network of
power/discourse, but there is room to maneuver within this
discursive terrain.

The performative subject must be

constantly reiterated, and this process of reiteration opens
up a space for resignification, redeployment and subversion.
The subject comes into being through this reiteration of the
network of power/discourse.
If the subject is a reworking of the very
discursive processes by which it is worked, then
'agency' is to be found in the possibilities of
resignif ication opened up by discourse.
In this
sense, discourse is the horizon of agency, but
also, performativity is to be rethought as
resignification. There is no 'bidding farewell'
to the doer, but only to the placement of that
doer 'beyond' or 'behind' the deed. 17
The subject is only in the performance, but within this
performance is room to resignify subjectivity.

There is no

subject position that is behind or beyond or outside of the
performance, which is to say, there is no subject position
behind or beyond or outside discursive practices.
16

Ibid., 135.

17

Ibid.
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change, therefore, must come by disrupting those practices,
so that the reiteration of the performance will reveal the
normative conventions it tries to conceal.

Thus Butler

writes, "I would argue that there is no possibility of
standing outside of the discursive conventions by which 'we'
are constituted, but only the possibility of reworking the
very conventions by which we are enabled. " 18

It is this

reworking of conventions that constitutes political
intervention.

This is a reworking of the conventional

concept of emancipatory political intervention, which begins
with a concept of agency, such as women or class, and then
proceeds to free that agent from oppressive power
structures, such as patriarchy or capitalism.

Butler's

concept of the subject as performative entails that the
agent is constructed through the process of political
intervention; in this case political intervention is a
reworking of the power/discourse matrix within which we are
always embedded.

Butler's concept of political intervention

does not offer us the possibility of ever being "freed" from
discursive systems, but only of reworking them.
The Construction and Performance of Gender
To further clarify Butler's notion of performativity,
let us consider her most important application of the

18 I
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concept, its application to gender . 19
According to Butler, gender is both constructed and
performative.

Butler does not think that the construction

of gender is somehow secondary to the construction of
identity because all people come into the world embodied,
and all bodies present themselves as gendered.

Therefore

gender is inseparable from identity, since all beings are
gendered.

What is necessary for feminist politics is to

examine how this gendering takes place.
Considering that 'the' body is invariably
transformed into his body or her body, the body is
only known through its gendered appearance.
It
would seem imperative to consider the way in which
this gendering of the body occurs. My suggestion
is that the body becomes its gender through a
series of acts which are renewed, revised, and
consolidated through time.
From a feminist point
of view, one might try to reconceive the gendered
body as the legacy of sedimented acts rather than
a predetermined or foreclosed structure, essence
or fact, whether natural, cultural, or
linguistic. 20
It is important to understand that this notion of
1

9Most feminists make a distinction between sex and
gender. The most common interpretation is that sex is a
biological given, and gender is the cultural manifestation
(or interpretation) of sex. Such an understanding, however,
leaves the category of biology unexamined, and allows it to
function as a metapolitical category.
In Bodies That
Matter: On the Discursive Limits of 'Sex' (New York:
Routledge, 1993) Butler problematizes the relationship of
gender and sexuality by examining more closely the role of
the body. Her analysis concerning the way bodies themselves
are materialized, while the logical next step to her
discussion of constructed gender, is beyond the scope of
this dissertation.
20Judith

Butler, "Performative Acts and Gender
Constitution: An Essay in Phenomenology and Feminist
Theory," Theatre Journal 40 (1988): 523.
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gender as an act or a performance does not entail that there
is a unified subject already in place who decides to act her
gender in one way or another.

Butler is not saying either

that there is a subject who chooses to perform a certain
gender one way one day and another way another day, as one
would choose one's clothes; or that there is a true sex or
gender that the performance is expressing.

To say that

gender is a performance is to say that it is only this
repetition of acts that constitutes gender; there is nothing
but the performance.
Gender is the repeated stylization of the body, a
set of repeated acts within a highly rigid
regulatory frame that congeals over time to
produce the appearance of substance, of a natural
sort of being. A political genealogy of gender
otologies, if it is successful, will deconstruct
the substantive appearance of gender into its
constitutive acts and locate and account for those
acts within the compulsory frames set by the
various forces that police the social appearance
of gender. To expose the contingent acts that
create the appearance of a naturalistic necessity,
a move which has been a part of cultural critique
at least since Marx, is a task that now takes on
the added burden of showing how the very notion
of the subject, intelligible only through its
appearance as gendered, admits of possibilities
that have been forcibly foreclosed by the various
reif ications of gender that have constituted its
contingent otologies. 21
One is always already engaged in the performance of
gender by virtue of being an embodied subject in the world.
The option is not to end the performance, but rather to try
and maneuver within the performance.

21

Butler, Gender Trouble, 3 3.
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emancipatory potential of performative theory is found.
It is important not to think of the performance of
gender as the expression of a particular role.

There is no

preexisting "self" who chooses to perform gender.

The

performance is constitutive of the gender (and necessarily
then of the self).
This distinction between expression and
performativeness is quite crucial, for if gender
attributes and acts, the various ways in which a
body shows or produces its cultural signification,
are performative, then there is no preexisting
identity by which an act or attribute might be
measured; there would be no true or false, real or
distorted acts of gender, and the postulation of a
true gender identity would be revealed as a
regulatory fiction.
That gender reality is
created through sustained social performances
means that the very notions of an essential sex, a
true or abiding masculinity or femininity, are
also constituted as part of the strategy by which
the performative aspect of gender is concealed.
As a consequence, gender cannot be understood
as a role which either expresses or disguises an
interior 'self' . . . . As a performance which is
performative, gender is an 'act,' broadly
construed, which constructs the social fiction of
its own psychological interiority.n
Butler refers to the concept of a true gender identity
as a regulatory fiction.

This observation then can be

extended to the notion of an essential self.

This

"essential self" is a fictitious idea that serves to
regulate how we conceive of what it means to be a person.
The performative model allows us to disrupt this regulatory
fiction, and to examine what operations of power and
oppression are involved in its creation.
22

Butler, "Performative Acts," 528.
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repetition of the performance leads us to believe there is
an actor behind the performance, but this is part of the
regulatory fiction that Butler challenges.
"the appearance of substance

As she writes,

is precisely that, a

constructed identity, a performative accomplishment which
the mundane social audience, including the actors
themselves, come to believe and to perform in the mode of
belief. " 23

Everyone is always already performati ve.

The

possibility of political action takes place when we
recognize that we are performing and manipulate and
reconstitute the operations of power that go into
constructing this script.
Performativity as Feminist Politics
Let me now apply the above analysis specifically to
feminist emancipatory politics.

Butler has addressed a

standard concern many feminist theorists have regarding
postmodernism.
If it is not a female subject who provides the
normative model for a feminist emancipatory
politics, then what does? If we fail to
recuperate the subject in feminist terms, are we
not depriving feminist theory of a notion of
agency that casts doubt on the viability of
feminist as a normative model? Without a unified
concept of woman or, minimally, a family
resemblance among gender-related terms, it appears
that feminist politics has lost the categorical
basis of its own normative claims. What
constitutes the "who," the subject, for whom
feminism seeks emancipation? If there is no

23

Ibid., 520.
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subject, who is left to emancipate?M
Traditionally feminist politics has been grounded in the
concept of "woman" and the category of women.

What happens

to this category when we apply the above critique of
foundationalist subject positions?

Does it, as some claim,

foreclose the possibility of engaging in feminist politics,
if the grounding subject of women is deconstructed?
To the contrary, I would argue, with Butler, that it is
precisely in deconstructing how the category of women is
constructed and deconstructed that the liberatory potential
of feminist theory can best be expressed.

Butler's move to

explicitly deconstruct the category of women (and the
concept of "woman") is a move that reconceptualizes what is
to count as viable political action.

Traditionally

political action is action that takes place external to the
subject.

Once the subject is reconceptualized as

performative, political activity is necessarily
reconceptualized as that which must take place at the level
of the subject.
position.

The subject is no longer a metapolitical

The configuration of subjectivity and the

inscription of that position is seen as always already
within matrices of power.
The importance of this conception shows itself when we
consider the difficult question of "identity politics."
24

Judith Butler, "Gender Trouble, Feminist Theory, and
Psychoanalytic Discourse," in Feminism/Postmodernism, ed.
Linda Nicholson (New York: Routledge, 1990), 327.
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Most emancipatory movements are grounded in identity
politics.

With Marx for example, it is class identity that

predominates, and in much feminist theory it is the identity
of women (gender) that is at the forefront.
Reconceptualizing emancipatory politics in a way that
removes it from the grounding in identity necessitates a
major reconfiguration of such politics.
A fundamental problem with identity politics is the
rigidity of the identity categories themselves.

Rather than

examining the operations of power involved in constructing
such identity categories as gender, race, and class, too
often these categories are taken to be the metapolitical
grounding of politics.

(Hence the term identity politics.)

A more fruitful move is to look at the relationships of
power and domination that are involved in the construction
of these categories.

This necessarily means a

reconceptualization of political praxis.

Rather than being

foundational to political praxis, the examination and
resignif ication of identity categories become part of
political praxis.
(T)he political critique of the subject questions
whether making a conception of identity into the
ground of politics, however internally
complicated, prematurely forecloses the possible
cultural articulations of the subject-position
that a new politics might well generate.
This kind of political position is clearly
not in line with the humanist presuppositions of
either feminism or related theories on the Left.
At least since Marx's Early Manuscripts, the
normative model of an integrated and unified self
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has served emancipatory

discourses.~

It is the avoidance of just such premature foreclosure
of the possible articulations of the subject position that I
think is crucial.

Part of rethinking emancipatory politics

is rethinking the definition of oppression.
The feminist resistance to the critique of the
subject shares some concerns with other critical
and emancipatory discourses:
If oppression is to
be defined in terms of a loss of autonomy by the
oppressed, as well as a fragmentation or
alienation within the psyche of the oppressed,
then a theory which insists upon the inevitable
fragmentation of the subject appears to reproduce
and valorize the very oppression that must be
overcome. . • .
(We need to) answer the question
of whether oppression ought to be defined in terms
of the fragmentation of identity and whether
fragmentation per se is oppressive. 26
This is one of the major points of disagreement between
Marxists and many feminist thinkers on the one hand and
those espousing postmodernism on the other.
for many feminists,

For Marx and

a fragmented subject is bad.

if the subject is inevitably fragmented?

But what

If this is so,

then oppression ought not be defined in terms of
fragmentation of identity.

I will argue that fragmentation

per se need not be oppressive.
The attraction

of "identity" as the basis for a

political movement cannot be denied.

Large numbers of

people can be brought together to work in the interests of
their common identity.
~Ibid.,
26

327-328.

Ibid., 327.
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identity categories such as "women"and "class" makes
unifying under such concepts difficult.

This is played out

in feminist theory in the problem of unifying under the
category of women.

Can feminist theory sustain itself as a

political movement if the category of women is called into
question?

In the absence of such a unifying category, is

not factionalization inevitable?

Butler argues that the

reverse is in fact the case:
I would argue that any effort to give universal or
specific content to the category of women,
presuming that that guarantee of solidarity is
required in advance, will necessarily produce
factionalization, and that 'identity' as a point
of departure can never hold as the solidifying
ground of a feminist political movement.
Identity
categories are never merely descriptive, but
always normative, and as such, exclusionary. 27
She does not object to employing identity categories
strategically.
This is not to say that the term "women" ought not
to be used, or that we ought to announce the death
of the category. On the contrary, if feminism
presupposes that "women" designates an
undesignatable field of differences, one that
cannot be totalized or summarized by a descriptive
identity category, then the very term becomes a
site of permanent openness and resignifiability. 28
That the subject of feminism is always and necessarily
fragmented is no cause for despair.

Recognizing that both

individual and collective identities are unstable can give a
movement strength.

27
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I would argue that the rifts among women over the
content of the term ought to be safeguarded and
prized, indeed, that this constant rifting ought
to be affirmed as the ungrounded ground of
feminist theory. To deconstruct the subject of
feminism is not, then, to assume censure of its
usage, but, on the contrary, to release the term
into a future of multiple significations, to
emancipate it from the maternal or racialist
ontologies to which it has been restricted, and to
give it play as a site where unanticipated
meanings might come to bear. 29
In other words the deconstruction of the subject is not the
eradication of the subject as some would think; it is an
opening up of the subject position to contestation; it is an
allowance for the possibility of resignifying subjectivity
by reinterpreting the ontologies within which the subject is
given.

It is a genealogizing of the power configurations

forming the category of women,

(and the concept of "woman")

rather than an insistence that that category be a unifying
identity uniting all feminists.
Of course, the question is inevitably raised; how do we
know which resignifications are truly emancipatory?

Don't

we need some set of norms to adjudicate competing
conceptions?

Butler responds as would I:

The only answer to that question is a counterquestion: who would set those norms, and what
contestations would they produce? To establish a
normative foundation for settling the question of
what ought properly to be included in the
description of women would be only and always to
produce a new site of political contest. That
foundation would settle nothing, but would of its
own necessity founder on its own authoritarian
ruse. This is not to say that there is no
29

Ibid.
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foundation, but rather, that wherever there is
one, there will also be a foundering, a
contestation. That such foundations exist only to
be put into question is, as it were, the permanent
risk of the process of democratization.
To refuse
the contest is to sacrifice the radical democratic
impetus of feminist politics. 30
To engage in postmodern politics is risky and
necessarily unsettling.
often criticized.

This is precisely why it is so

But I think that to summarily dismiss

such political engagement because it disrupts normative
foundations and calls for a resignification of subjectivity
is wrong.

Furthermore I don't think that such politics as

outlined by Butler negates large scale political movements
based on more Marxian models; it just means that the
founding assumptions of such movements must be open to
contestation.

Butler is not saying, for example that we

can't invoke the category of women when discussing feminist
politics; she is saying that we must recognize that this is
a category which is a site of permanent resignifiability.
Many people engaged in emancipatory politics want to refuse
the contest which necessarily arises when the authoritarian
ruse of grounding normative assumptions is brought into
play, but what they do not acknowledge is that to refuse the
contest, while bringing a false sense of security by
providing a firm foundation, is to sacrifice the radical
democratic impetus of emancipatory politics.
Given this framework, what is task of postmodern
Mibid., 50-51.
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feminist politics?

According to Butler,

Obviously, the political task is not to refuse
representational politics--as if one could. The
juridical structures of language and politics
constitute the contemporary field of power; hence,
there is no position outside this field, but only
a critical genealogy of its own legitimating
practices. As such, the critical point of
departure is the historical present, as Marx put
it. And the task is to formulate within this
constituted frame a critique of the categories of
identity that contemporary juridical structures
engender, naturalize, and immobilize. 31
One of the reasons feminists often insist on the unity
of the category of women is so that this category can form
the foundation of a coalition which acts jointly to achieve
its goals.

In deconstructing the category of women, Butler

reconceives coalition politics.

She proposes an

antifoundationalist coalition politics that does not demand
a unified subject such as women on which to ground its
action.

Many feminist theorists insist on establishing

coalition politics based on the identity of women, or at
least they assume that the unified identity of the category
of women as a useful premise for grounding political action.
Butler challenges this assumption by asking, what kind of
politics demands this concept of unity in advance?

Such a

feminist politics that bases itself on the concept of women
does not allow for the political critique of that concept.
Similarly, when a concept of c.oalitional politics based on
unity is insisted upon, there is an implicit acceptance that

31

Butler, Gender Trouble, 5.
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solidarity is always desirable.

Butler proposes, "Perhaps a

coalition needs to acknowledge its contradictions and take
action with those contradictions intact.

Perhaps also part

of what dialogic understanding entails is the acceptance of
divergence, breakage, splinter, and fragmentation as part of
the often tortuous process of democratization."n
Butler introduces a new concept of coalition, which
allows us to extricate ourselves from some of the unexamined
normative categories that traditionally ground coalition
politics.

In allowing for a destabilized subject at the

beginning of coalition politics, this antifoundational
coalition politics does not cover over oppressive normative
identity categories.

It also does not insist on an

agreement of foundational identities before action can
proceed.

For instance, rather than working to come to an

agreement on what a woman is, and exactly who qualifies to
be in this category, this antifoundational coalition
politics recognizes that identity cannot be known before
politically-engaged action.

Moreover, when the identity of

women is not assumed as a founding principle of politics,
the construction of that very category can be the focus of
political action.
Antifoundationalist approach to coalitional
politics assumes neither that 'identity' is a
premise nor that the shape or meaning of a
coalitional assemblage can be known prior to its
achievement. Because the articulation of an
32

Butler, Gender Trouble, 14-15.
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identity within available cultural terms instates
a definition that forecloses in advance the
emergence of new identity concepts in and through
politically engaged actions, the foundationalist
tactic cannot take the transformations or
expansion of existing identity concepts as a
normative goal.n
Butler's reconceptualization of the subject as
constructed and performative thus necessitates her
reconceptualization of political intervention and her
concept of coalition and community.

I think she presents a

legitimate reconceptualization of coalition.

I do not think

she is, as some critics claim, foreclosing the possibility
of coalition politics or of collective action.

She is

stating that the identity on which coalitions are based
cannot be agreed upon in advance, since that forecloses the
possibility that the coalition itself can reconfigure that
identity category.
(W)hen agreed-upon identities . . . . no longer
constitute the theme or subject of politics, then
identities can come into being and dissolve
depending on the concrete practices that
constitute them. Certain political practices
institute identities on a contingent basis in
order to accomplish whatever aims are in view.M
Identity is not a fixed category established in advanced but
rather a strategic and performative position which is always
already politically engaged.

Antifoundational postmodern

feminist politics does not try to artificially fix gender
identities by demanding a unified and stable category of
Dibid., 15.
Mrbid., 15-16, italics mine.
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women.

Rather it allows for the strategic enactment of

various expressions of women depending on the specific
political task being engaged.
Gender is a complexity whose totality is
permanently deferred, never fully what it is at
any given juncture in time. An open coalition. •
. will affirm identities that are alternately
instituted and relinquished according to the
purpose at hand; it will be an open assemblage
that permits of multiple convergencies and
divergences without obedience to a normative telos
of definitional closure."
Butler makes it clear that she is not advocating that
feminist politics rid itself of subjects, rather she wants
it recognized that the subject is not fixed.

Feminist

theories that ground themselves in essentialist concepts of
subjectivity, and therefore do not allow identity to be
"relinquished" are, according to this position, less
effective at instigating change, because they are unable to
allow for the strategic enactment of subject positions
"according to the purpose at hand".
Coda: Response to Two Critics
Seyla Benhabib and Nancy Fraser, both situating
themselves in the tradition of critical theory, have raised
criticisms about postmodernism generally and about Butler in
particular.~

35

Let me conclude this chapter with a brief

Ibid. , 16.

~Benhabib is unproblematically situated within the
tradition of critical theory.
Fraser, on the other hand,
moves between critical theory and postmodernism, and has an
uneasy, often hesitant, relationship with the latter.
For
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summary and evaluation of this debate. 37 Benhabib questions
the adequacy of postmodernism as a theoretical grounding for
feminist theory.

She concludes that, "the postmodernist

position(s) thought through to their conclusions may
eliminate not only the specificity of feminist theory but
place in question the very emancipatory ideal of the women's
movements al together.

1138

Benhabib singles out Butler's conceptions of
subjectivity and agency, and tries to show their inadequacy
for emancipatory feminist politics.

She wonders "how . .

. the very project of female emancipation would even be
thinkable without such a regulative principle of agency,
autonomy, and selfhood? " 39

But this is precisely the issue

that Butler addresses with her concept of performativity.
What Benhabib does not adequately consider is the politics
of agency

construction.

She invokes autonomy as necessary

an example of Fraser's relationship to postmodernism see
Nancy Fraser and Linda Nicholson, "Social criticism Without
Philosophy: An Encounter Between Feminism and
Postmodernism," in Feminism/Postmodernism, ed. Linda
Nicholson (New York: Routledge, 1990), 19-38.
37

The debates and dialogue among Benhabib, Fraser, and
Butler (as well with Drucilla Cornell) are found in Feminist
Contentions: A Philosophical Exchange. The papers by
Benhabib, Butler, and Fraser were first published in Praxis
International 11 (July 1991) .
38
Seyla Benhabib, "Feminism and Postmodernism: An
Uneasy Alliance," in Feminist Contentions: A Philosophical
Exchange, ed. Linda Nicholson (New York: Routledge, 1995),
20.

39 I

b'd
l
. , 21.
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for feminist politics but does not address Butler's powerful
(and I think unanswerable) criticism that autonomy is itself
a politicized and regulative fiction, and that subjectivity
is always constructed within the discourses of power.
Benhabib questions the emancipatory potential of a
subject that is constituted by discourse, for she thinks
that such a concept of subjectivity is overly deterministic.
"Indeed the question is: how can one be constituted by
discourse without being determined by it? 1140 Benhabib claims
that Butler's theory of performativity "presupposes a
remarkably deterministic view of individuation and
socialization processes which falls short of the currently
available social-scientific reflections on the subject. 1141
Clearly, Benhabib fails to understand what Butler means when
she speaks of the subject as constituted within discourse.
Butler's theory of performativity is structured precisely to
avoid the overly deterministic tenor of certain currents of
postmodernism.

In fact, it opens up new categories of

subject formation.

In response to Benhabib, Butler writes,

"To be constituted by language is to be produced within a
given network of power/discourse which is open to
resignification, redeployment, subversive citation from

~Seyla Benhabib, "Subjectivity, Historiography, and
Politics," in Feminist Contentions: A Philosophical
Exchange, ed. Linda Nicholson (New York: Routledge, 1995),
110.
41

Ibid.

196

within, and interruption and inadvertent convergencies with
other such networks. 1142
Benhabib thinks that not only is Butler's concept of
subjectivity overly deterministic, but that it does not
allow for emancipatory action.

She is troubled by Butler's

discussion of the absence of a "doer behind the deed,"~and
asks, "If this view of the self is adopted, is there any
possibility of changing those 'expressions' which constitute
us?

If we are no more than the sum total of the gendered

expressions we perform, is there ever any chance to stop the
performance for a while, to pull the curtain down, and only
let is rise if one can have a say in the production of the
play itself?" 44 Again Benhabib seems to have misunderstood
Butler's position.

Butler answers Benhabib as follows:

Benhabib misconstrues the theory of performativity
I provide by grammatically reinstalling the
subject 'behind' the deed, and by reducing the
above notion of performativity to theatrical
performance. . . .
I would argue that there is no
possibility of standing outside of the discursive
conventions by which 'we' are constituted, but
only the possibility of reworking the very
conventions by which we are enabled. Gender
performativity is not a question of instrumentally
deploying a 'masquerade,' for such a construal of
performativity presupposes an intentional subject
behind the deed.
On the contrary, gender
performativity involves the difficult labor of
deriving agency from the very power regimes which
constitute us, and which we oppose. This is,
42

Butler, "For A Careful Reading," 135, emphasis mine.

~Benhabib

the deed,"
44 Ibid.

incorrectly quotes this as the "doer beyond
"Feminism and Postmodernism," 21.
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oddly enough, historical work, reworking the
historicity of the signifier, and no recourse to
quasi-transcendental selfhood and inf lated
concepts of History will help us in this most
concrete and paradoxical of struggles. 45
This last part of Butler's statement can be read as a
response to Benhabib's questioning of the postmodern
disruption of the grand narratives of history.

Benhabib

worries that "the 'death of history' thesis occludes the
epistemological interest in history and in historical
narrative which accompany the aspirations of all struggling
historical actors.

Once this 'interest' in recovering the

lives and struggles of those 'losers' and 'victims' of
history are lost, can we produce engaged feminist theory?"%
But Butler would agree that we cannot produce engaged
feminist theory that does not take history into account.
Butler's position, in employing genealogical critique, is
necessarily and radically historical.

What is at issue is

not the importance of history, but rather how we

conceptualize history.

Does history necessarily have to be

interpreted as some sort of single, unitary, objective truth
as Benhabib seems to suggest, or can the interpretation and
enactment of history be political in itself?

Surely Butler,

and postmodernists generally, are right: history does not
have one meaning.

The meaning(s) of history are the ones we

construct, as we ourselves perform and resignify our
~Butler,

"For A Careful Reading,'' 135-136.

%Ibid., 142.
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subjectivity.
Of course, I use the grammar of an "I" or a "we"
as if these subjects precede and activate their
various identifications, but this is a grammatical
f iction--one I am willing to use even though it
runs the risk of enforcing an interpretation
counter to the one that I want to make.
For there
is not "I" prior to its assumption of sex, and no
assumption that is not at once impossible yet
necessary identification. And yet, I use the
grammar that denies this temporality--as I am
doubtless used by it--only because I cannot find
in myself a desire to replicate too closely
Lacan's sometimes tortured pros (my own is
difficult enough).~
Fraser, in her contribution to Feminist Contentions
offers two criticisms of Butler's position:

the esotericism

of Butler's language, and her inadequate concept of
liberation.
Fraser claims that Butler's language is anti-humanist
and impersonal.

She maintains that Butler uses a "self-

distancing idiom" which "projects an aura of esotericism. 1148
Fraser asks, "Why should we use such a self-distancing
idiom?

What are its theoretical advantages (and

disadvantages)?"

But the "self" that this idiom is

distancing from is the Enlightenment-humanist subject with
which postmodernism takes issue.

Since Butler's philosophy

is a deconstruction of that subject, it is necessary to

47

Judi th Butler, Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive
Limits of "Sex", (New York: Toutledge, 1993).
48

Nancy Fraser, "False Anti thesis: A Response to Sey la
Benhabib and Judith Butler," in Feminist Contentions: A
Philosophical Exchange, ed. Linda Nicholson (New York:
Routledge, 1995), 67.
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invoke an idiom which signifies this deconstruction.

The

theoretical advantage, therefore, is that Butler is trying
to invoke a new conception of subjectivity and to disrupt
the logocentricism which informs our language.

Fraser

claims that Butler's idiom, "is far enough removed from our
everyday ways of talking and thinking about ourselves to
require some justification. " 49

Fraser seems to be missing

here the very point of Butler's discussion of subjectivity,
which demands that we rethink and redeploy subjectivity in a
way that is radically different than our everyday way of
thinking and speaking.

To the charge that her language is

unnecessarily esoteric Butler replies:
I would rejoin that it is probably not
'esotericism' that is at issue for Fraser, whose
own language is filled with Habermasian and
Frankfurt School locutions which are equally
remote from •everyday ways of talking and
thinking.'
Indeed, if I understand the linguistic
turn of Habermas, and Fraser's shared concern with
asking after •warrants' and •validity,' it relies
on the premise that ordinary language cannot
provide ultimate grounds for adjudicating the
validity of its own claims (the implicit
presuppositions of ordinary language need to be
made explicit through a quasi-transcendental
reflection which is decidedly unordinary) . 50
Fraser is also critical of what she calls Butler's
inadequate concept of liberation.
feminists need utopian hope.

Fraser thinks that

While I would say that as a

feminist I want utopian hope, I agree with Butler that any

49

Ibid.

50

Butler, "For A Careful Reading," 13 8.
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invocation of utopia demands the question, "utopia for
whom?" which brings us back to the problem of a grounding
subject.

Fraser claims that certain types of

foundationalism have emancipatory effects, and that Butler,
in dismissing foundationalism entirely, also forecloses the
possibility of emancipation.

To this Butler replies that

there can be a strategic enactment of foundationalism.
Foundationalist concepts of subjectivity can be ''deployed
strategically," "instituted through a subversive citation
and redeployment.

1151

Unlike Fraser's concept of a

normatively grounded, fixed foundation, Butler's idea of
foundation is one that "moves, and which changes in the
course of that movement."

Such a concept of foundation,

which is open to redeployment and not fixed within a rigid
prediscursive concept of normativity, seems to me more than
adequate to emancipatory feminist politics.
Butler establishes a contingent foundation, which is
guided by a contingent concept of normativity, as opposed to
the fixed and universal concept of normativity that Fraser
seems to want.

Butler writes,

It is clear that in order to set political goals,
it is necessary to assert normative judgments.
In
a sense, my own work has been concerned to expose
and ameliorate those cruelties by which subjects
are produced and differentiated. . . . To this
end it is crucial to rethink the domain of powerrelations, and to develop a way of adjudicating
political norms without forgetting that such an
adjudication will also always be a struggle of
51 Ibid.,

141.
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power. 52
Like Flax, Butler reconfigures our concept of
normativity (what I referred to in my Flax chapter as "nonnormative ethics").

All normative judgments are part of the

power/discourse matrix.

There is no universal metapolitical

normative as Fraser would have it.
normativity is a political move.

Any instigation of
Just as we must act our

subjectivity within contingent foundations, so too must our
political practice be guided by contingent normativity.
Since normative judgements are made within power/discourse
matrices, they are open to critique.

I agree with Butler

that it is not only possible but necessary that political
critique be informed by such contingent normativity.
There is no pure place outside of power by which
the question of validity might be raised, and
where validity is raised, it is also always an
activity of power. 53

53

Ibid.
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Chapter Six
Conclusion:

In Defense of Postmodernism

I have argued that the postmodern feminist theory of
subjectivity and of political praxis is most useful for
grounding an emancipatory feminist politics.

Performative

theory collapses the distinction between subjectivity and
political praxis; to be a subject is always already to be
politically engaged.

I have argued that this thesis points

to postmodern feminism's liberatory potential.
however, many critics of this position.

There are,

Many political

philosophers, among them critical theorists and Marxists,
think that not only is postmodernism ineffective as an
emancipatory strategy, but that it is nihilistic,
simplistic, dangerous, and provides no framework from which
to challenge oppression.

Critics of postmodernism often

employ a common rhetorical strategy, adopting a dire tone,
and warning that postmodernism advocates such varied "evils"
as the end of philosophy, the end of politics, the death of
history, the death of the subject, and the complete
rejection of such Enlightenment concepts as justice, reason,
autonomy, and free will.

When examined carefully, however,

it is often the case that these critics of postmodernism are
feeding off their own fears and their own ideas, for
202
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often they have not seriously engaged any specific
postmodern theorist.
In the concluding section of this dissertation I will
address the concerns of two prominent Marxist critics of
postmodernism, Ellen Meiksins Wood and Terry Eagleton.

A

recent special issue of the independent socialist journal,
Monthly Review, entitled "In Defense of History:

Marxism

and the Postmodern Agenda" features both these thinkers. 1
Both offer the most common criticisms and (I will argue)
misrepresentions of the postmodern position.

According to

Wood (one of the editors), the main message of this issue of
Monthly Review is to argue "that this may be just the right
time to revitalize Marxist critique." 2 Unfortunately Wood
and Eagleton attempt to substantiate this claim by
delegitimating postmodernism.

Their position is that

Marxism is antithetical to a still vibrant postmodernism.
Consequently, both of their articles consist primarily of
sustained attacks on postmodernism.

I will demonstrate that

their attacks are invalid.
In a sense my dissertation has come full circle.
began with Marxism, and it will end with Marxism.
appropriate.

It

This is

Marxism shares with postmodern feminism a

1

Ellen Meiksins Wood, "What is the 'Postmodern' Agenda?
An Introduction." Monthly Review 47 (July/August 1995): 112. Terry Eagleton, "Where Do Postmodernists Come From?"
Monthly Review 47 (July/August 1995): 59-70.
2

Wood, "The 'Postmodern' Agenda," 12.
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commitment to radical social change.

Like feminism it

regards itself as a theory about oppression, and a movement
against oppression.

So the starting points of Marxism and

postmodern feminism are quite similar.

Most Marxists,

however, view postmodernism in much the same way as do
other, less radical, critics of postmodernism.

Most

Marxists remain firmly within the Enlightenment tradition,
and hence their criticisms, represented here by Wood and
Eagleton, are typical of the standard criticisms raised
against the position this dissertation defends.

In

answering these criticisms, I am defending postmodern
feminism generally and my own position in particular.
In her article "What is the 'Postmodern' Agenda?
Introduction''

An

Ellen Meiksins Wood claims that

postmodernism, among other things, is irrational, denies
history, and has no theory of politics.
these charges in order.

I will address

She begins her critique with wide-

sweeping claims against postmodernism in general that are
characteristically vague and unsupported by examples,
textual references, or arguments. 3
We are being told yet again that an epoch has
ended, that we are living in a 'postmodern' age,
that the 'Enlightenment project' is dead, that all
the old verities and ideologies have lost their
relevance, that old principles of rationality no
3
It is interesting to note that nowhere in Wood's
article does she mention any specific postmodernist, nor
does she carefully examine any one specific postmodern
concept. And her endnotes do not contain any references to
postmodern texts, authors, or concepts.
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longer apply and so on. 4
This seems to be too strong a statement so that she can
dismiss postmodernism in toto rather than carefully consider
specific postmodern questions and concepts.

Certainly it is

not true that all or even most postmodernists would say that
an epoch has ended.

Wood's language belongs to those who

think in terms of metanarratives. 5 Postmodernists do not say
that the "Enlightenment project" is dead, only that it is no
longer (or never was) the primary way of thinking about our
world and organizing our conceptual framework.

Finally,

postmodernists such as myself, Butler, and Foucault do not
argue that "principles of rationality no longer apply," only
that they should not be hegemonic, and that other
"nonrational" and nonlinear ways of thinking also need to be
given serious consideration.
Wood goes on to make the even stronger claim that
postmodernism is fundamentally irrational. 6

What she fails

to understand is that a theory that challenges the supremacy
of rationality is not necessarily fundamentally irrational.
This is similar to a common misreading of the feminist
project--women who challenge patriarchy are often said to be

4Wood,

"The 'Postmodern' Agenda," 4.

5Foucault

speaks of epochs and ages, but he contrasts
the "classical period" with the modern period. Neither he
no Butler nor Flax see the contemporary period as
constituting a "new epoch."
6wood, "The 'Postmodern' Agenda, " 5.
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fundamentally against men.

To deconstruct, critique,

challenge, or redeploy X is quite different than being
fundamentally against X.

Deconstructing or challenging one

system, such as patriarchy or rationality, does not imply
one is advocating its opposite--matriarchy or irrationality.
A valuable part of the

postmodernism project is to

deconstruct this very type of binary thinking.
Wood's next charge against postmodernism is that it
denies, ignores, and is insensitive to history.

In order to

examine this charge, it is important to understand what Wood
means by "history."
The postmodern sense of epochal novelty depends on
ignoring, or denying, one overwhelming historical
reality: that all the ruptures of the twentieth
century have been bound together in a single
historical unity of logic--and the internal
contradictions--of capitalism. 7
This is precisely the type of all-encompassing grand
statement that postmodern feminists such as myself find so
problematic.

Certainly it is

reasonable to claim that

capitalism is an important power structure, but Wood
dogmatically asserts that it is responsible for all the
ruptures of the twentieth century.

She then contends that

because postmodernists disagree with this claim, they ignore
or deny history.

Certainly we disagree with this view of

history, but even the most cursory reading of Foucault, for
example, reveals that postmodernists do not "ignore" or

7 Ibid.,

4.

Emphasis my own.
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"deny" the claim that all history is bound together by the
single historical unity of capitalism; they apply a
genealogical critique and deconstruct it. 8
Wood repeatedly attacks postmodernism for being
insensitive to history.

This is unwarranted.

What is at

issue is the type of historical narrative one employs.

If

history is thought in terms of genealogies, which are
fundamentally historical, it must be acknowledged that
postmodernism is deeply concerned with history.

Certainly

most postmodernists disagree with Wood's statement that
there is a "single historical unity" bound by the logic of
capitalism--if by that claim one intends to deny that there
are other major historical forces operating in the modern
world.

Regarding this disagreement there could be an

interesting debate.

However, Wood forecloses the

possibility of such debate by labelling the postmodern
project as "remarkably insensitive to history.

119

But what

she means by "history," really, is a specific theory of
history, namely historical materialism.

Postmodernists

challenge the idea that historical materialism is the only
way to understand historical reality.

I would not say

postmodernists are "insensitive" to history, but rather we
8

I have examined this genealogical critique in my
discussion of Foucault's analysis of Marx.
9

Wood, "The 'Postmodern' Agenda," 5.
Pamela Caughie
addressed such charges in "Feminism and the Postmodern
Turnabout" (Chicago, IL: Radical Scholars and Activist
Conference, 1990).
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challenge this view of history and deconstruct it.
Certainly this is not the same as denying history
altogether.
Wood, however, does not seem to grasp this distinction.
Later she adds,
Not only do we have to reject the old 'grand
narratives' like Enlightenment concepts of
progress, we have to give up any idea of
intelligible historical process and causality, and
with it, evidently, any idea of 'making
history. ' 10
Wood equates the rejection of 'grand narratives' with the
rejection of history.

Her contention that postmodernists

have no theory of history is thus based on this important
misunderstanding of postmodernism.

(She cites no textual

evidence to back up her interpretation.)

Wood continues to

equate the contestation of 'grand narratives,' and the
rejection of the idea that there is a single historical
unity guided by the logic of capitalism, with the denial of

any history.
After concluding that postmodern theory denies history,
she goes on to claim that it rules out politics as well:
In fact, 'politics' in any traditional sense of
the word, having to with the overreaching power of
classes or states and opposition to them, is
effectively ruled out, giving way to the fractured
struggles of 'identity politics' or even the
10

Ibid., emphasis my own.
For an example that
postmodernists do not give up on the idea of "making
history" see Pamela Caughie, "Making History," in Making
Feminist History: The Literary Scholarship of Sandra Gilbert
and Susan Gubar, ed. William Kain (New York: Garland, 1994),
255-268.
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'personal is political'. .
In short:
epistemological skepticism and a profound
political defeatism. 11

a deep

But the issue here is whether postmodernists engage in
politics or have a theory of history.

If these concepts are

thought of exclusively in terms of historical materialism-then no, postmodernists do not think of politics in this way
or have such a theory of "history"--politics limited to
examinations of the macrostructure and all-inclusive large
scale revolts; history being a single historical unity
guided by the logic of capitalism.

This is not to say that

postmodernists reject out of hand such concepts of politics
and history.

It means that these concepts of "politics" and

"history" are not the only useful ones for guiding
emancipatory praxis.

We may avail ourselves of Wood's views

of politics and of history, but at the same time we must
seriously consider other interpretations of what is meant by
"politics" and "history."
these terms.

Wood seems unable to think in

The way she has laid out her discussion, it is

either Wood's view of history, or we have no theory of
history; her view of politics or we have no politics.
Wood has forced an artificial delimitation of the
political field by insisting that we choose between either
postmodernism or historical materialism.

Postmodern theory,

on the other hand, allows us to engage in political critique
and praxis without making such a choice.
11

Ibid., 9.

While Wood finds
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it necessary to delegitimate postmodernism in order to claim
the superiority and necessity of Marxism, what I have argued
for is the need to employ both various postmodern concepts
of history and politics as well as socialist/Marxist ones.
Rather than a wholesale rejection of Marxism, what is called
for is a strategic deployment of non-hegemonic Marxian
concepts • 12
We do need a way to think together the macrostructure
and the microstructure; we do need a way to conceptualize
and resist large systems such as capitalism and patriarchy,
but we must not privilege these larger struggles and dismiss
the validity of local struggles and performative acts.

In

other words we need to be rigorously engaged in
renegotiating power within these larger matrices of
domination, while at the same time conceptualizing and
working towards large scale changes.
Wood seems to assume that there is a fundamental
dichotomy between structures and causes on the one hand, and
fragments and contingencies on the other.

She then assigns

the former to historical materialism, and consigns the
latter exclusively to the domain of postmodernism.
Current theories of postmodernity . . . effectively
12

Nancy Fraser addresses this issues in "Pragmatism,
Feminism, and the Linguistic Turn" but ultimately she
insists on grounding this strategic deployment on a
foundation of normativity.
See Nancy Fraser, "Pragmatism,
Feminism, and the Linguistic Turn," in Feminist Contentions:
A Philosophical Exchange, ed. Linda Nicholson, (New York:
Routledge, 1995), 157-171.
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deny the very existence of structures or
structural connections and the very possibility of
'causal analysis.' Structures and causes have
been replaced by fragments and contingencies.
There is no such thing as a social system (e.g.,
the capitalist system) with its own different
kinds of power, oppression, identity, and
discourse. 13
Even the most cursory reading of, for example Foucault
or Butler, reveals that a major issue examined by postmodern
theorist is structure.

Why should one assume that

"structures and causes" and "fragments and contingencies"
are mutually exclusive?

It is not either "structures and

causes" or "fragments and contingencies" but both.

It is in

thinking of them together that emancipation lies, not in
arguing for their opposition, as does Wood. I think,
therefore, that useful political philosophy begins when we
acknowledge that we always have both, simultaneously.

The

question ought not to be which is more important--structures
and causes or fragments and contingencies.
important question is:

Rather, the

How do we engage in useful political

philosophy aimed at emancipatory strategies when we have

both structures and causes as well as fragments and
contingencies? (We must examine, for instance, how to think
together a social system such as capitalism and selves
structured performatively.)

If one maintains a rigid

opposition, the philosopher's task becomes one of arguing
for one position over the other as opposed to trying to

13Wood,

"The 'Postmodern' Agenda," 5.

212

think of them both together.

My whole project is one of

learning to think of structures and causes together with
fragments and contingencies, rather than, as Wood does,
reifying their opposition for the sake of proving that one
is better than the other.
Wood ends her article by quoting from the letter she
sent out requesting articles for this issue of the Monthly
Review.

In it she wrote, "We are proposing a collection of

articles that will offer some suggestions about how
historical materialism can deal with that other agenda in
more fruitful, forceful, and liberating ways than the
current intellectual and political fashions are able to do.
Part of the object is to demonstrate that our terrain
is where it's at. " 14 If the point is to prove that
historical materialism is better than postmodernism, then
one ought to lay out both theories carefully, and then make
the case for one or the other.

Wood, however, does a broad-

stroke misreading of the postmodern project, creating
instead a "postmodern" strawperson, which she can knock down
in favor of historical materialism.
I agree with Wood that this is a time to revitalize
Marxist critique.

However, as I have argued, I think

postmodernism does not exclude such a revitalization.

In

framing the issue--Marxism versus postmodernism--Wood misses
an opportunity to explore the differences between Marxism
14 I

b'd
1 •

,

12.
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and postmodernism, and to examine possible ways to think
these discourses together, as well as point out places in
which they are irreconcilably different.

Rather than

establishing a theoretical framework for an emancipatory
political praxis, she seems more concerned with proving that
she (and all historical materialists) are right and,
conversely, that all postmodernists are wrong.

However, to

state that postmodern theory is fundamentally irrational,
deny that it has a theory of history, and claim that it
lacks a politics, is to completely misunderstand
postmodernism.
In "Where Do Postmodernists Come From?" Terry Eagleton
also attacks postmodernism in an attempt to valorize
Marxism.

He begins his article with a rhetorical ploy:

Imagine a radical movement that had suffered an
emphatic defeat.
So emphatic, in fact, that it
seemed unlikely to resurface for the length of a
lifetime, if at all. As time wore on, the beliefs
of this movement might begin to seem less false or
ineffectual than simply irrelevant . . . .
Radicals might come to find themselves less
overwhelmed or out-argued than simply washed up,
speaking a language so quaintly out of tune with
their era that, as with the language of Platonism
or courtly love, nobody even bothered any longer
to ask whether it was true. What would be the
likely response of the left to such a dire
condi tion? 15
Thus begins Eagleton's story of how postmodernism comes
about in the wake of Marxism's ebbing hegemony.

While

clever, this ploy enables Eagleton to hide behind

15 Eagleton,

"Where Do Postmodernists Come From?" 59.
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conjecture.

He provides no arguments, citations, examples,

or specifics to support his unequivocally harsh attack on
postmodernism.

Like Wood, he does not carefully examine any

specific postmodern concept, nor does he refer to any
specific postmodern theorist.

And like Wood, the

"postmodernism" Eagleton disputes is one of his own
invention.

Among his many charges against postmodernism,

Eagleton accuses postmodernism of being a naive celebration
of otherness, lacking rigor, having no political
commitment, presenting an impoverished view of subjectivity,
and finally, of denying macrostructure and focusing only on
microstructure.

Let us examine these accusations.

According to Eagleton, postmodernism, "thinks in the
rigid opposition of 'inside' and outside,' where to be on
the inside is to be complicit and to be on the outside is to
be impotent. " 16

According to Eagleton, it is this

inside/outside opposition that leads postmodernists to
celebrate "otherness."
The only genuine criticism could be one launched
from outside the system altogether; and one would
expect, therefore, a certain fetishizing of
'otherness' . . . . There would be enormous
interest in anything that seemed alien, deviant,
exotic, unincorporable, all the way from aardvarks
to Alpha Centuri, a passion for whatever gave us a
tantalizing glimpse of something beyond the logic
of the system. 17
It is precisely such inside/outside dichotomies,
16

Ibid., 61.

17

Ibid., 61.
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however, that postmodernism deconstructs.

As we have seen,

according to postmodern theory one can never get "outside
the system altogether."

What Eagleton calls the

"fetishizing of 'otherness'" is actually internal to a
discourse inclusion of marginalized discourses and voices in
an attempt to challenge the structure of inside/outside.

He

sees this as a "fetishizing" because he thinks in terms of
either/or.

In his misunderstanding of the postmodern

project, we are either inside or outside the system,
therefore he claims that postmodernists reject the system;
we either

reject and ignore the 'other' or we have a

fetishizing of 'otherness.'

In attributing this binary

construction to postmodern theory, Eagleton's argument
demonstrates a serious misunderstanding of one of its basic
tenents.
Ironically, while Eagleton himself demonstrates an
inability to grasp the subtleties and complexities of
postmodern theory, he accuses postmodernists of being the
ones who are unable to engage in rigorous analysis:
Grasping a complex totality involves some rigorous
analysis; so it is not surprising that such
strenuously systematic thought should be out of
fashion, dismissed as phallic, scientistic, or
what have you. 18
Here Eagleton snidely suggests that postmodernists who are
critical of metanarratives, phallologocentrism, and
scientism are simply too lackadaisical to engage in rigorous
18

Ibid.

I
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analysis.

It is, of course, much easier for Eagleton to

dismiss the complex discussions within postmodern theory of
such issues as the phallic nature of discourse and the
privileging of science, than it is for him to argue why such
postmodern analysis is unnecessary, or prove that it is
incorrect.
Not only does Eagleton accuse postmodernists of being
theoretically weak, but he also accuses us of being
politically indifferent.
When there is nothing in particular in it for you
to find out how you stand--if you are a professor
in Ithaca or Irvine, for example--you can afford
to be ambiguous, elusive, deliciously
indeterminate . 19
This statement is insulting to postmodern feminists such as
myself.

Eagleton implies that postmodernists are not

fighting for our lives but only engaging in some amusing
academic game. This type of unsupported and disparaging
remark I find appalling.

Eagleton carelessly implies that

postmodern feminists who argue for the efficacy of
ambiguity, or the political necessity of indeterminacy are
not expressing deeply held political convictions.

He

accuses postmodernists of playing a "delicious" academic
game, snidely claiming the moral and intellectual highground, without seriously addressing any of the real issues
at stake.
He continues in this vein,
19

Ibid.
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Cognitive and realist accounts of human
consciousness would yield ground to various kinds
of pragmatism and relativism, partly because there
didn't any longer seem much politically at stake
in knowing how it stood with you. 20
I argue for pragmatism and relativism because there is

everything politically at stake in knowing how it stands
with me.

Unlike Eagleton--a white male safely ensconced in

the academic hierarchy with connections in the "good old
boys" network--who can self-righteously claim, without
argument or justification, that his way is the best,

(why he

feels the need to do this is itself an issue postmodern
feminism addresses) I feel a certain degree of urgency to
open up the political terrain to the other, which in many
cases is myself.

Eagleton, however, would claim that I

think he is smug simply because I am attracted, like a moth
to light, to the "hair-raisingly avant garde."
And what would also gradually implode, along with
reasonably certain knowledge, would be the idea of
a human subject "centered" and unified enough to
take significant action.
For such significant
action would now seem in short supply; and the
result, once more, would be to make a virtue out
of necessity by singing the praises of the
diffuse, decentered, schizoid human subject--a
subject who might well not be •together' enough to
topple a bottle off a wall, let alone bring down
the state, but who could nevertheless be presented
as hair-raisingly avant garde in contrast to the
smugly centered subjects of an older, more
classical phase of capitalism.u
Eagleton presents the postmodern account of
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subjectivity in an absurdly naive way, and then he attacks
it.

Of course he gives us this skewed and truncated account

of the postmodern subject so that he can easily topple this
strawperson and claim that his way is the only way.

He

implies that the postmodern account of subjectivity, rather
than being the well reasoned and complex account that it is,
is just a nonchalant effort by theoretically inept
postmodernists to make a virtue out of a necessity.
Eagleton repeats this theme of "making a virtue out of
a necessity" when he discusses marcropolitics versus
micropolitics.
If no very ambitious form of political action
seems for the moment possible, if so-called
micropolitics seem the order of the day, it is
always tempting to convert this necessity into a
virtue--to console oneself with the thought that
one's political limitations have a kind of
objective ground in reality, in the fact that
social •totality' is in any case just an illusion.
. • • It does not matter if there is no political
agent at hand to transform the whole, because
there is in fact no whole to be transformed.n
Eagleton makes the false assumption that it is either
"ambitious form of political action" (he is obviously
alluding to revolution here in his annoyingly vague and coy
manner) or micropolitics.

With this polemical construction

of the problematic, Eagleton misses the chance to discuss
seriously how we can engage in effective emancipatory
politics employing both macropolitics and micropolitics.
Instead he insists that we must choose between micropolitics
22

Ibid.
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and macropolitics, a choice postmodern theory claims cannot
and should not be made.
After claiming that postmodernism fetishizes the other,
lacks political commitment, has an inadequate theory of
subjectivity and is unable to theorize the macrostructure,
Eagleton applies this description of postmodernism to judge
its efficacy in challenging capitalism.

There are several

things wrong with his analysis, two of which I will mention
here.

The first is that the "postmodernism" he has outlined

is so vague, misleading and bereft of depth that it is
impossible to apply it to the critique of capitalism.

And

this is yet another place where Eagleton misses the
opportunity to advance political theory and contribute to a
useful dialogue between postmodernism and Marxism.

The

question he should be examining is: How can a particular
postmodern analysis, such as Butler's or Foucault's, be
applied specifically to the critique of capitalism?

His way

of course is much easier.
The second problem with his analysis is that he misses
the significant postmodern point that capitalism is not the
only, nor necessarily the most important, structural system
of domination.

He is, for example, ignoring much of the

feminist concern with gender when he writes,
One might predict in this period a quickening of
interest in psychoanalysis--f or psychoanalysis is
not only the thinking person's sensationalism,
blending intellectual rigor with the most lurid
materials, but it exudes a general exciting air of
radicalism without being particularly so
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politically.
If the more abstract questions of
state, mode of production, and civil society seems
for the moment too hard to resolve, then one might
shift one's political attention to something more
intimate and immediate, more living and fleshy,
1 ike the body. 23
The last part of this statement in particular is an affront
to almost all feminist theorists in general, and certainly
to postmodern feminists in particular.

Eagleton insinuates

that those of us who choose not to privilege the abstract
questions of state, mode of production, etc., do this
because they are "too hard to resolve."

Maybe we do this

because we think there are other equally important issues to
address, such as gender.

"Living and fleshy" things like

the gendered body are unimportant to Eagleton so he assumes
that those of us who analyze these issues are simply not up
to the task of engaging in "real" analysis about "important"
things.
Eagleton does reluctantly concede that postmodernists
offer an analysis of gender and ethnicity, but he quickly
adds that this is at the expense of missing the "real"
issues.
These valuable preoccupations have also often
enough shown a signal indifference to that power
which is the invisible color of daily life, which
determines our existence--sometimes literally so-in almost every quarter, which decides in large
measure the destiny of nations and the internecine
conflicts between them.
It is as though every
other form of oppressive power can be readily
debated, but not the one which so often sets the
long-term agenda for them or is at the very least
23 I
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implicated with them at their core. The power of
capital is now so wearily familiar that even large
sectors of the left have succeeded in naturalizing
it, taking it for granted as an immutable
structure."N
The issue here is simple--rather than arguing that
fighting capitalism is more important than fighting, for
example patriarchy and racism, rather than trying to prove
(in a blustery tirade of self-righteous verbiage) that the
power of capital is the ultimate determiner of our
existence, I maintain--and have argued--that for
emancipatory political philosophy to move forward, we must
accept that we are constructed within multiple power
dynamics.

I contend that there are multiple forces within

which we are constructed (not determined), and by focusing
on overthrowing a single force such as capitalism, we will
not succeed in achieving liberation.
While Eagleton insinuates that postmodernist, I do this
for kicks (or because they are too lazy or stupid to think
about ''real" things such as the state)

in fact I engage in

political philosophy to save my life, and this project
entails engaging the fight on many levels at once, not
wasting valuable time and energy proving one way is better
than another.

While Eagleton marks time attacking the

legitimacy of (his view of) postmodernism as a viable
emancipatory practice, and while he is busy declaring that
the only thing worth fighting is the power of capital-Nrbid., 67-68, emphasis my own.

222

fascism may well be approaching.

According to Eagleton,

however, as a postmodernist I should not even be able to see
the problem with fascism.
In pulling the rug out from under the certainties
of its political opponents, this postmodern
culture has often enough pulled it out from under
itself too, leaving itself with no more reason why
we should resist fascism than the feebly pragmatic
plea that fascism is not the way we do things in
Sussex or Sacramento.~
Both Eagleton and Wood, like many Marxist critics of
postmodernism, are primarily concerned with establishing the
hegemony of historical materialism (and conversely with
delegitimating postmodernism).

However, postmodernism,

according to their descriptions, has become so vague and
amorphous as to be rendered a meaningless term that stands
for whatever they need it to mean at any particular time-the ever ready strawperson.

Battling this amorphous

strawperson then becomes their overriding theoretical and
political project.

In my view, one of the most important

contributions of postmodern theory to political philosophy
is precisely that it challenges this either/or construction
presented by both Wood and Eagleton.

Postmodernism, as I

have shown, allows us to employ multiple strategies of
political intervention, rather than engage in a hollow
academic debate that attempts to establish the hegemony of a
single strategy, while proving definitively the illegitimacy
of any other.
~Ibid.,

68.

Works Cited
Austin, J.L. How To Do Things With Words. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1962.
Bachofen, Johann J. Myth, Religion and Mother Right:
Selected Writings of J.J. Bachofen. Translated by Ralph
Manheim. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967.
Bartky, Sandra. Femininity and Domination. New York:
Routledge, 1990.
Benhabib, Seyla.
"Feminism and Postmodernism: An Uneasy
Alliance." In Feminist Contentions: A Philosophical
Exchange, ed. Linda Nicholson, 17-34. New York:
Routledge, 1995.
"Subjectivity, Historiography, and Politics." In
Feminist Contentions: A Philosophical Exchange, ed.
Linda Nicholson, 107-125. New York: Routledge, 1995.
Beauvoir, Simone. The Second Sex. Translated and edited by
H.M. Parshley. New York: Vintage Books, 1989.
Briffault, Robert. The Mothers: The Matriarchal Theory of
Social Origins. Edited with an Introduction by Gordon
Rattray Taylor. New York: Howard Fertig, 1993.
Butler, Judith. "Performative Acts and Gender Constitution:
An Essay in Phenomenology and Feminist Theory." Theatre
Journal 40 (1988): 519-531 .
Feminist Theory, and
---- . "Gender Trouble,
Psychoanalytic
Discourse." In Feminism/Postmodernism,
ed. Linda Nicholson, 324-340. New York: Routledge,
1990 .
. Gender Trouble: Feminism
------Identity. New York: Routledge,

and the Subversion of
1990.

Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of
"Sex". New York: Routledge, 1993 .

- - - - - . "Contingent Foundations." In Feminist
Contentions:

A Philosophical Exchange, ed. Linda
223

224

Nicholson, 35-57. New York: Routledge, 1995 .
. "For A Careful Reading."
---APhilosophical Exchange, ed.

In Feminist Contentions:
Linda Nicholson, 127-143.
New York & London: Routledge, 1995.

Caughie, Pamela. "Making History." In Making Feminist
History: The Literary Scholarship of Sandra Gilbert and
Susan Gubar, ed. William Kain, 255-268. New York:
Garland, 1994.
"Feminism and the Postmodern Turnabout." Chicago,
IL: Radical Scholars and Activist Conference, 1990.
Crews, Frederick. Skeptical Engagements. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1986.
Derrida, Jacques. Limited Inc.
University Press, 1972.

Evanston: Northwestern

Margins of Philosophy. Translated by Alan Bass.
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982.

Descartes, Rene. The Philosophical Works of Descartes.
Translated by Elizabeth s. Haldane and G.R.T. Ross. Vol
II. London: Cambridge University Press, 1984.
Eagleton, Terry.
"Where Do Postmodernists Come From?"
Monthly Review 47 (July/August 1995): 59-70.
Edelson, Marshall. Hypotheses and Evidence in
Psychoanalysis. Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1984.
Engels, Friedrich. The Origin of the Family, Private
Property and the state. With an Introduction by Eleanor
Burke Leacock. New York: International Publishers,
1972.
Flax, Jane.
"Do Feminists Need Marxism?" Quest 3 (Summer
1976): 46-58.
"Psychoanalysis and the Philosophy of Science:
Critique or Resistance." Journal of Philosophy, LXXVII,
10 {October 1981): 561-569.
"Postmodernism and Gender Relations in Feminist
Theory." In Feminism/Postmodernism, ed. Linda
Nicholson, 39-62. New York: Routledge, 1990.
Thinking Fragments: Psychoanalysis, Feminism, and
Postmodernism in the Contemporary West. Berkeley:

225
University of California Press, 1990.
Disputed Subjects: Essays on Psychoanalysis,
Politics, and Philosophy. New York: Routledge, 1993.
"Multiples: On the Contemporary Politics of
Subjectivity." Human Studies 16 (April 1993): 33-49.
Foucault, Michel. The History of Sexuality, Volume I: An
Introduction.
Translated by Robert Hurley. New York:
Vintage Books, 1978.
Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison.
Translated by Alan Sheridan. New York: Vintage books,
1979.
Power/knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other
Writings, 1972-1977. Translated and edited by Colin
Gordon. New York: Pantheon Books, 1980.
"The Subject and Power." Afterward in Hubert
Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond
Structuralism and Hermeneutics, 208-226. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1982.
Fraser, Nancy. Unruly Practices: Power, Discourse and
Gender in Contemporary Social Theory. Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1989.
"False Antithesis: A Response to Seyla Benhabib
and Judith Butler." In Feminist Contentions: A
Philosophical Exchange, ed. Linda Nicholson, 59-74. New
York: Routledge, 1995.
"Pragmatism, Feminism, and the Linguistic Turn."
In Feminist Contentions: A Philosophical Exchange, ed.
Linda Nicholson, 157-171. New York: Routledge, 1995.
Freud, Sigmund. The Ego and the Id. Edited by James
Strachey, translated by Joan Riviere. New York: W.W.
Norton, 1960.
Civilization and Its Discontents. Translated and
edited by James Strachey, with an Introduction by Peter
Gay. New York: W.W. Norton, 1961.
"Female Sexuality." In The Standard Edition of
The Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud.
Edited and Translated by James Strachey. Vol XXI.
London: The Hogarth Press, 1961.
The Standard Edition of the Complete

226

Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud.
Edited and
Translated by James Strachey. Vol. XIII, Totem and
Taboo. London: Hogarth Press, 1964.

"Femininity." In The Standard Edition of the
Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. Edited
and Translated by James Strachey. Vol. XXII,New
Introductory Lectures on Psycho-analysis. London:
Hogarth Press, 1965.
The Standard Edition of the Complete
Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. Edited and
Translated by James Strachey. Vol. XXIII, Moses and
Monotheism: Three Essays.
London: Hogarth Press, 1966.

Fromm, Erich.

Marx's Concept of Man. New York: Ungar, 1966.

Gay, Peter. Freud: A Life For our Time. New York: W.W.
Norton & Company, 1988.
Goldberg, Arnold. The Prisonhouse of Psychoanalysis.
Hillsdale, NJ: Analytic Press, 1990.
Gould, Carol c. Marx's Social Ontology. Cambridge: MIT
Press, 1978.
Grunbaum, Adolf.
"Epistemological Liabilities of the
Critical Appraisal of Psychoanalytic Theory." Nous XIV,
3 (September 1980): 307-386.
Validation in the Clinical Theory of
Psychoanalysis. Madison: International Universities
Press, 1993.

Hartman, Heidi.
"The Unhappy Marriage of Marxism and
Feminism: Towards a More Progressive Union." In Women
and Revolution: A Discussion of the Unhappy Marriage of
Marxism and Feminism, ed. Lydia Sargent, 1-41. Boston:
south End Press, 1981.
Hoy, David Couzens, ed. Foucault: A Critical Reader.
London: Basil Blackwell, 1986.
Husserl, Edmund.
Ideas: General Introduction to Pure
Phenomenology. Translated by W.R. Boyce Gibson. New
York: Collier Books, 1931.
Cartesian Meditations. Translated by Dorion
Cairns. Boston & London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,
1960.

Leacock, Eleanor Burke. Introduction to The Origin of the

227
Family, Private Property and the State by Friedrich
Engels. New York: International Publishers, 1972.

Lerner, Gerda.
The Creation of Patriarchy. New York:
Oxford University Press, 1986.
Lyotard, Jean-Francios. The Postmodern Condition: A Report
on Knowledge. Translated by Geoff Bennington and Brian
Massumi. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
1984.
Martin, Emily. The Woman in the Body: Cultural Analysis of
Reproduction. Boston: Beacon Press, 1992.
Marx, Karl. Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844.
Translated by T.B. Bottomore. In Marx's Concept of Man
by Erich Fromm, 87-196. New York: Unger, 1966.
Capital: A Critical Analysis of Capitalist
Production. Edited by Frederick Engels. New York:
International Publishers, 1967.
The Grundrisse. Translated by M. Nicolaus. New
York: Vintage Books, 1973.

Marx, Karl and Friedrich Engels. The Communist Manifesto.
New York: Washington Square Press, 1965.
Marx, Karl and Frederick Engels. Karl Marx and Frederick
Engels Collected Works.
Vol. 3, Marx and Engels 18431844. New York: New World Publishers, 1975.
Marx, Karl and Frederick Engels. Karl Marx and Frederick
Engels Collected Works. Vol. 5, Marx and Engels 18451847. New York: New World Publishers, 1976.
Marx, Karl and Friedrich Engels. The Marx-Engels Reader. 2d
ed. Edited by Robert C. Tucker. New York: W.W. Norton &
Company, 1978.
Morgan, Lewis.
Ancient Society. Edited by Eleanor Burke
Leacock. New York: World Publishing Company, 1963.
Nicholson, Linda, ed.
Routledge, 1990.

Feminism/Postmodernism. New York:

Nietzsche, Friedrich. On the Genealogy of Morals.
Translated by Walter Kaufman. New York: Vintage, 1969.
Ollman, Bertel!.
Alienation: Marx's Conception of Man in
Capitalist Society. Cambridge: At The University Press,
1971.

228

Plato.
The Republic. Translated by G.M.A. Grube.
Indianapolis: Hackett, 1974.
Rabinow, Paul, ed.
Books, 1984.

The Foucault Reader. New York: Pantheon

Sawicki, Jana. Disciplining Foucault: Feminism, Power, and
the Body. New York: Routledge, 1991.
Schmitt, Richard. Introduction to Marx and Engels: A
Critical Reconstruction. Boulder: Westview Press, 1987.
Schweickart, David. Against Capitalism. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1993.
Sheridan, Alan. Michel Foucault: The Will To Know. London:
Tavistock Publications, 1980.
Smart, Barry. Foucault, Marxism and Critique. London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983.
"The Politics of Truth and the Problem of
Hegemony." In Foucault: A Critical Reader, ed. David
Couzens Hoy, 157-173. London: Basil Blackwell, 1986.
Tong, Rosemarie. Feminist Thought: A Comprehensive
Introduction. Boulder: Westview Press, 1989.
Wood, Ellen Meiksins.
"What is the 'Postmodern' Agenda? An
Introduction." Monthly Review 47 (July/August 1995): 112.

Young, Iris. Throwing Like A Girl and Other Essays in
Feminist Philosophy and Social Theory. Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1990.

VITA

Ann Victoria Dolinko was born in Chicago, Illinois on March
27, 1964.

She graduated cum laude from Lake Forest College

in 1985, with a Bachelor of Arts degree in philosophy and
psychology.

She began taking graduate courses in philosophy

at Loyola University Chicago in 1987, and began full-time
graduate studies under a graduate assistantship in the Fall
of 1989.

She received a Master of Arts degree in philosophy

in 1989.

She was granted a graduate assistantship in

philosophy from 1989 to 1992.

She was awarded a University

Teaching Fellowship for 1992-93, a graduate assistantship in
Women's Studies for 1993-94, and a Schmitt Dissertation
Fellowship for 1994-95.

In 1993 she was also awarded the

Presidents Medallion for excellence in scholarship,
leadership and service.
In 1987 she gave a paper to the Philosophy Honors
Society of Lake Forest College entitled, "The Juxtaposition
of the Cogito and Dasein: Heidegger and Descartes on
Subjectivity."

In 1992 she again presented a paper to the

Philosophy Honors Society of Lake Forest College, this one
called "Performing the Scene of Gender: Irigaray, Butler,
and Beauvoir.''

In 1993 she presented a paper at the Midwest
229

230

Scholars and Activist Conference called, "Performing the
Self as Actor: Emancipatory Strategies for Women.''

In 1996

she presented a paper to the Eastern Division Meeting of the
American Philosophical Association titled, "A Postmodern
Feminist Critique of Morality."
In 1993 Ann Dolinko compiled a gender neutral language
pamphlet, which was distributed throughout Loyola
University.

That same year she was the founder and director

of the Loyola University Undergraduate Feminist Forum.

In

1991 she was the co-founder and co-director of the Loyola
University Graduate Feminist Forum.
From 1991-1996 she has taught sections of Introductory
Philosophy, Metaphysics, Epistemology, Political Philosophy,
Women's Studies, Continental Philosophy, Feminist
Philosophy, Philosophy of Social Science, and Postmodern
Philosophy in the Philosophy Department of Loyola University
Chicago, at Oakton Community College, and at Shimer College.

DISSERTATION APPROVAL SHEET
The dissertation submitted by Ann Victoria Dolinko
has been read and approved by the following committee:
David Schweickart, Ph.D., Director
Professor, Philosophy
Loyola University Chicago
Pamela Caughie, Ph.D.
Associate Professor, English
Loyola University Chicago
David Ingram, Ph.D.
Professor, Philosophy
Loyola University Chicago
The final copies have been examined by the director of the
dissertation and the signature which appears below verifies
the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated
and that the dissertation is now given final approval by the
committee with reference to content and form.
The dissertation is, therefore, accepted in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

D;~~~ ~f :h:losophy.
Date

0j ~
Director's signature

